Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

360. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom⁰

Washington, June 3, 1959, 8:10 p.m.

10647. Deliver following message to Prime Minister from the President. Advise date time delivery.

“June 3, 1959

Dear Harold:

I am glad that you have given Selwyn such firm support. Before your cable¹ arrived I had sent to Herter a message² telling him that I thought Selwyn had developed well in his post and that in my opinion he was doing a fine job. I think your statement should neutralize any damage done to his prestige by the Times article of June first.

This morning I shall be in a press conference³ and I shall undoubtedly be questioned closely about any discernible progress at Geneva and therefore the possibility of a Summit Conference.

As you know, I adhere to my position that a Summit meeting based on nothing more than wishful thinking would be a disaster. The world would interpret such a move as being a virtual surrender, while Soviet prestige would be enhanced.

On the other hand, we agreed in our conversations at Camp David⁴ that we could afford to make a rather liberal definition of progress. While I agree that a document formulating our two positions would be a useful document, I do think we must also have something recognizable as a specific accomplishment. For example there might be included as a prerequisite in your formula something of this sort: “Since the Geneva Conference is partially a result of the crisis of Berlin, created by the Soviet Union, there must be an agreement confirming the continuing status of Berlin pending the reunification of Germany.” I do not see how any of us can with self-respect go to a Summit meeting unless such a statement has been issued by the Soviets or an agreement to this effect has been consummated.

While I shall not try to give at my press conference a full list of the things that would spell additional real progress at the Foreign Ministers’ meetings, we might hope for a widening of contacts between the two sides of the Iron Curtain, particularly in the fields of press exchanges, books and travel by private citizens. Other ways in which progress might be achieved would be by some firm agreement for initial steps in banning of particular tests and control thereof.

I repeat that the production by the Foreign Ministers of a reasonable paper for us to work on at a Summit Conference, together with the assurance that there will be no further attempts to restrict our rights and privileges with respect to Berlin, constitute the very minimum that would justify a Summit meeting.

These are not new ideas; so far as I know, all of us are agreed on them.

With warm regard,

As ever, Ike”

[Here follows text of Macmillan’s June 2 message to Eisenhower.]

Murphy

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling. Drafted at the White House and approved by Murphy.
1. Macmillan’s message, June 2, was repeated to London at the end of Eisenhower’s message in this telegram. Macmillan stated that he hoped there would be sufficient progress at Geneva to hold a summit meeting. In particular he thought that not very much progress was required, perhaps only an agreed formulation of the two positions would be enough. On June 3, however, Macmillan told Whitney that he doubted whether Khrushchev really was anxious for a summit meeting. The Prime Minister thought that the Soviet Union would break off the Geneva talks and sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, an eventuality that he believed the West was completely unprepared for. (Telegram 6338 from London, June 3; ibid., Central Files, 396.1/6–359)
2. See Document 357.
3. See footnote 6, Document 351.
4. See Documents 234–241.