484. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower0
Dear Friend, I fully understand and share your anxiety about the maintenance of our rights in Berlin unimpaired by any interim agreement. In our agreeing to a moratorium it must be clearly understood that at the end of the period fixed our rights have not been affected and we return to a position of negotiation with our rights as they are now. Nor of course must either side take any unilateral action during the moratorium. In a word, my concept of the moratorium is like a period [Page 1074] that sometimes elapses between the acts of a play—“X” years pass, and when the curtain rises again the negotiation is resumed with us all, including the Russians, in the same position as we are today.
As I understand the latest exchanges in Geneva, that is the position which Gromyko is now accepting. If the formula of the Western proposal of June 16 is taken as a basis, that should be good enough for us. This I think could be called progress certainly when we compare it first with the ultimatum of November 27, 1958, and secondly with the Soviet proposals of the 10th and 19th June. In fact the discussions at Geneva have been useful and have served to narrow the differences and to provide the outline of at least an agreement for a moratorium over Berlin.
Now for the length of the moratorium. What I suppose we want is a period of at least two and a half years which would take us over the next German elections. It is a matter of judgment whether we are likely to get such a period at the Foreign Ministers Meeting or whether it would be better to leave it for the Heads of Government. The question is at which meeting the better bargain can be made. On the question of nuclear armaments in Berlin and the rights of military and civilian access during the moratorium, the Foreign Secretaries are already within a measurable distance of agreement. The level of our forces in Berlin is a very important point with regard to which we must remember the morale of the West Berliners. I feel this is a matter which can only be finally resolved at a meeting of the Heads of Government.
That leaves the question of how to discuss the whole German problem during the moratorium. The Russians’ first position was to insist on an All-German Committee. Ours was a Four Power Commission. I believe that this is also a matter which could be left for discussion at the Meeting of Heads of Government, with a probability of some satisfactory intermediate formula being found.
The Foreign Secretaries have worked now for something like eight weeks, and I fear that if they go on talking much more things may begin to go backward rather than forward. So I hope you will feel that we should now proceed to tell the Foreign Ministers to prepare for a Summit on the basis of the progress already made. That being so, I have been extremely interested in what Chris told Selwyn of your approach to Koslov and Khrushchev’s reply. You certainly gained a great deal out of this because although he is making these rather hostile noises publicly he is obviously anxious to visit the United States and to talk with you. The question which Chris has discussed with Selwyn is what should be the next step. Having regard to your plans and my preoccupations, the opening date for a Summit must either be during the last days of August or, at the latest, September 1, or postponed until some time to suit you at the end of October, or the beginning of November.
[Page 1075]There are two difficulties about the later date. First it involves the Russians being willing to wait as long as that and secondly if Mr. Khrushchev’s visit to the United States takes place, it would be difficult to avoid discussions of substance on the matters outstanding. You would probably find this embarrassing. It might cause considerable suspicion on the part of the French and Germans, nor would my public position be very easy to explain. I therefore would much prefer the earlier date.
This involves our bringing the Foreign Ministers Meeting to a very rapid conclusion. That still leaves the question of procedure.
As I understand it, you now owe Khrushchev an answer to his message about your invitation. I would suggest that in view of all these considerations you should in your reply couple the idea of his visit to the United States with a proposal for a formal Summit Meeting in Washington or Quebec, towards the end of August. To give a choice of place might be easier for de Gaulle. At the same time as you issue this invitation you might issue similar invitations to a Summit to de Gaulle and myself, and inform Adenauer of what you were doing. I assume that there would be no fixed agenda for the Summit but after dealing with these German questions, we could perhaps pass on to other questions, for instance, in what forum a substantive discussion on disarmament might best take place.
At the same time as asking de Gaulle and me to come to a Summit, you might suggest a Western Summit including Adenauer to meet in Paris a week or ten days before.
If Khrushchev and I were to accept this plan, I do not see how de Gaulle could stand out in view of your most generous suggestion of coming to Paris beforehand.
With warm regard,
As ever,