78. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State0

2147. German Amb called on me today to ask my opinion of his analysis current situation of Berlin and German problems. He read from written document which he is presumably submitting to his govt. Main points follow.

Khrushchev wishes to settle these problems by negotiation rather than by ultimatum and unilateral action but is unwilling to wait indefinitely.
Khrushchev desires appointment of all-German commission to deal with reunification problem. If such commission were appointed it is unclear whether he would insist upon a provisional Berlin solution or would be willing to leave matters as they are.
It is unclear whether Khrushchev would accept any Berlin solution which did not provide for the end of occupation status.
If Khrushchev does not get a Berlin solution or important step toward solution German problem he will proceed with separate peace treaty although it unclear how quickly this would be done.
Ulbricht recently mentioned possibility Sov bloc concluding peace treaty with East Germany and Western Powers concluding peace treaty with Western Germany. It is unclear what Khrushchev position is on this problem.

I told Amb I agreed generally with his analysis subject to foil comments. With respect to point 5 it appeared to me Khrushchev’s position was clear as Sovs had frequently mentioned this possibility which [Page 194] clearly was unacceptable to West. With respect to point 2 I thought his attitude on Berlin question would depend upon how far West would go toward a solution of over-all problem. For example, if commission was obliged to complete its work by early fixed date he would obviously be less insistent on Berlin solution.

From subsequent discussion it was clear that Amb’s personal view is that best way to avoid showdown on Berlin and gain time is to agree to some sort of all-German commission although he would prefer to have it in form of technical talks or meeting of delegations. I gathered however that he was very dubious that Adenauer would agree to such solution.

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

I told Kroll I thought that in determining its policy West should carefully examine alternative courses of action in event agreement not reached at summit and Khrushchev proceeded with separate treaty. Amb fully agreed. I expressed personal observation that it appeared to me Adenauer, suspecting weakness on part of West—particularly Brit and US—was attempting to offset this by being unduly rigid which would make difficult coordination of Western position. Amb indicated he personally agreed with this observation.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2–1660. Secret; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London and Paris.