Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

188. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Paris, May 18, 1960, 5–6:20 p.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • President Eisenhower
  • Secretary Herter
  • Secretary Gates
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Kohler
  • (Colonel Walters)
• United Kingdom
  • Prime Minister Macmillan
  • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
  • Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar
  • Sir Anthony Rumbold
  • Sir Gladwyn Jebb
  • Mr. de Zulueta
• France
  • President de Gaulle
  • Prime Minister Debre
  • Foreign Minister Couve de Murville(note takers, interpreters)

SUBJECT

• US-UK-French Cooperation

(Note: The exchange of views recorded in this memorandum took place between the discussion on Berlin and the discussion on disarmament, reported in a separate memorandum of conversation.)1

President Eisenhower said, however, that he was thinking of something more. He said to the extent that could be presently foreseen we would be faced with a more critical and tense situation in our relations with the USSR. If these relations should become worse over a considerable period of time he wondered if the cooperation within the working groups was a close enough relationship between us. He felt that we needed in some way to be closer together at the top governmental level. He said that he and Prime Minister Macmillan had been discussing this question for the past hour and that he had thought about it for a long time. He felt we needed some method, without derogation of NATO, for more frequent communication between ourselves, possibly between the Foreign Ministers. The three powers had a very special responsibility for Germany and it was important that none of us should be operating in a way not in consonance with the others.

President de Gaulle commented that he had been concerned about this question for a long time. He recalled that nearly two years ago he had written to the President and to Prime Minister Macmillan about the need for closer coordination of our policies.² At the time there were the problems of Syria and Iraq and Jordan. Today it was the problem of Berlin. Perhaps later we would be faced with other critical problems. He had thought that it would be possible to organize our relations more effectively, develop common strategic thinking and plans, and the like. However we were still where we were when he had written two years ago and if an abrupt crisis should arise the situation could be serious. He recognized that in such questions as that of Berlin it might be said that we already have an organization to deal with such problems in NATO; but NATO is limited in its capacity to take quick and effective action. We needed a method of being able to act quickly.

President Eisenhower said he thought that there was justification for developing a closer cooperation between the three powers since they were the ones who came out of the last war with specific responsibilities in specific areas. This gave them every reason to work more closely together.

Prime Minister Macmillan said he agreed with what the President had said. He felt the three powers ought to have machinery able to act quickly and perhaps somewhat more broadly. It was important that the three remove any difficulties between themselves so that they could really rally the West. He commented that the three met here today and would then go away. He believed they would be able to act quickly if they had to. He then cited Khrushchev’s statement and his press conference this afternoon,³ repeating the Soviet threat to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR, which would bring to an end the Allied rights in Berlin, and Khrushchev’s statement that such a treaty was ready and could be signed whenever the Soviets decided. Thus, it was possible that a crisis might arise at any time. Consequently, it was necessary to strengthen the sense of unity generally between themselves. In fact, he felt that this sense of unity had been strengthened by the current meetings and was perhaps the most important result of the meetings. He recalled that he had discussed this question of closer cooperation with General de Gaulle at Rambouillet.⁴ Originally it had been General de Gaulle’s idea and in this respect the three were of a like mind. It was true that the Foreign Ministers already met frequently and maybe it would be better if they met even more frequently. However, he felt they might broaden their consultations, not meeting just to discuss specific problems but to try to get a real unity of view. President Eisenhower interjected the comment that this was not possible to achieve by directives, to which the Prime Minister agreed.

President de Gaulle said that a series of arrangements had been tried from time to time during the past couple of years, but satisfactory organizational machinery had not yet been found. We had agreed that the Embassy Counselors should meet every month, without informing NATO or Spaak that this was going on. He had recently sent a military representative of considerable value to the standing group in Washington. This representative had tried to work closely with his American and British colleagues but had become rather disheartened and the results had not amounted to much. Of course, it must be recognized as a fact that organizations exist, such as NATO and SEATO, which resist the development of new organizational patterns. In any event, while the three seem to agree on the general idea, it had not been possible to find a practical means to implement this agreement. He did not want to say things which would sound unpleasant, but felt that we should learn from history and that we could talk freely and frankly among ourselves. For example, at the time of the Egyptian crisis the West was in complete disarray; perhaps in a new crisis over Berlin the same would be the case.

President Eisenhower said that the meeting might note that the Foreign Ministers were meeting again in Washington on May 31 at the time of the SEATO conference. They could have discussions then and perhaps it would be possible to require them to meet about every sixty days or even more often. He was convinced that we could find a way to do this without arousing suspicions of others. He recognized this might require even more travel on the part of the Foreign Ministers. However, if our consultation was maintained at too low a level, he feared that many things simply would not get done. In fact, the Heads of Government might meet more frequently, too—preferably without creating any complicated apparatus which would arouse suspicion or alarm. He was not proposing that the three powers set up a directorate to run the world. However the three had specific responsibilities and things to be done—matters to be considered between themselves particularly. He added that the procedure he suggested might cause some anguish to the Foreign Ministers but he would point out that his own Foreign Minister, in terms of the amount of travel he would have to do, would be at a two-to-one disadvantage with respect to each of the others!

President de Gaulle said that the Heads of Government must pay tribute to their Foreign Ministers who, in fact, seemed to be all over the place. He saw Secretaries Herter and Selwyn Lloyd frequently in Paris and knew they were in Istanbul and many other places. The world truth was here in this room. If that could be organized, the rest would come naturally.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said he thought that the Foreign Ministers do not prepare their work carefully enough, and the President at this point indicated this agreement. Mr. Lloyd felt the Foreign Ministers should prepare their agenda more carefully. At present their meetings were perhaps too casual. It would be better if they developed specific plans for their consultations so that they could inform the Heads of Government of the results.

President de Gaulle said that since the President and the Prime Minister had referred to this matter, he would ponder it and make specific proposals to both. He said he would write them in the near future on the subject. His letter would be in the same spirit as the one he had sent two years ago, but developed with greater precision. If times were good, this would perhaps be only an academic exercise; but if a crisis should arise, such a plan might be the basis for our salvation.

Prime Minister Macmillan said he believed that all knew what they would like to do, but clearly they needed a more organized system with agenda, positions, etc. He indicated that he would be glad to receive President de Gaulle’s ideas.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Kohler. The conversation took place at the Elysée Palace. See also Document 187.
2. De Gaulle’s letter to Eisenhower and Macmillan, September 17, 1958, is printed in vol. VII, Part 2, Document 45.
3. For a transcript of Khrushchev’s press conference including his statement on the U–2 and the summit conference, see Background Documents, pp. 56–68.
4. During the Heads of Government meeting at Paris December 19–21, 1959.