179. Telegram From the Delegation at the Summit Conference to the Department of State0

Secto 25. At final meeting three Western Heads of Government evening May 17,1Lloyd reported he had invited Gromyko to UK Embassy before dinner and spent more than an hour talking to him.2

Lloyd stated he raised question of U2 and said that the Soviets bore responsibility for wrecking conference.

Lloyd then told Gromyko regarding nuclear test talks, UK–US had hoped for progress at summit but in light developments Paris this proved impossible. He inquired of Gromyko what ideas he had on this matter. Gromyko replied that progress only possible by instructions to delegations at Geneva.

Lloyd then raised question of disarmament and original expectations that constructive directive to participants’ delegates would emerge from summit.

He reported Gromyko in reply delivered lengthy speech, reasonable in tone. It contained, however, nothing of substance and in effect was propaganda exercise.

Lloyd said he then remarked on interest he found in Khrushchev’s statement regarding postponement summit conference for six or eight months. He asked if Soviet interest in such was in effect genuine and whether in interval Soviets intended to avoid increase in tensions.

Gromyko replied that in this intervening period, Soviets intended no action which would increase tensions or make trouble. They would await another summit.

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Lloyd said then he threw fly over Gromyko by observing that he had seen press statements to effect Khrushchev was returning to Moscow via East Berlin and wondered whether purpose was there to sign peace treaty with GDR.

Gromyko replied that he had nothing to add beyond what Khrushchev had said at Baku.3 Namely, that if no agreement were reached it would be necessary for Soviets to sign peace treaty with GDR. (In questioning of Lloyd following meeting, Lloyd said his interpretation of this was that it was repetition standard Soviet doctrine and not necessarily to be construed as intention to conclude German peace treaty in immediate future.)

In summary Lloyd said his conversation with Gromyko had been on whole friendly and not grim. Essentially, however, he considered it propaganda exercise by Gromyko with only real significance lying in statement Soviets intended no actions in months immediately ahead designed to increase tensions.

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/5–1760. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Moscow, London, and Bonn.
  2. See Document 180.
  3. For another brief account of this talk, see Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p. 211.
  4. See footnote 1, Document 138.