Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

75. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, February 5, 1960, 6 p.m.

1468. Paris pass USRO. Adenauer will be unhappy re nature of further Summit preparations outlined Deptel 1658.¹ As reported in my telegram 1432 (sent Department only), Brentano was explicit in saying Germans could accept no changes in Foreign Ministers and heads of government meetings, and this was also made clear by von Walther in Paris (Polto 288) as condition for German acceptance demise of Steering Committee.²

I would hope therefore that if proposal decided upon, it could be put forward to Chancellor in positive sense as giving satisfaction to Italians and smaller NATO powers without impinging too much upon our prior commitment to him re quadripartite meetings. To do this, it seems to me following would be required:

1. Rescheduling of proposed meetings of Foreign Ministers so that first and second would be quadripartite on Germany including Berlin, these to be followed by meeting of three with Spaak, then that of five on disarmament, and series concluded with meeting of Six with President.

2. Renewed assurance of full if informal consultations with Germans on disarmament and East-West relations prior to Foreign Ministers meetings.

3. A binding commitment to him that if above schedule of Foreign Ministers meeting accepted we will hold fast to original concept of meeting of heads of government on quadripartite basis.

I believe further that foregoing must be presented to Chancellor as US suggestion at least simultaneously with approach to British and French, rather than proposal already agreed to tripartitely. This would give him feeling of being consulted instead of being faced with fait accompli. [3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

I do not mean to imply changes indicated above would make proposal palatable to Adenauer. At best, it might elicit counter-proposal or perhaps even reluctant consent, rather than flat rejection and strong reaction which any tripartite proposal as outlined reference telegram would most surely bring.³

Dowling

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/2–560. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, and Ottawa.
1. Dated February 3, telegram 1658 to Bonn transmitted a draft schedule of the April 13–14 sessions at the Foreign Ministers meeting, which had a session on disarmament first and did not include the West Germans. (Ibid., 396.1–PA/2–360)
2. See footnote 3, Document 73.
3. Following further comments from London, Paris, and Rome on the schedule of sessions, the Embassy in Bonn was instructed on February 11 to see the Chancellor and suggest a schedule that had the first Foreign Ministers meeting discussing Germany including Berlin, followed by a five-power meeting on disarmament. (Telegram 1739 to Bonn; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/2–1160) Dowling met with Adenauer on February 15, informed him of this draft schedule, and assured him that the four-power Western summit meeting in May would not be affected by any arrangements for the Foreign Ministers meeting. The Chancellor agreed to the schedule, saying that he saw advantages to all concerned. (Telegram 1544 from Bonn, February 15; ibid., 396.1–WA/2–1560)