Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

486. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, July 28, 1959, 11 p.m.

Cahto 179. For Dillon from the Secretary. Have just finished second private session today¹ with Selwyn Lloyd and Couve de Murville to try to formulate our joint ideas as to where we go from here both from a substantive and a procedural point of view. Both of them are glad that I have been committed to going to Santiago² since they feel that this will force a break not necessarily in continued negotiations but certainly in the type of negotiations which have been so fruitless in the past two weeks.

As I told you by phone,³ I found it was essential to advise Couve de Murville of the fact that Khrushchev might be coming to the U.S. I am very glad that I did so since it made it possible for the three of us to discuss possible procedures and timetables with this visit and the possible return visit by the President being a very important part of the whole picture. Selwyn, who as you know has tried to interpret every exchange of views with the Russians from the most optimistic angle, is now pretty well convinced that it will be impossible for us to find sufficient justification in the progress made here to justify a summit conference which would come within the time limits which the British have had to set themselves in relation to elections. While my natural instinct is to look on the optimistic side and my political inclination would have been to lean over backwards in order to make a summit possible, I just could not in good conscience have recommended an early decision on a summit with the situation as it now stands.

Tomorrow I am scheduled to lunch with Gromyko and to try to carry the ball for the Western Foreign Ministers since we are endeavoring the bilateral approach to see if it can move things along any better than the multilateral. I shall tomorrow try to do two things: first, ascertain whether there is any further give in Gromyko than there was before as a result of the Khrushchev invitation; second, what procedural steps we can now take to carry on our negotiations either with deputies or through a recess to some time such as the time of the Foreign Ministers attendance at the UN. I think Gromyko is going to insist that we keep right on talking and, if so, it will obviously have to be done at the deputy level.

One very interesting thing developed with regard to the attitudes of both Selwyn and Couve on the Khrushchev visit. Both for different reasons felt it was desirable that the coming visit be publicized at the earliest possible date. Selwyn felt that attention on the visit would take away from attention on a possible summit and might well give the British the talking point in that such a visit would ensure continuity of discussions. Both, however, felt early announcement with regard to the visit particularly if it came before a possible recess or break up next week would be very important in that it would not then be interpreted as having been arranged as a result of the breakdown of the Geneva Conference and as a result of the President’s feeling that he could perhaps alone negotiate where the three powers had failed. I think the foregoing consideration is of real importance. Already the story has leaked out of Washington with regard to a possible Western summit meeting and we are frankly living in dread of a leak on the Khrushchev visit which would not be given the slant which would come from our making the first surprise announcement ourselves.

As I see possible timetable ahead, it would be this. End of August or early September meeting Paris Western heads of state around September 10, Khrushchev visit to US. Around September 20 (if British election dates allow) Foreign Ministers continue discussions New York. October 20, President returns Khrushchev visit with ensuing travel. November 5, Foreign Ministers again meet either to continue Berlin talks or if progress made arrange for summit meeting. End of November or early December, a summit meeting. In laying out above, I realize many considerations may intervene but it is important at least to have some type of schedule in mind to work toward.

Your suggested reply to Macmillan⁴ just received and will get you our reaction to that as well as report on talks with Gromyko tomorrow at earliest moment.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–HE/7–2859. Top Secret; No Distribution.
1. The sessions took place at noon and 3 p.m.
2. The opening session of OAS was scheduled for August 12 at Santiago, Chile.
3. No record of this conversation has been found.
4. The draft was transmitted in Tocah 196, July 28 at 12:31 p.m. and received in Geneva at 7:08 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 110:11–HE/7–2759) For text, see Document 493 and footnotes 3 and 4 thereto.