Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

291. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany ⁰

Washington, April 15, 1960, 3:57 p.m.

2221. Bonn’s 1905, 1918, 1949, 1972, London’s 4998, Moscow’s 2498.¹ Following are our views on German suggestion for notes and Summit approaches to Soviets re farm collectivization in SovZone.

We do not think suggested procedure is best way to publicize problem. We note coverage in German press has been excellent and believe, if matter has raised less interest in US, one explanatory factor may be that public had tended to assume that GDR regime more aggressive than it is in fact and that all agriculture in Communist-controlled area already collectivized. In any case we believe most effective publicity can be based on human interest stories re collectivization incidents and effects, on discussion political purposes of collectivization, and on comparison productivity of private, versus collectivized, sectors of East German agriculture. Argumentation about legality or violations of human rights in abstract probably has less impact on opinion, whether of informed or of man in street.

We also find two of themes in draft German note rather inconsistent with general German policy. References to GDR “Constitution” permit inference that document is something more than travesty or window dressing for illegitimate regime. Moreover, bringing this isolated aspect of German question to attention UN, if it had any effect, might prompt question whether UN might not play greater role in attempt resolve German question as whole.

We doubt even drafters of note can believe collectivization in SovZone can in itself have prejudicial effect on forthcoming Four-Power negotiations.

Although it is uncertain whether public attention will still be focused on collectivization at time of Summit, we expect it will be necessary at some point in discussions for Western Powers counter Soviet false statements about conditions in FedRep and West Berlin by dwelling on conditions in SovZone. We believe brutality of collectivization can be exploited very effectively in this context and that it would be useful for FedRep to start now assembling factual data which could be cited.

Believe sending notes Sov. Govt will only provoke Soviet rejection and counter charges. Believe it might be more effective for Germans to issue draft note as public declaration and obtain British and French concurrence with us in issuing individual supporting statements.

We would not favor a request for consideration for action on this subject by the Security Council or other UN organs for the following reasons:

(1) While some advantage in drawing world attention to Soviet violations of human rights immediately following hypocritical Soviet diatribe in SC on violation of human rights in South Africa, two cases not sufficiently similar in terms of dramatic quality to place desired degree of opprobrium on USSR and GDR.

(2) Soviet pressures for agricultural collectivization in East Germany not essentially different from measures conducted in other countries of Eastern Europe. No initiative was taken to secure UN action with regard to these equally obnoxious violations of human rights. Many neutral nations might be suspicious of move to single out East Germany for special attack at this time.

(3) In any debate in SC or other UN organ, human rights issue would not be clear-cut. Would be confused by arguments over economic ideology and agricultural methods. A number of neutral nations may have some sympathy with Soviet and Chinese Communist experiments in collective farming. US realizes Soviet and GDR actions involve injury and death to individuals, but this is difficult to highlight as separate issue.

(4) As general principle, US has some reluctance to see UN become involved in German question at this time unless circumstances compel UN involvement. We nave no assurance that UN consideration of East German atrocities could be limited to this subject. Debate might be broadened to include overall status of East German regime, German reunification, and special status of Berlin, which, in turn, might invite certain non-Europeans to put forward irresponsible “compromise” proposals on these subjects which would serve Soviet propaganda interests.²

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4–560. Confidential. Drafted by Cash and McKiernan; cleared by Davis, Hillenbrand, Nunley, and Cargo (UNP); and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, Moscow, and USUN.
1. Telegram 1905 from Bonn, April 5, transmitted a summary of a draft West German note to the Soviet Union that publicized the troubles of the farmers in the East Zone. (Ibid.) In telegram 1918 from Bonn, April 6, Ambassador Dowling supported the idea of sending the note. (Ibid., 762B.00/4–660) Telegram 1949 from Bonn, April 11, transmitted a redraft of the note. (Ibid., 762B.00/4–1160) Telegram 1972 from Bonn, April 13, reported discussion of the note at a quadripartite meeting that day. (Ibid., 762B.00/4–1360) Telegram 4998 from London, April 13, reported that neither the British nor the French was enthusiastic about sending the note. (Ibid.) In telegram 2498 from Moscow, April 6, Ambassador Thompson stated that the idea was “most unwise,” since it would lead to Soviet demands on the West to suppress militarism and Fascism in West Germany. (Ibid., 762B.00/4–660)
2. Following further discussion, the Federal Republic decided not to send the note, but to include its information in a publication which was released as a White Book on April 26, entitled Die Zwangskollektivierung des selbstandigen Bauernstandes in Mitteldeutschland.