98. Memorandum of Conversation0
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Arthur Sylvester, Newark News
- Jack Leacacos, Cleveland Plain Dealer
- Andrew H. Berding, Assistant Secretary
In response to questions the Secretary said that the Summit Conference might well open with Khrushchev’s proposal for separate peace treaties with the two Germanies. The Secretary confirmed that we had [Page 246] been thinking about proposing an internationally supervised plebiscite on this subject in Germany. We have particularly in mind East Germany. Khrushchev has been emphasizing the right of peoples to self-determination. In his speech at Kabul recently he went way beyond former statements and talked about Lenin’s principles of nationality and said that all peoples are entitled to self-determination. This idea, we believe, should also be applied to East Germany.
As for Adenauer’s proposal at the National Press Club for a plebiscite in West Berlin, this took us by surprise. Adenauer’s idea that the plebiscite should be conducted by the occupying powers is not a good one, since it would not be regarded by world opinion as a free vote. The election of December, 1958, which had the effect of a plebiscite did not involve the three Western powers and was conducted by the municipality. It probably would be difficult to arrange this before the Summit meeting. Another difficulty would be what question would be submitted to the people in the plebiscite?
Off the record, the Secretary said there had been a considerable discussion with Adenauer on this subject at the dinner at the German Embassy Wednesday night. Adenauer was adamantly opposed to a suggestion that he invite an international body of observers to observe such a plebiscite in West Berlin. It was pointed out to him that this would set a good precedent so that a similar group could observe a plebiscite in East Germany. It was mentioned to him that the Russians said that the elections in 1958 had been conducted at the point of allied bayonets. Adenauer objected to the idea of foreign observers. He also seemed to demonstrate no interest at all in the idea of a plebiscite in East Germany.
Still off the record, the Secretary said that another surprising after dinner conversation had occurred with Adenauer getting into a vigorous argument with men like John McCloy, AI Gruenther, David Bruce, Red Dowling and others who are good friends of the Chancellor. The argument developed out of Adenauer’s statement that by 1965 the Russians would have surpassed the United States economically. The others advanced many arguments to show that this was not possible, but Adenauer did not seem convinced. End off the record.
The Secretary said that Adenauer’s attitude is conditioned by what seems to be his determination to run again in the elections next year. Feeling that Mayor Brandt of West Berlin will be his rival candidate, he feels he has to maintain a stronger stand on Berlin than Brandt himself. Even though Berlin is not a part of West Germany, Brandt does qualify under the constitution as a candidate.
As for the Summit Conference, it is possible to expect something to be done with regard to disarmament, depending on what happens in the disarmament discussions in Geneva. If certain agreements are [Page 247] virtually reached, they might be firmed up at the Summit. The same thing might be true with regard to the suspension of nuclear testing. East-West relations will also be discussed, but there is no agenda for the Summit. As for Berlin, Adenauer greatly fears that if we start at the Summit where we left off at Geneva, we will make further concessions. He does not want any change in the status of Berlin at all. If the Russians raise the matter of separate peace treaties, the Summit Conference will probably start from the beginning of the Geneva Conference.
As for what deGaulle’s attitude will be at the Summit, we will know more about that after Khrushchev’s visit to Paris.1 This will be an interesting meeting, with a couple of Tartars clashing head on. It is likely that deGaulle will talk turkey to Khrushchev. DeGaulle believes that Khrushchev’s attitude toward Berlin will be an acid test of whether he wants anything to come out of the Summit. The Russians have adopted only a minimum of an attitude on Algeria, which is surprising because the Arab States have ganged up on this issue.
The Secretary admitted that there was much unfinished business after the conversations between the President and deGaulle in Paris last September,2 but the matter of France’s participation in NATO is going better.
The question of the East European satellites might be raised by the western powers at the Summit Conference. This would be related to the idea of self-determination as expressed by Khrushchev. We are still holding conversations on this subject.
As to whether the Germans will be in the wings at the Summit Conference as they were at the 1955 Summit, the Secretary said he did not know. The President is expected to get to Paris early on Sunday, May 15, but we do not yet know whether Adenauer will come to Paris for a conference with him and Macmillan and deGaulle. Much will depend on whether the lines of the Western positions are clear enough by that time. There will be a Foreign Ministers Meeting in Paris a couple of days before the Summit.
As to Khrushchev’s statement that neither side should rock the boat before the Summit Conference, the Secretary commented that despite this statement Khrushchev has said adverse things himself which have tended to rock the boat. The Secretary said our decision on the high altitude flights to Berlin had nothing to do with the Summit Conference. Likewise it was not a quid pro quo for the Soviet decision on passes for the Liaison Missions.3
[Page 248]Informed by Mr. Sylvester that he had been quoted following a meeting on the Hill as having told a Congressional committee that we were prepared to recognize East Germany in exchange for a free corridor to West Berlin, the Secretary said this was not true. There had been something like this informally tossed around in the Defense Department; the proposal would have been for a hundred kilometer-wide corridor and if the Soviets refused that, we would fall back to sixty kilometers; but the Secretary said he had not entertained any such idea himself, and he did not know what Defense’s quid pro quo would have been.
The Secretary acknowledged that the Soviets could always put effective indirect pressure on West Berlin through an economic squeeze. The President has said that the situation in West Berlin is abnormal, and this was misconstrued; but the fact is the situation is abnormal in that Berlin lies one hundred ten miles inside hostile territory. Nevertheless, the spirit of the people is wonderful; there is a great deal of new building going on, including the construction of speedways through and around the city.
The Secretary said that something on the Middle East might come up at the Summit, perhaps in the nature of a proposal by the Russians for an arms embargo. The Russians might also propose a guarantee of the status quo in the Middle East. That would raise the question of the border between Israel and neighboring States. The Arabs would scream at such a proposal. We ourselves would go as far as anybody to keep the peace, but we don’t know what our attitude will be on this question as yet.
The 1950 Tripartite Declaration on the Middle East4 still stands as far as we are concerned. The question of an arms embargo might also be raised with regard to Africa, and in either case produces a real headache because the nations of those areas, particularly the new nations, would claim that any embargo on arms shipments to them was an infringement of their sovereignty. Ben Gurion did not raise with us the question of United States arms supplies for Israel.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Backgrounder. Confidential. Drafted by Berding on March 21.↩
- Khrushchev was scheduled to visit France March 23-April 3.↩
- See Document 10.↩
- For documentation on the question of passes for the Allied Military Liaison Missions to travel in East Germany, see Documents 283 ff.↩
- For text of this declaration, May 25, 1950, see American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. II, p. 2237.↩