Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

294. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (White) to Secretary of State Herter⁰

Washington, August 12, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Military Liaison Missions in Germany

During recent weeks the United States, British, and French Military Liaison Missions to the Soviet Forces in Germany have been subjected to systematic and continuous harassment which has not only made it difficult for them to carry out [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] functions [1 line of source text not declassified] but has even raised the question whether the closing of the Mission, probably upon the basis of a request by the “GDR” to the Soviet Forces, may not be anticipated in the near future.

Western Mission tours have been frequently “tailed” and often detained by East German police in plain clothes. There have been incidents in which the East German police have assaulted and arrested Mission personnel. Harassment of the British Mission reached the point where the British found it necessary to suspend travel in the Soviet Zone temporarily. Soviet responses to Allied protests about these incidents have been quite unsatisfactory. Moreover, large areas of the Soviet Zone have been placed “off limits” for Mission travel. At the same time, the East German propaganda media have made much of the intelligence activities of the Western Missions. Ulbricht, for example, has claimed that “aggressive war plans” have been seized from Western Mission personnel.

There seems to be general agreement on the United States side and among the Three Powers that the Missions have sufficient value [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to warrant their continuation as long as possible. At the same time there also seems to be general agreement that we must make it clear to the Soviets that their Missions will not be permitted [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] privileges in the Federal Republic which the Western Missions do not enjoy in the Soviet Zone.

The British and French had originally suggested a verbal warning to the Soviets, but on the United States side a mere warning was considered inadequate. Ambassador Dowling considered such a warning weak and thought the only real reprisal would be to restrict the movement of the Soviet Missions, which he felt would entail a risk of the Missions’ being closed. General Norstad preferred a reprisal program to a verbal warning and, while he thought there might be an advantage in maintaining the Missions as long as possible, he believed that the Soviets might be preparing to put an end to them.

Meanwhile, General Eddleman had already begun reciprocal harassment of the Soviet Mission in Frankfurt on July 28. On August 4 he reported that he had ceased reciprocal harassment because it already appeared to have had the desired effect. A few days ago, General Cassels, Commander in Chief of the British Army of the Rhine, also began reciprocal harassment of the Soviet Mission accredited to him.

The British Embassy informed us yesterday (August 11) that General Cassels is going to Berlin on August 20 for a short visit and that he may take this occasion to call on the Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, General Yakubovski. At the Foreign Secretary’s suggestion, General Cassels proposes to speak to General Yakubovski along the following lines:

It is dangerous to permit the East Germans to continue to harass the Western Missions, and General Cassels trusts General Yakubovski will do something about the situation. General Cassels has found it necessary to take certain retaliatory measures against the Soviet Mission to his headquarters and, if harassment of the British Mission does not cease, he will have to make retaliation a fixed policy. Although General Cassels is not speaking for the Americans and the French, there has been the closest liaison among the Three Powers on the subject and what he has said is in accordance with American and French views.

The British Embassy has asked for our concurrence in such a statement to Yakubovski. Ambassador Caccia will probably repeat this request when he sees you today.¹

We have informed Defense of the British approach and they tell us they cannot concur with it. Defense believes that there is nothing to be gained by giving the question recognition at the Cassels-Yakubovski level and that making a threat of reciprocal harassment is a weak way to handle the matter. Furthermore, Defense believes that General Yakubovski might take refuge behind the fact the Western Missions have been harassed by East Germans to complain that General Cassels is threatening to act against the Soviet Mission in a way in which the Soviets themselves are not acting against the Western Mission.

Defense believes that it is preferable to resort to actual reciprocal harassment, as necessary, without explanations or threats. Defense therefore suggests that State attempt to obtain British and French agreement to authorize the three military commanders in Germany to confer with a view to establishing a coordinated tripartite program of harassment to be implemented by the military commanders on their own initiative as required by the situation at the moment with respect to the Western Missions in the Soviet Zone.

Recommendations

That you reply to Ambassador Caccia (or authorize us to reply to the British Embassy if the Ambassador does not raise the subject) as follows:

1. We concur regarding the need for reciprocal harassment of the Soviet Missions.

2. We see certain disadvantages to making a threat to General Yakubovski as suggested by the British, although we would not object if General Cassels were to do so on behalf of the British only.

3. We believe that the Three Governments should authorize their military commanders in Germany, in consultation with their Ambassadors, to work out a program for reciprocal harassment of the Soviet Missions, in the light of the situation at the moment.²

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8–1260. Secret. Drafted by McKiernan, initialed by White, and concurred in by Vigderman and Colonel Schofield in OSD/ISA.
1. No record of Herter’s conversation with Caccia has been found.
2. Herter initialed approval of the three recommendations on August 12.