106. Airgram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State0
G–38. Customary summer pause finds Polish situation basically unchanged since beginning of year but country subjected to new pressures, few of them favorable.
Major influence has been sharpening East-West post-summit tensions,1 making regime more wary of Western contacts while adhering outwardly to business-as-usual attitude. Press reporting and comment on U.S. policies have been variably sharp but apparently moderated on occasion to conform with hopes and prospects (recently fulfilled) of further American credit assistance.
Perceptible change seems to have occurred in discussion of “co-existence question” which Gomulka apparently felt called upon to re-define for Poland after Bucharest Communist gathering.2 Earlier doctrine outlined by Party thinker Adam Schaff late May and described as official was to effect “socialist” and capitalist states could compete peacefully, even on mutually profitable basis, while continuing ideological struggle. Greater influence assigned to socialist camp due enhanced Soviet power position but cultural contacts and effects of time and universal change admitted by Schaff as factor reducing mistrust. In authoritative Katowice speech early July3 Gomulka reverted to standard designation of Western capitalist nations as “imperialists,” affirming in essence that prospect for peace lies in present ability socialist bloc to impose its will. “Constructive co-existence” is given third priority in latest list of objectives stated by FonMin Rapacki, following after proletarian unity and solidarity with colonial emancipation.
Shift is doubtless reflection of Polish aim to maintain reputation for orthodoxy within Communist bloc. Distinct and sometimes outspoken disagreement (as in WFTU meeting at Peking)4 has been evident with ChiCom stand on co-existence, but in honoring commitment of trust in Khrushchev, Poles apparently feel safe in going as far as Soviets in seeking compromise.
[Page 289]In practice Polish foreign policy has marked time under shadow of Soviet initiatives, perhaps not always pleasing in themselves, by requiring Poland to stand up and be counted in prominent positions it sought in UNSC and disarmament talks. Standard anti-Adenauer campaign is main theme pressed with vigor, although feeble overtures continue with aim of promoting neutralism in Scandinavian countries. Writing off of U.S. as active political factor pending elections apparently not stressed to same degree as by Soviets, and U.S. ability to react to interim crises probably not underestimated. Private Polish official justification for Khrushchev’s Summit behavior is sharp warning was necessary to forestall U.S. provocative incidents affecting Berlin. Unspecified Polish fears hint at sharpening of Berlin conflict before year’s end.
Sense of fatalistic uneasiness has not disturbed outward calm of domestic scene where state of economy is chief preoccupation. Intellectuals seem to have reached lowest point of degradation since war, with their leaders frustrated, by-passed for the moment, but materially accommodated. Church-State tug-of-war has continued in sporadic incidents which neither side has forced to conclusion, although pressure maintained on church teaching institutions. Apparently for prestige reasons both sides reluctant to revive work of mixed committees, church in any event preferring stand off until fall.
Pressure on peasants has not materially increased, due doubtless to greater need for relying on them during difficult crop year, as well as due to slow organizational pace of agricultural circles aggravated by continued lack of leadership cadres. On other hand there has been general tightening up especially in cultural field where preference for Eastern products has been made more explicit and dealings with West require higher approval. While police have been only slightly more aggressive, attempts at greater discipline pervade. This seems to have become larger issue now in Central Committee whose debates reportedly reflect efforts by dogmatic planners to prevail over pragmatists and moderates in interest of solving economic troubles.
On economic side especially, deflationary program has enhanced financial, investment and labor discipline, and impressive production and productivity gains registered. Rapid increases achieved in producers goods production with less favorable results engineering and light industry. Significant shortages of rolled goods, pig iron and electric power noted. Deflationary program also created own problems including accumulated stocks several consumer durables and some unemployment and decline living standards. These accompanied by popular dissatisfaction reflected in sporadic, short-lived labor disturbances in first quarter. Large scale changes in work norms, work organization and producers prices effected in attempt rationalize the economy. Effects [Page 290] probably favorable with however some disruption orderly planning and production.
Some economic gains appear represent windfall profits from general tightening, particularly introduction of an element of uncertainty, even fear, into the labor force regarding job security. Further deterioration balance of trade noted with imports increasing during first half year faster than exports. Growing centralizing tendencies apparent in increasing Planning Commission powers, reorganization scientific and technical bodies, creation Labor and Wage Committee, etc.
Until now regime’s economic program characterized in practice by considerable flexibility. However, recent decisions to step up planned heavy industrial production and investments for 1961–1965 and to reduce housing suggest stiffer tendency prolong consumer sacrifice in determined effort give economy necessary impetus. At same time, regime apparently realizes deflation perhaps carried too far. Some price and wage tax reductions announced, and top level decision other counter-deflationary measures seems pending.
Regime agricultural policy still stresses encouragement and persuasion. Private farmers continue to invest and demonstrate some interest in mechanization. However, weather has failed to cooperate, and although increased hog and cattle numbers reported, important rye crop will be reduced with other crops probably normal. Probably realistically, 1961–1965 agricultural production goals recently reduced and investments increased.
Prospects through year’s end are for further favorable development industrial production, perhaps hampered by increasing supply and coordination difficulties, some possibility of wage increases or price reductions on overstocked consumer durables. Heavy demands upon population, particularly industrial labor force, likely to continue however with possibility some revival labor unrest.
Within this far from encouraging setting, important factors will be regime’s willingness and ability to direct labor force through incentives rather than compulsion, and to withstand pressures tending to upset political compromises which have so far preserved stability.
Department please pass as desired.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 748.00/8–560. Confidential. Drafted by Beam and Lee T. Stull, Second Secretary at the Embassy.↩
- Reference is to the abortive summit meeting in Paris in May 1960.↩
- Reference is to the meeting of Communist Party leaders from all the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia except Yugoslavia held in Bucharest June 20–25.↩
- A summary of Gomulka’s July 6 speech in Katowice is in despatch 6 from Warsaw, July 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 748.00(W)/7–860)↩
- At the World Federation of Trade Unions’ 11th General Council session in Peking June 5–9, the Chinese Communists challenged the, correctness of the Soviet Union’s “peaceful co-existence” line.↩