Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

506. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/168

Geneva, August 4, 1959.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Reinhardt
  • Mr. Toon
• U.K.
  • Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd
  • Sir Anthony Rumbold
  • Sir Patrick Reilly
  • Mr. Morgan
• France
  • Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
  • M. Lucet
  • M. Laloy
  • Mr. Andronikov
• U.S.S.R.
  • Foreign Minister Gromyko
  • Mr. Zorin.
  • Mr. Malik
  • Mr. Martynov
  • Mr. Pervukhin (Gromyko’s residence only)
  • Mr. Ilichev (Gromyko’s residence only)

SUBJECT

• Private Discussions of Final Communiqué

A. At Lloyd’s Villa

Before proceeding to a discussion of the Western draft communiqué which Lloyd had handed Gromyko on August 3 (Annex A),¹ the Ministers exchanged views on how the conference should end. Gromyko said that the Ministers should decide whether the conference would end on August 5 or should remain in session: Lloyd pointed out that practical considerations made it desirable to agree that the conference would terminate on August 5. In the first place, as Gromyko was aware, the Secretary would have to leave on August 6 in order to attend the Santiago Conference. Secondly it would be useful to have an interval for careful examination of the two sides’ positions on the questions before the conference since despite long and intensive discussion there remained fundamental differences between the two sides on important issues of substance.

Turning to the Western draft communiqué, Gromyko suggested the desirability of specifying areas of agreement and disagreement, including some reference to a Summit Conference, spelling out in greater detail the problems on which the conference in both plenary and private sessions focused. He could not accept the Western statement specifying the conference participants as the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers; while he would prefer to mention the six powers represented at the conference, he would be prepared to accept simply “the Foreign Ministers”.

The Western Foreign Ministers concurred in the latter suggestion since this was the formula used in the recess communiqué. They believed, however, that Gromyko’s general prescription for a final communiqué would involve lengthy and difficult negotiations. It would not be easy, for example, for the two sides to agree on language setting forth areas of agreement and disagreement. If this were done, the West would have to insist on making specific reference to the question of Allied rights; this alone would require going over much the same ground that had been covered in recent private sessions. With regard to a Summit Conference, the Western Foreign Ministers could not agree to Gromyko’s suggestion that the communiqué reflect agreement on the desirability of a Heads of Government meeting since this decision should be reserved for the Heads of Government themselves in the light of reports by their Foreign Ministers. In the Western view, therefore, it was desirable to work toward a brief communiqué which could be easily and quickly agreed upon.

Gromyko continued to believe that the communiqué should attempt to spell out the problems on which some progress had been made and those which required further discussion. While he would not insist on referring to a Summit Conference in view of the attitude of the Western Foreign Ministers, he still felt that the communiqué should touch upon problems other than the Berlin settlement that were discussed during the negotiations. He had in mind, for example, such questions as a peace treaty, European security, and disarmament.

It was pointed out that even this amended formula of Gromyko’s would involve points of sharp controversy on which it would be difficult to work out agreed language. If Gromyko were to insist, for example, on mentioning the peace treaty question, the Western Foreign Ministers would have to insist on mentioning the problem of reunification.With regard to disarmament, it was suggested that this be covered in a separate communiqué since the discussions of procedures for continuing disarmament negotiations had taken place outside the conference.

Gromyko agreed with the latter suggestion. He also agreed to produce a draft communiqué which would incorporate the points which he felt should be mentioned.

At Lloyd’s suggestion, it was agreed that Soviet and Western draft communiqués would be discussed by deputies at a meeting at Les Ormeaux at 6:00 p.m. and that the Foreign Ministers would meet at Gromyko’s villa at 9:30 p.m. to consider the results of the deputies’ discussion.

B. At Les Ormeaux

Zorin tabled the Soviet draft communiqué promised earlier by Gromyko (Annex B). There appeared to be tentative agreement on a compromise formula to replace the first five paragraphs of the Soviet draft (Annex C). At the last moment, however, Zorin withdrew his agreement to the compromise language, and the Western deputies thereupon withdrew their tentative approval also. The Western deputies did not object strenuously to paragraphs 6 and 7, the sharp disagreement on fundamental issues which the discussions had revealed and that the problems of mutual interest mentioned in paragraph 7 would be difficult to define. They pointed out that paragraphs 8 and 9 related to disarmament which they understood the Ministers had agreed would be covered in a separate communiqué. The result was that no progress was made at the deputies meeting except for agreement on the first and last two paragraphs of the Soviet draft, and the Foreign Ministers at 9:30 faced the task of beginning the negotiations anew.

C. At Gromyko’s Residence

The Foreign Ministers discussed paragraph by paragraph the Soviet draft communiqué and ultimately reached agreement on a version which was ultimately adopted at the Plenary Session on August 5 (Annex D).²

In the course of the discussion, Gromyko pressed hard for Western acceptance of language referring to an interim settlement without relating it to Berlin. But the Western Foreign Ministers would have none of this, however, and it was finally agreed not to refer to an interim settlement at all. The Secretary opposed including in the communiqué Gromyko’s statement that the discussions had been carried on in an atmosphere of “complete candor”. He pointed out that Gromyko’s persistent refusal to provide direct answers to Western inquiries with regard to the status of Western rights at the end of an interim agreement was anything but candor on Gromyko’s part. Gromyko finally agreed to limit the description of the negotiations to “frank and comprehensive”.

Asked how press inquiries on the meaning of “useful exchanges of views on other questions” should be handled, Gromyko suggested that the press be informed that such questions related to European security, non-aggression undertakings, and problems of a strictly bilateral nature.

Gromyko readily accepted the Western suggestion that the communiqué should specify that the Foreign Ministers would report to their respective Governments, not to Heads of Government. He remarked wryly, however, that the reference to Heads of Government had been included in the original Western draft and he felt this was again a case of withdrawal of a Western suggestion when it was accepted by the Soviet side.

After there appeared to be full agreement on the text of the communiqué, Gromyko questioned the use of the preposition “in” in the expression “participants in the conference”. He insisted that the preposition “of” should be used since he was convinced that use of “in” altered the meaning of the phrase. He implied that the West’s insistence on “in” was designed to prevent an interpretation that the East Germans had participated in the conference. In a rather sharp exchange, Lloyd said that he thought it was inappropriate for Gromyko to tell the Western Foreign Ministers how the English language should be written; after all, he would not attempt to criticize Gromyko’s use of certain words in the Russian language. The hour-long controversy over the use of the words “of” and “in” finally ended on the understanding that the question would remain open until the following day by which time, Gromyko said, he expected to conclude his research on the problem. (Gromyko did not raise the issue again, and the communiqué which appears as Annex D was adopted at the plenary session on August 5.)

It was agreed that a plenary session should be held on August 5 and Lloyd suggested that it begin at 1100, pointing out he hoped to be in London before 1900. Gromyko disagreed, saying that the past practice of holding plenary sessions at 1530 should be continued. Lloyd suggested a compromise time, and Gromyko ultimately agreed to 1430.

Annex B³

Geneva, August 4, 1959.

Proposal by the Soviet Delegation

COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF 1959

1. The Conference of Foreign Ministers in Geneva conducted its work from May 11 to June 20 and from July 13 to August 5, 1959. The Conference considered questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the Berlin question.

2. As a result of the detailed and comprehensive discussion of questions relating to West Berlin the positions of the sides on a number of questions have come closer together and the possibility of agreement has materialized.

3. The results of the consideration of the above questions and the rapprochement in the positions facilitate the attainment through further negotiations of the necessary agreement between the parties concerned.

4. The participants in the Conference have agreed that the understanding, which would include these questions where the differences have not yet been fully removed, should be expressed in an appropriate interim agreement.

5. They agreed that further efforts should be made to achieve final agreement.

6. The participants of the Conference note that the work of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers proceeded in an atmosphere of candor and the desire to find such solutions as would correspond to the interests of easing international tension and strengthening peace, which is the unalterable aspiration of peoples.

7. Furthermore, the participants of the Conference had the opportunity to have a useful exchange of views on other questions of mutual interest.

8. During the work of the Conference a private exchange of opinions took place between the Ministers with regard to further negotiations on questions of disarmament. Agreement was reached on the necessity for setting up such a body as would appropriately promote the success of these negotiations.

9. The results of the exchange of opinions on this question will be announced within a matter of days.

10. The Foreign Ministers have agreed to report the results of the work of the Conference to their respective Heads of Government.

11. Agreement has been reached that the date and place for the resumption of the work of the Conference will be settled through diplomatic channels.

Annex C⁴

Geneva, August 4, 1959.

Proposal by the British, French, and United States Delegations

VARIANT FOR FIRST FIVE PARAGRAPHS OF SOVIET DRAFT COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS 1959

The Conference of Foreign Ministers met in Geneva from May 11 to June 20 and from July 13 to August 5, 1959. The Conference considered questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin.

The Foreign Ministers set out their respective points of view on these questions. As a result of the detailed and comprehensive discussion of questions which might be included in an interim agreement relating to Berlin some of the differences between them were narrowed. They agreed that further efforts would be necessary to reach an agreement.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1342. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Toon on August 6 and 7 and approved by Scranton on September 3. The meeting at Lloyd’s residence was 1–3 p.m.; at Les Ormeaux, 6–8 p.m.; and at Gromyko’s residence, 9:30 p.m. to 12:30 a.m.
1. Annex A is not printed; for text of this draft, see Document 504.
2. Annex D is not printed; for text of the final communiqué, see Document 507.
3. Secret. Unofficial translation.
4. Secret.