Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

210. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, September 9, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Possible Discussion of Germany and Berlin at Forthcoming Session of United Nations General Assembly

PARTICIPANTS

• German Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe
• Dr. Swidbert Schnippenkoetter, Counselor, German Embassy
• The Secretary
• Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler
• Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, GER

Ambassador Grewe began by noting that the events of the past week gave heightened substantive importance to the discussion between Foreign Minister von Brentano and the Secretary scheduled to take place on September 18. He went on to say that his Government was seriously concerned about recent Berlin developments. Most of the harassments so far have not been very large in themselves, but they were creating anxiety and might be the beginning of new and more dramatic moves by the Soviets starting with Khrushchev’s appearance in the UN. Rumors were being spread by the Soviets in Vienna and Moscow indicating that they intended to raise the Berlin question in the GA. The German Government felt that the situation was becoming more dangerous and difficult. It was considering what kind of countermeasures could be contemplated and how to proceed in invoking them.

The Federal Republic was, of course, not represented in the UN, Ambassador Grewe continued. He assumed that there would be tripartite coordination of positions relating to Germany and Berlin. His Government would like to be fully informed and brought into these consultations where appropriate.

The Secretary said that we have had no direct indication that Khrushchev is going to bring up the Berlin problem in the GA. Mr. Kohler added that we have been rather skeptical about reports that the Soviets would do this. We did not envisage that a formal agenda item relating to Berlin would be inscribed. It might be anticipated that they would attack the Federal Republic in speeches for rearming and for its militaristic intentions. Instead, we anticipated harassments of the present kind, perhaps building up to a climax sometime after the US elections. These would be aimed essentially at German civilian access and the ties between the Federal Republic and Berlin, as had been anticipated in the Four Power discussions in Paris in May. The Secretary said that we were a little disturbed by reports that twice as many West Germans were going to the Leipzig Fair this year and that trade relations were proceeding normally.¹ This was an area where the East Germans were sensitive and we hoped that the Federal Republic was giving consideration to possible action. It was somewhat difficult for us when we were being asked to make military threats while the West Germans were carrying on as normal in the economic field.

Ambassador Grewe noted that Mayor Brandt had already appealed to the West Germans to refrain from attending the Leipzig Fair and had criticized the large scale attendance. This was something which only could be effected by moral pressures and not by legal action. As to economic countermeasures, these had been discussed for many years in Bonn between the Federal Republic and the three embassies. The general conclusion reached in the past had been that, as long as there was no total blockade, West Berlin was too much dependent on the interzonal trade arrangements to take action which might result in a self-imposed blockade.

The Secretary suggested that it might be a good idea to have the Four-Power Working Group meet soon in Washington to discuss the developing Berlin situation. It was noted that a Four-Power group in Bonn is already considering harassment of civilian access and economic countermeasures and that it would be better to leave the detailed discussions there. The consensus was that a general exchange of views in the Working Group here would be valuable.

Ambassador Grewe came back to his point about the Federal Republic’s desire to have certain contacts established in New York so that the Germans would be fully informed of developments in the UN. He noted that the new German observer there, Ambassador Knappstein, had just come from two years of service in Bonn as Under Secretary of State. Mr. Kohler observed that the US Delegation in New York presumably had good relations with the German observer.

The Secretary said that it was still unclear precisely what Khrushchev had in mind. No request had apparently so far been made for him to speak. Until September 22 the GA would be engaged in organizational matters. Khrushchev was apparently arriving on the 19th.

In response to Ambassador Grewe’s query as to our thinking about how the West could best react to Khrushchev’s appearance, the Secretary indicated this was not yet certain. The President had not made a final decision. If he did appear, however, it would probably be at the very beginning of the session and not in rebuttal of Khrushchev. We were, of course, discouraging attendance at the session of Heads of Governments. There were rumors that Castro, Nasser, Sukarno, and others might appear. These rumors indicated a timing somewhat later in the session. We did not know how long Khrushchev himself would stay. Ambassador Grewe commented that it was difficult to know whether it would be worse for the West to get involved in a debate with Khrushchev or simply to leave the floor to him. The Secretary agreed and noted that the meetings of the GA would bring together a strange conglomeration, with representatives of many of the new African countries coming for the first time. Mr. Kohler observed that, apart from the Satellite representatives, some of the African Heads of Governments had been planning to come to the UN primarily because it would be the first appearance of their countries in the GA.

Ambassador Grewe said that, as far as inclusion of Berlin and Germany on the GA agenda was concerned, his Government had no indication that the Soviets intended inscription. It was more likely that they would launch a broad attack against alleged German militarism and revanchism, make strong appeals on behalf of their peace treaty project, and perhaps give some indication of their future intended action on Berlin. Mr. Kohler commented that we would be surprised if any formal resolution on Berlin were introduced. Ambassador Grewe noted that, in general, the Federal Republic was opposed to any form of internationalization in the UN of the Berlin and peace treaty question. It was better to keep the possibility of an appeal to the UN as a last resort, as contemplated in Western contingency plans. Mr. Kohler added that Article 107 of the UN Charter limited UN competence on the German question.

Ambassador Grewe went on to say that his Government would be very grateful to see some progress on the earlier German request for participation in Allied contingency planning relative to Berlin. Mr. Kohler said that he hoped the Germans were saying the same thing to the British and the French, [1 line of source text not declassified] Ambassador Grewe said the German Ambassadors in Paris and London had received appropriate instructions.

The Secretary said that one happy augury was that it seemed clear that the Berlin the German question would not become a campaign issue in this country.

As to the recent De Gaulle press conference,² Ambassador Grewe said he thought it preferable to leave this subject for the Secretary’s discussion with Foreign Minister von Brentano. The Secretary noted that a general guidance had been sent to our mission abroad and that we were frankly not very happy with the press conference. Ambassador Grewe commented that the Secretary’s remarks of yesterday³ on the subject would be well received in Bonn.

In response to Ambassador Grewe’s query as to whether we had any information about Khrushchev’s plan for an African tour, the Secretary said that it was hard to see where such a tour would fit in. Khrushchev had so many other engagements. Mr. Kohler noted that the only firm date we had for him was October 14–16 for North Korea.

Ambassador Grewe said that he would be leaving Washington on September 12 for ten days in Alaska. Hence he would not be here for the von Brentano visit.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–960. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand, initialed by Kohler, and approved in S on September 15. A 3–page briefing memorandum for this meeting, dated September 8 and drafted by Kohler, is ibid., 611.62A/9–860.
1. Herter expressed similar views to Ambassador Alphand the day before. (Memorandum of conversation, September 8; ibid., 762.00/9–860)
2. For a transcript of De Gaulle’s press conference on September 5, see Statements, pp. 84–98.
3. For text of Herter’s address to the United Press International Conference on September 8, see Department of State Bulletin, September 26, 1960, pp. 467–473.