Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

216. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, September 21, 1960, 6 p.m.

442. Paris for Embassy and USRO. I have read with great interest Department’s 410 to Bonn of September 2 and subsequent exchanges.¹

I should like to summarize my own views on effect of Soviet offensive since abortive summit meeting on German attitudes and expectations, and to suggest what might be result of an indefinite prolongation of unrelieved Soviet pressures on Berlin and Federal Republic, accompanied by continued inability by West to hold out to the Germans some prospect other than that of being a perpetual punching bag for the Soviet Union.

Since November 1958, Soviets have been exerting constant pressure of one kind or another on this country while proclaiming their desire for peaceful solution to German problem. Macmillan visit to Moscow in March 1959, followed by Geneva conferences that year, created doubts and forebodings in minds of chancellor and of others (including Willy Brandt) which have never been entirely dispelled, and which, in my judgment, will be rekindled unless West finds means within next few months to assume a more vigorous, confident and united posture than it is now displaying. Continuation of Soviet attacks against Adenauer personally, and repetition of stereotyped accusations that Federal Republic is basically motivated by aggressive and revanchist aims has now succeeded in gaining some credence in forum of world opinion, or so it seems to many responsible Germans. At any rate, lack of a correspondingly vigorous and effective reaction by West to such charges, and signs of disunity within the Western Alliance, are gradually creating a fear that Federal Republic and Berlin can expect little else than indefinite continuation of Soviet pressures, without prospect that West will mobilize its resources in such way as to induce Soviet Union desist. Rightly or wrongly, many Germans tend, as does Chancellor, to question degree of determination and solidarity, apart from public exhortation, which their Western Allies (in particular the UK and more recently France) are willing to display, when for example it comes to sharing the sacrifices which a resolute position, including among other things imposition of economic countermeasures, would involve.

When I returned to Germany at end of last year after absence of nearly four years, I was struck not only by its increased economic strength and greater political maturity, but by growing sense of national purpose and by an intention to accept more responsibility and play a more active role as equal participant within Western Alliance. This attitude I considered, generally speaking, to be healthy one, and I have in the past reported my views in this sense to the Department on several occasions. It may sometimes be argued that in certain specific cases Germans should be doing more, standing more on own feet; but it must be remembered they are still not used to being expected to show initiative, and that process of adjustment to the role they should play is not entirely easy for them. Specifically in field of countermeasures re Berlin, Germans are prepared to follow West but tend to show reluctance to take initiatives themselves, though there is improvement in this respect.

However, this asset to the West of growing German confidence is predicated on maintenance of conviction by Federal Republic that the long-term unity of West is (apart from minor ups and downs) unquestionable, and that West has collective sense of purpose and resolution sufficient in the end to discourage pressures directed against any one of its members. In other words, a robust attitude of Federal Republic within the Alliance is not, in my opinion, an absolute asset which the West can count upon indefinitely, or independently of the West’s own political strength and unity. I fear that we are at this moment experiencing a decline in German confidence that the West is willing to make effort required by German problem. I do not wish to overdramatize this tendency or to have this construed as meaning that Germany has suddenly decided it is being abandoned by its allies; but at this stage, I think it fair to say there are few Germans who see any light at end of tunnel in terms of difficulties which we and they are now facing. This state of mind is in my judgment likely to be particularly acute and particularly dangerous with regard to Berlin, for reasons which are obvious. While opinion in Berlin, and with regard to Berlin, is outwardly firm and unyielding, there is, practically speaking, no margin between sustained confidence and possibly catastrophic discouragement. Question therefore arises as to how long sustained confidence can endure under present Soviet pressures (which are likely to increase) unless, Western Alliance as a whole can find a way to inspire once again conviction that it is not prepared to accept passively progressive encroachment by the Soviet Union.

Dowling

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.00/9–2160. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, and Moscow.
1. Telegram 410 to Bonn transmitted the texts of telegrams 568 and 575 from Moscow, August 26 and 27. (Ibid., 661.00/8–2760) Copies of the two cables, which analyzed the future of Soviet foreign policy and proposed steps which might be taken to preclude various Soviet gambits are ibid., 661.00/8–2660 and 661.00/8–2760.