Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

48. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, December 8, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Summit Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

• British Embassy
  • Ambassador Caccia
  • Minister Hood
  • Mr. Greenhill
  • Mr. Logan
• Department of State
  • Secretary of State Herter
  • Mr. Kohler, EUR
  • Mr. McSweeney, SOV
• German Embassy
  • Ambassador Grewe
  • Mr. Pauls
  • Mr. Osterheld
• French Embassy
  • Ambassador Alphand
  • Minister Lebel
  • Mr. Winckler
  • Mr. Manet

The Secretary opened the discussion saying he wished to introduce an extraneous subject. A telegram from the President at Karachi¹ referred to a New York Times despatch from Bonn alleging United States intent to withdraw its forces from Europe. The Secretary wished to make the following statement:

• “1. There have been press reports alleging that the U.S. will eventually withdraw its forces from Europe.
• “2. These reports represent a totally false conception of how the U.S. assesses its long-range security interests and of our commitment to NATO.
• “3. As long as the Soviet threat exists and as long as our collective defense effort continues, American troops will remain an effective part of the military shield in Europe. There will be no withdrawal.
• “4. We also believe that certain NATO nations have a special obligation to examine their respective contributions.
• “5. Although we believe that their proportional contributions should be increased, we have never hinted that this would involve U.S. withdrawal.”

Ambassador Alphand said he was grateful for the statement. He did not know the origin of the Times story but suggested that it might have developed as speculation based on press comment in the United States recently regarding balance of payments, etc. In response to Lord Hood’s inquiry, the Secretary said the remarks he had just made would not be published. Ambassador Grewe was assured that a copy of the remarks would be given each of the Embassies at the end of the meeting.

The Secretary then proceeded to discuss the record of Washington consultations (HGP D–O/l).² With regard to timing, he assumed that the dates April 21 to 26 were acceptable. He mentioned the un-desirability of publishing the terminal date of the conversations since it might be that the meetings would conclude earlier than that time. In fact, the President’s available time should be considered as April 21 to 25 since he must be back in Washington on the 27th.

The Secretary mentioned that the 10-nation disarmament group preparatory work will be going on at the same time as the pre-summit preparations and he would hope that these discussions could take place in the same city for purposes of coordination. He said that Washington has been suggested and this would be agreeable to the United States if the others so desired, although we would be ready to consider any other city that might appear more convenient to the others.

The question of consultation with NATO, the Secretary said, presents a difficulty as regards the possibility of premature disclosure of substantive matters in view of the gap between the Western summit in December and the East-West summit in April. The first meeting therefore should not deal with substance but rather leave this for preparations which would take place early next year. He felt that NATO would be satisfied if it had the feeling it was being filled in from time to time during the preparatory interval. Ambassador Caccia said that while the U.K. is doubtful about the United States suggestion for a Spaak representative in the Working Group, the U.K. felt that something of substance must be said to NATO. Ambassador Grewe asked if the recent Geneva experience was not a good example since NATO seemed to be satisfied with the method used then. The Secretary mentioned that the Foreign Ministers had taken turns in discussing problems with NAC. Ambassador Alphand noted the difference between discussions with the Soviets and the deliberations of a Working Group since in the latter case you would not want to give advance information of subjects proposed to governments for consideration. While NATO must be kept informed, he felt the Working Group governments could say something without saying everything and that the decision as to the content of the reports could be made on a day to day basis. Ambassador Caccia pointed out that the regular weekly meetings of NAC would be available to receive reports which, as Minister Hood pointed out, could become more frequent as time goes on. The Ambassador said that the U.K. would prefer that the Spaak liaison officer idea not be pressed since this arrangement would deprive the participants of the power of choice of the kind of reports that should be made to NATO.

Commenting on the section entitled Psychological Factors, the Secretary mentioned that caution is necessary in order not to give the impression that we are going to the summit without hope of success and so assume blame for a conference failure. We should state the fact, which is that “we just don’t know”. Instead of being very pessimistic we should steer a middle course. Ambassador Alphand suggested a minor revision of the last paragraph to the effect that efforts would be directed toward keeping public expectations in balance rather than limiting public expectations. On the question of disarmament the Secretary raised the matter of timing of the 10-nation group in relation to the summit. Noting, however, that the announcement of the 10-nation group referred to its beginning work early in the year, he suggested that Western consultations should begin about February 1. If it were decided at Paris to begin the 10-nation negotiations prior to the summit, this would permit six weeks for Western consultation before convening the 10-nation group, on or about March 15.

Regarding the section entitled Germany, Including Berlin, the Secretary said that the list of questions which had been proposed was in no way an attempt to pre-judge the issues. We hoped that the Western summit would go far enough in providing answers, even if negative, so that the Working Group could have a clear picture of the scope of its activities. Ambassador Alphand suggested that Annex III on this subject be designated an American paper; in this case the French reservation to the Annex could be withdrawn. This would be advisable to avoid any indication of a split among the four nations. After it was agreed that this could be done, Ambassador Alphand said that the questionnaire included in Annex III cannot, in the French view, form a basis for discussion by the Heads of Government; Paris thinks the questions unjustifiably lead to the conclusion that a new status for Berlin is possible. When the Secretary suggested that it would certainly be within the President’s rights to introduce these questions for discussion, Ambassador Alphand conceded that this was so. Ambassador Grewe said that the Germans were reluctant about the questionnaire because the essence of the paper indicated that it is possible to find a new Berlin solution, whereas this question has been discussed for a long time without any new solutions being found. The Germans feel that to commit experts to finding some new solution would be dangerous. The Secretary reiterated that there was no attempt to prejudge the issues and that the United States hoped for discussion of these questions even if the answers proved to be negative. Ambassador Caccia pointed out that to exclude consideration of the questions raised would also pre-judge the results of Heads of Government consideration. Ambassador Alphand said that this was something the Heads of Government would have to decide for themselves.

The Secretary noted the French suggestion for discussion of East-West relations and pointed out that an arrangement which would avoid rivalry in arms shipments to newly emergent and neutral nations could be a profitable field for discussion and even agreement.

In response to the Secretary’s inquiry regarding the French item on aid to underdeveloped areas, Ambassador Alphand said that the French do not propose discussion of the substance at this time. They wish only to have the Annex included as part of the record.

The Secretary presented a draft interim report to NATO³ which, after minor amendment, it was agreed could be presented orally to NAC December 9 by the United States Permanent Representative on condition that the statement would not be circulated as a NATO document but that a text would be available with the Secretary General for examination by NAC members. The Secretary then suggested that the “record of consultations”, after appropriate editing, might be circulated to NATO a day or two before the Ministerial meeting to form the basis of an oral statement which, he hoped, could be made by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. He felt that if we can distribute something it will give the NATO members a feeling of participation which they would not get from an oral presentation alone. Ambassador Caccia said he would put forward the question of a Selwyn Lloyd statement to London. It was agreed that the “consultative group” would meet December 9 to undertake the task of editing the paper. Ambassador Alphand had reservations about the extent to which the content of the record of consultations could be made available and suggested that the edited version should be limited to the body of the record excluding Annexes. He mentioned that there will be a NATO Ministerial Meeting subsequent to the Western Heads of Government meeting at which perhaps fuller explanation could be given. He did agree, however, that something must be said to the Ministerial Meeting next week which is more than the sketchy report to be presented to NAC December 9. Lord Hood suggested that some of the Annexes could not be considered dangerous. It was agreed that the content of the edited paper will be determined by the “consultative group”.

Ambassador Alphand reverted to portion A of the record of consultations regarding timing. He said he had instructions from Paris which contained the French view that recommendations concerning the date and place of the East-West summit are not within the competence of the Washington representatives. The record of consultations, therefore, cannot properly contain precise proposals. In any event, the French are not sure that Geneva is the best site for such a conference in view of its unhappy history. It was suggested and agreed that the section regarding date and place should be alerted to indicate that it was a United States proposal.

At the Secretary’s request, Ambassador Caccia reviewed London’s suggestion regarding the handling of press at the Western summit. This proposal involved determination by the four participants of the basic press line, which would be conveyed to the press officers of each of the delegations just prior to the end of each meeting. The subsequent individual briefings by delegations would then be uniform and in accord with the agreed line.

It was agreed that, with respect to today’s meeting, the press should be informed simply that it had to do with continuing preparations for the Western summit meeting.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–859. Secret. Drafted by McSweeney and approved by S on December 11.
1. President Eisenhower was in Karachi on December 8 as part of his “good will” tour. The telegram under reference has not been found.
2. No copy of this draft report has been found. The report as revised by the working group in light of the comments made at this meeting, HGP D–O/lb, December 10, comprised three sections: I) Procedures and Arrangements, II) Scope, and III) Annexes, of which there were six. (Department of State, EUR/SOV Files: Lot 64 D 291, Germany) Another copy of the report, with only two annexes, was circulated as NMM Ref–1/102, December 8. It was intended for the use of the NATO Ministerial Meeting delegation. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1554)
3. A copy of this report was transmitted in Topol 1082 to Paris, December 8 at 8:42 p.m. (Ibid., Central Files, 740.5/12–859)