Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

358. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/75

Geneva, June 3, 1959, 3:30 p.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Secretary McElroy
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Ambassador Thompson
• United Kingdom
  • Mr. Lloyd
  • Sir Anthony Rumbold
  • Mr. Hancock
• U.S.S.R.
  • Mr. Gromyko
  • Mr. Zorin
  • Mr. Malik
  • Mr. Soldatov
• France
  • Couve de Murville
  • M. Lucet
  • M. Laloy

SUBJECT

• Discussion of Western and Soviet Positions on Berlin

Lloyd opened the discussion by referring to the draft protocol¹ which the Soviets had submitted at the last meeting.² He would speak frankly as there was no use having private talks unless we were prepared to be frank. Making clear that he was speaking for all three Western Powers, he said the Soviet document put forward proposals which the Western Powers had already clearly said were unacceptable and it put forward no new proposals. The Western objections were briefly as follows:

1. The document seemed to extinguish allied rights in Berlin which existed by right of conquest.

2. The proposal would establish a third state on Berlin soil.

3. There was nothing in the document about East Berlin, therefore, it was no solution to the Berlin problem.

4. It provided for the introduction of Soviet troops into West Berlin with no corresponding provision in regard to East Berlin.

5. It associated the GDR with the agreement by including them in the proposed international commission, giving the GDR a kind of supervisory status and providing for reports to be submitted to it.

6. It made no provision for free political life and economic stability in West Berlin nor did it contain any provisions with regard to access. It also contravened the will of the West Berliners to which they had often given expression most recently in 1958.

7. The document constituted a wrong approach by putting forward something which we could not accept even as a basis for discussion. He realized that Gromyko had said the same thing about the Western proposal.

Gromyko said their document should be considered in connection with their proposals on West Berlin. The Soviet document related to guarantees. With respect to access, provision was made in the protocol for the conclusion of a special agreement on this question. He said the GDR was on the same footing as other powers since West Berlin was in the center of the GDR. He did not consider that the provision in the protocol regarding GDR participation should be considered a recognition of that government. This was a separate question but it was unjust to deny to the GDR the right of participation in the agreement. The Soviet proposal provided two alternatives with respect to Berlin, that is, there could either be the presence of troops of the four powers or of neutrals. He inquired whether there was anything unacceptable in the document.

Lloyd said there were some things with which we could agree. We agreed our purpose was the right of West Berlin to choose its form of society. We agreed that free access was part of the necessary arrangement for a free way of life. We agreed that our occupation was symbolic and we also agreed that there could be a commission of some kind. These were elements on which we could negotiate. However, a protocol which envisaged equal GDR participation, which dealt only with West Berlin, and which brought Soviet troops to West Berlin furnished no basis for negotiation.

Gromyko asked what kind of a commission we proposed.

Couve said a commission was important but it was to implement certain arrangements between us. It was first necessary to agree on principles and then see how they could be carried out in practice. A question that always came between us was that of the GDR. It was not possible to have a commission of the four of us and the GDR.

Gromyko agreed that the commission was not the important thing and that the main point was what kind of arrangement could be arrived at.

Mr. Herter said he agreed we should not start with the commission until we knew what it was to do. The Soviet protocol was based on premises that were unacceptable since it would start by wiping out our rights. We had made plain that we could not have those rights extinguished unilaterally until there was agreement on the reunification of Germany. The framework had to be the rights that we now have. When Gromyko spoke of dangers we stated we were willing to talk about them. He said we also believed there were dangers to the people of West Berlin. If an agreement was carried out along the lines the Soviets proposed, we believed the people of West Berlin could be strangled. We had lived for some time with tensions—the present tensions that the Soviets had created. The position which the Western Powers had put forward today was a final one and we suggested that we start from this.

Gromyko said Mr. Herter had used the words “within the framework of our rights”. Could he give a definition of those rights?

Mr. Herter said that the rights were clear and were part of the agreements we had with the Soviets. The elements of tension had been created by the Soviets saying they would turn over access routes to someone we did not recognize.

Gromyko said that tension was created by the presence of Western troops.

Mr. Herter pointed out that for 10 years the Soviets had not referred to this as a danger. We had been prepared to talk in regard to Berlin and have presented a number of proposals in good faith. Both Mr. Gromyko and the head of the Soviet Government had said that our proposals were not negotiable. We were equally frank in saying the Soviet proposals were non-negotiable. We were agreed on only one thing, namely, that Germany should be reunified. We should begin our talks on the basis of our troops remaining in Berlin and our having free access to that city. Gromyko observed that Mr. Herter was now discussing the general question of Germany. He had thought we were discussing Berlin.

Mr. Herter said we were discussing Berlin as part of our proposals. He had brought the matter up in connection with the subject of tensions.

Gromyko said the Western Powers had not made any proposals to reduce tensions or to improve the situation. They had mentioned improvements but he did hot know what they had in mind. Could they submit in writing what they meant by “within the framework of our rights”?

Couve said the Soviets had raised the question of Berlin on the ground of the dangers they saw there. The Western Powers were prepared to consider their views and proposals. First with respect to the views, he said he was not convinced by what Gromyko had said of dangers as he had produced no proof. Nothing new had happened requiring drastic measures to prevent incidents. It was up to the Soviets to make proposals. The Western Powers were not completely negative and had included Berlin in their proposals. Gromyko had rejected these. The Western Powers had the Soviet paper which they could not take as a basis for discussion. They had repeatedly said they were prepared to see what could be done on the basis that there was no possibility at this time of a solution of the German problem. He said they had put on paper what they thought were lines on which the Soviet worries could be discussed. He emphasized these were Soviet worries, not Western ones. He then read the Western document³ and pointed out that the first paragraph answered the question Gromyko had put with respect to rights. He pointed out that there were three paragraphs on which we were prepared to discuss certain points in order to meet Soviet views. One of these paragraphs dealt with the level of forces. Another dealt with such matters as agitation, subversion and espionage. Then there was the question of access. After reading the pertinent paragraph, he said it had been framed in this way since we did not know what the Soviets wanted. Free access already existed in two ways. The most important was the access for civilian needs, such as traffic in goods, post and telegraph, etc. This right was reaffirmed in 1949 and is under supervision by the GDR at the border point. In the second place, there was freedom of access for Western military needs which was covered by special agreements between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union. It was also covered or referred to in the Bolz–Zorin agreements⁴ in that the Soviets had not transferred this function to the East German authorities. The Soviets said they had no intention of interfering with these communications. The Western Powers did not know what Gromyko had in mind when he said he wished to change these arrangements. The last paragraph of the Western paper stated it would continue in force until German reunification. This was an idea which Mr. Gromyko himself had expressed. These were ideas and not expressed in treaty language.

Gromyko said he wished to make certain preliminary observations. We had stated our position and the Soviets had put forward theirs. He inquired how this document could be considered as a basis for negotiation. This was impossible because it was one-sided. They had come to Geneva to reach agreement on all questions, including Berlin. If this was the Western position the outlook was very gloomy.

Mr. Herter said he found Mr. Gromyko’s remark very strange since in this document the West had made all of the concessions and there were none called for on the part of the Soviet Union.

Gromyko inquired what concessions were made.

Mr. Herter mentioned as an example that we gave up our right to increase our forces. Gromyko said the Soviets had been talking about reductions.

Couve said we stated we could accept a limitation.

Gromyko said not one soldier was withdrawn—where was the concession?

Mr. Herter said we had the right to increase pur forces and were making a concession in offering to limit the number.

Gromyko said we were worried about guarantees.

Couve denied this and said we were not worried.

Mr. Herter said our only worry was that the Soviets might go back on their word.

Couve said that access was presently guaranteed. The Soviets wanted some change. We were prepared to examine their proposals.

Gromyko said the Soviets wanted to give up their functions. We were worried about access. The Soviets were prepared to give guarantees on this subject. Some 14 years had passed and they wished to put things in order. The Soviets had no occupation rights but they fulfilled some functions regarding access.

Couve said the Soviets had said they would take unilateral action to abolish their guarantees. We had protested this. Now the position was different in that he had not so far spoken of unilateral action. He had suggested that we look at the question of access which we were prepared to do but he was not specific. He merely said the GDR existed.

Gromyko said this was a substantial fact. With respect to unilateral action they had refrained so far from any such actions hoping they could reach agreement with the Western Powers. He would still like to hope but he could not understand when we represented paragraph 4 of our paper as a concession.

Mr. Herter said we had a right at present to increase our troops.

Gromyko said opinion differed on this. He did not see any willingness on the part of the Western Governments to facilitate a solution on a mutually acceptable basis.

Couve asked what he did not like about our proposals.

Gromyko said it was not a question of changing a few words. What was important was the direction in which our document led. The presence of Western troops constituted the danger. The West had ignored Soviet worries and their position.

With respect to paragraph 3 he pointed out that East Berlin was a part of the GDR. The Government of the GDR had made a declaration which constituted an obligation not to cause tension regarding East and West Berlin.

Mr. Herter said he would be glad to give Gromyko more illustrations of how the East Germans were carrying out their declaration.

Gromyko said he did not know on what date the declaration was made.

Mr. Herter said the illustrations he gave were of events that had taken place since this conference began.

Mr. Gromyko said he had spoken with the GDR representatives and they denied Mr. Herter’s allegations. He could not say himself. In his opinion the main source was in West Berlin. He had a long dossier which gave dates and named names establishing what was being done in West Berlin but he did not think this was the best route to follow. He had made proposals in regard to access.

Couve observed that they were not precise.

Gromyko said he would think the matter over and perhaps could formulate them more precisely. He said with respect to paragraph 5 of the Western paper there was no question and that he thought on this point an understanding had been reached. With respect to paragraph 1, he had made many statements about the Soviet position on rights and so had Mr. Khrushchev. The Soviet position was clear and he inquired why this was raised in written form. Would the West consider that an agreement already existed and whether procedures should be worked out. There was another alternative which was to put aside the question of rights so that it would not interfere with the making of concrete arrangements. He stressed that these were preliminary views.

Mr. Herter said that the reason we attached importance to the reaffirmation of rights was that this question had arisen last November when the Soviets began by saying we had forfeited our rights by violating the Potsdam Agreement. Then, Mr. Khrushchev said we did have rights. We had been in some doubts until Gromyko now said these rights exist. It was, therefore, natural that we should raise the question.

Gromyko said that we should not ask him to undersign rights of occupation in Berlin fourteen years after the end of the war. The Western logic was that “since you do not like the situation in Berlin, please confirm it”.

Couve said with respect to paragraph 3 that we had mentioned Greater Berlin. If there were a source of tension in Berlin from subversive and other activities, it was on both sides. Gromyko himself had mentioned the possibility of reciprocal arrangements in East and West Berlin. He knew that Gromyko considered the GDR responsible in East Berlin. If agreement were reached among the Four Powers on access, this meant that there would be some sort of agreement between the Soviets and the GDR. He had mentioned a declaration between the GDR and the Soviet Union. With respect to the subject of propaganda and subversive activities, we considered that the same basis could be used.

Gromyko said that he had in mind the declaration which the GDR had already made. In West Berlin nothing had been done.

Couve said that if we made an agreement between the Four Powers all of them would be responsible. The Western Powers could get in touch with the West Berlin Government and the Soviets could get in touch with the GDR or East Berlin but we would be responsible each to the other.

Gromyko pointed out that he was being expected to undersign an agreement maintaining the occupation of Berlin, maintaining our troops in Berlin, and a provision for Greater Berlin. This did not constitute a proposition and he could almost assume it had been put forward to make him angry.

Mr. Herter said quite solemnly that this was the very maximum to which the Western Powers could go and he was surprised that Mr. Gromyko had not been appreciative of this.

Mr. Gromyko said he was sorry the Western Powers were so critical of the Soviet Protocol. He remarked that they considered the idea of a Commission was useful.

Mr. Lloyd said he was not sure he understood Mr. Gromyko. Apparently he agreed with our paragraph 1 but was not prepared to say so. With respect to paragraph 2, the difference lay in whether or not Soviet troops were to be added to West Berlin. With respect to paragraph 3, Gromyko objected to the Greater Berlin area but he could not understand that Gromyko objected to doing something about propaganda and subversion. He had said nothing about paragraph 4. He said he agreed with paragraph 5.

Gromyko said, with respect to troops, the West had talked about symbolic reduction of troops but now talked about symbolic troops. The Soviets talked about symbolic presence.

Lloyd asked what about Gromyko’s objections to the Greater Berlin area. Gromyko said he did object to such an idea but agreed it was good to cease this kind of activity. The Government of the GDR had taken such an obligation. He would inform us of the date of their declaration.

Lloyd asked if he agreed on reciprocity.

Gromyko said that when the Central Government took an obligation it was more important than an undertaking by local officials.

Couve said the important thing was not what they said but what they did.

Gromyko said he considered this activity was carried out by one side.

Mr. Herter said it would be interesting to see the GDR declaration.

Gromyko said the Western Powers had been more precise when they talked about this subject than they were in the document.

Lloyd asked Gromyko what his opinion was on paragraph 4.

Gromyko said he had made several observations on this and the position was clear.

Couve observed that it was clear but not precise.

Gromyko inquired in what aspects.

Couve said we did not see what would be the change a) in the civilian traffic or, b) in military traffic.

Gromyko said the functions which the Soviets fulfilled would be fulfilled by Germans. He pointed out that 90 percent of the traffic was already controlled by Germans.

Couve asked if for military traffic the Soviets would substitute German agents for Soviet agents.

Gromyko replied by saying, “Germans”.

Lloyd asked if the Soviets would guarantee the rights and the Germans would carry them out.

Gromyko said that if agreement was reached the Soviets would guarantee.

Couve said we had agreements on military traffic and it was under Soviet responsibility. What we wished to know is would it remain under Soviet responsibility.

Gromyko said the Soviets would give a guarantee.

Lloyd asked if they would make some agreement with the East Germans.

Gromyko replied some kind of agreement with them would be necessary. The Soviets would cease to exercise certain functions. The Germans would take them over.

Couve remarked that the Soviets would have an agreement with the West and the Soviets would have an agreement with the GDR.

Gromyko said if we had an agreement the GDR would take part in assisting. If we did not want them to sign a document then they could issue a declaration. Then all four of us would take part in guarantees.

Mr. Herter asked what would happen if one day the DDR decided to stop our traffic.

Gromyko said this was an impossible example but pointed out that we would all be parties to the guarantee.

Couve pointed out that we had no power or responsibility in East Germany. The Soviets were responsible to us for access and the East Germans were responsible to the Soviets.

Gromyko said he could not accept the idea of the DDR as agents.

Lloyd said the four of us would guarantee freedom of access. The GDR would make a declaration and the Soviets would make their agreement with the DDR.

Gromyko said that they would make an agreement but it would be a simple one.

Mr. Herter asked if the agreement would establish the GDR as an occupying power.

Gromyko replied in the negative.

Mr. Herter said the Soviets proposed that they would turn over to someone else the responsibility that they had to us without consulting us. He inquired how we could guarantee the behavior of the GDR. If the GDR violated the arrangement, and this was a real responsibility [possibility], whose responsibility would that become?

Gromyko said if we did not believe in the GDR and in the capacity of the four powers then an agreement would be very difficult.

Lloyd asked what would happen if the GDR disagreed with the Soviet Union. As one of the participants would the Soviet Union be responsible.

Gromyko said that they would all look into it together. The Soviet Union had good relations with the GDR and was sure they would fulfill their agreements because they took this matter seriously.

Mr. Herter asked whom we go to if an American convoy was stopped on the Autobahn.

Gromyko said the first question was to determine in the agreement what should be passed—the number of trains, etc. Mr. Herter had raised a hypothetical situation and all of us would have to look into it.

Mr. Herter pointed out that differences do arise and inquired if we would be expected to go to a government we did not recognize.

Gromyko said the GDR would be participants whether their signature was on the same paper or not.

Mr. Herter said we have had some disagreements on access. Under this agreement to whom would we go?

Gromyko said we understood each other.

Couve said we understood each other but did not agree.

Lloyd said if he understood correctly there would be an agreement precisely on our access rights and a declaration by the GDR. If there was any difficulty we would go to the Soviet Union.

Gromyko said a system of guarantees could be worked out and these could all be in the same agreement or the Four Powers can sign an agreement and there would be a solemn declaration by the GDR and all parties would be responsible.

Couve said present obligations were clear. Our side carried out transport for the needs of a garrison with an obligation not to abuse this, for example, for commercial purposes. The Soviet obligation concerned transportation across the territory of their former zone—number of trains, etc. These arrangements could be confirmed or prolonged by agreement between the four of us. You tell us that your personnel are removed from check points and replace them with Germans. Then the Soviets make an agreement with the German authorities that they accept this responsibility. If difficulties arise we tell the Soviets in a form to be agreed upon and they arrange matters.

Gromyko said that Couve did not raise any new questions in his statement.

Mr. Herter suggested an alternative would be to have Germans at the check point responsible to the Four Powers.

Gromyko said this was not possible. As a sovereign state the GDR would undertake obligations. From the Western point of view it would be wrong to minimize their importance.

Couve said the GDR would take this responsibility in an agreement with the Soviet Union.

Gromyko said their agreement would be very simple. The Soviets would cease to perform certain functions and on a certain date, the GDR would take over the functions which they formerly fulfilled. This function was no longer that of the Soviet Union.

Lloyd said that it was a Soviet responsibility.

Gromyko remarked that this was for Four Powers.

Couve said that the GDR took over functions and responsibility. They were responsible to the Soviets.

Gromyko said he had already explained his position and did not accept that the GDR would be their agents.

Couve said that they would take over from the Soviets their responsibility and would be responsible to the Soviets.

Mr. Herter said it might be useful to seek in black and white what kind of agreement Gromyko had in mind to make with us and what kind of agreement with the East Germans.

Gromyko said it seemed to him that they had explained their position but we should all think together about the form of guarantees.

Mr. Herter said it was better to work from a piece of paper.

Mr. Gromyko said he wished to raise a new subject—that of the All German Committee. The Soviets had raised this in connection with the Peace Treaty and Dr. Grewe had mentioned it yesterday. The Western Powers knew the, Soviet position on the All German Committee, namely that it should be established by Germans. However, he said that we here could recommend to them to create such a Committee on the basis of parity—not 25—10. He pointed out that there are two sides. They may discuss the question of reunification of Germany by stages. They might discuss the question of the principles of a Peace Treaty as well. It would be advisable to establish a certain period of time for the Committee to complete its work such as within one year.

Mr. Herter asked if the Committee disagreed, would they then submit their two proposals to elections.

Gromyko said no, that this was outside of his proposal.

Mr. Herter asked if the principles of a Peace Treaty were to apply after reunification.

Gromyko suggested that it be left to the Germans to decide this. Let them try for one year to undertake these tasks. The terms of reference would be (1) to discuss reunification by stages and (2) the principles of a Peace Treaty.

After an interval in which Gromyko raised the question of Polish and Czech participation but quickly dropped it saying he regretted the Western attitude on this matter and made clear he wished to keep the matter open, Gromyko said to Mr. Herter that the matter that they had been discussing today was, of course, within the framework of their Berlin proposals.

It was agreed to hold another private meeting on Thursday and a plenary session on Friday.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1339. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Thompson and approved by Herter on June 4. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Cahto 65 from Geneva, June 4. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.00/6–459)
1. Document 349.
2. See Document 348.

3. This proposal reads:

   • “1. There can be no modification of the rights of the Western powers in Berlin on the basis of which various agreements have been concluded with the Soviet Union. Among these rights are the right to maintain troops there and the right of unrestricted access to Berlin.
   • “2. Under certain conditions the Western powers would be prepared to declare their intention not to increase the present level of the forces stationed in Berlin.
   • “3. They would similarly be prepared to consider ways in which, in the greater Berlin area and while respecting fundamental rights and liberties, arrangements which might be made to avoid illegal or clandestine activities which might either disturb public order or seriously affect the interests of the different parties.
   • “4. If the Soviet Government wishes to modify certain of the procedures regarding the present access arrangements, the Western powers would be prepared to examine its proposals.
   • “5. The various arrangements which might be agreed to would continue in force until the reunification of Germany.” (Cahto 64 from Geneva, June 3; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6–359)

4. See footnote 5, Document 31.