Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

498. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower⁰

London, July 30, 1959.

Dear Friend, I was glad to get your message of July 29.¹ I agree that the talks at Geneva must be brought to a conclusion within the next days. The latest reports from there suggest that there is now a chance of making some further last-minute progress. Gromyko seems to be showing signs of wanting to do business. I hope we shall not discourage him. After all, we are not at this stage aiming at more than an interim settlement on Berlin. And, if we are asking for a moratorium, we cannot expect that our rights should be guaranteed beyond the end of the renewed negotiations. That surely is what a moratorium means.

We may therefore get within the next few days a conclusion at Geneva which you could regard as progress. On further reflection however I agree with you that even if that happens it would not be wise to try to proceed at once to a Summit meeting. A later date would now be more convenient for us all.

Therefore I am in broad agreement with the timetable which you now have in mind:

(1) A Western Summit before the end of August;

(2) Khrushchev’s visit to you and your return visits during September and October; and

(3) A full Summit meeting in November. Quebec would suit me very well. I am very happy to know that in your journeys you will be able to include a visit to us.

I am not sure whether it will be necessary to interpose a further meeting of Foreign Ministers between (2) and (3). If the Foreign Ministers make substantial progress over the next few days they may be able to take up, before they recess, their duty of discussing arrangements for a Summit meeting. Indeed it may be difficult for us to decline to do so if Gromyko raises the question; for, as you yourself say, it was one of the tasks remitted to them. They may themselves be able to recommend a date in November. On the other hand, if this is not possible the time and place could be arranged during Khrushchev’s visit to you. In any case it does not seem likely that there will be much further progress which the Foreign Ministers could make at an adjourned meeting in the autumn before a Summit.

I hope therefore that we can get agreement between all the Western Powers on the following programme for further negotiations in the coming months:

(1) We should aim to secure that the Geneva meeting is recessed next week either with a Summit fixed or on a basis which will enable us to claim that some progress has been made and that we can look forward to further negotiations.

(2) We should hold a Western Summit in Paris before the end of August, at which the Heads of the Western Governments would review the results of the Geneva meeting.

(3) This would be followed by a period of personal contacts between yourself and Khrushchev during which exploratory discussions would continue.

(4) As a result of all these preparations, a full Summit before the end of the year, not in an atmosphere of crisis, but with a prospect of success based on these intermediate stages of negotiation and discussion.

I do not believe that we can present a firm Western position to public opinion unless we can say that the process of negotiation will continue over the coming months and culminate in a Summit meeting before the end of the year. Certainly for opinion here it is of first importance that we should make it plain as quickly as we can that there will be a Western Summit before the end of August and that a full Summit will follow later in the year.

I hear that de Gaulle is doubtful about the need to hold a Western Summit before Khrushchev’s visit to you. I do not understand why he is taking this view. For my part I should welcome the opportunity for consultation before you see Khrushchev and I think it very important that this should take place. It really is essential that the Western Governments should be able to take stock of the position and clear their lines before Khrushchev’s visit. Moreover, I know that you also want to talk to de Gaulle about other matters and I am sure that this is most important and urgent. I hope therefore that you will feel able to press de Gaulle very strongly to fall in with your plan for a Western Summit in Paris in August. In the last resort, if he proves obdurate, I would prefer to hold a Western Summit in London with France represented by Debre rather than defer it until after Khrushchev’s visit.

I believe that you and I are pretty well at one on a plan for continued negotiations in the months ahead. There is, I think, only one real difference between us. You are reluctant to say now that there will be a Summit meeting, though I believe that you recognize that it is in fact inevitable. I, on the other hand, should like to get it settled and announced now that there will be such a meeting before the end of the year. This is not because I want a Summit for its own sake. I have never wanted that. What I have wanted is a settlement, and I have always believed that a settlement could only be reached by negotiation between Heads of Government. Nothing that has happened at Geneva has made me revise this opinion. Indeed it has confirmed me in the view that if we are to reach a settlement we must do so at a Summit meeting.

With warm regards,

As ever,

Harold²

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 64 D 204. Top Secret and Personal. Attached to a transmittal note from Hood to Murphy dated July 30. A copy was also delivered directly to the White House on July 30.
1. Document 493.
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.