Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

35. Telegram From Department of State to the Embassy in Germany⁰

Washington, November 14, 1958, 9:25 p.m.

1002. Paris pass USRO. Despatch 1075, December 18, 1957;¹ your 1027,² Berlin’s 315, 316.³ Agree essential that GFR and Berlin authorities understand basis for tripartitely agreed contingency plans in event GDR officials replace Soviets at check points. Possible widespread dismay might be caused among Germans if we automatically apply agreed formula dating back to 1954 without informing them fully.

Accordingly, Section I of Policy Paper enclosed with reference despatch should (with tripartite concurrence) be discussed at appropriately high level with GER soonest, with strong caution concerning sensitivity of information. Berlin follow same procedure to inform Brandt. Stress should be placed on fact that these contingency plans, drawn up under High Commission and kept under review since, represent realistic attempt to adjust to possible new situations, on basis implied agency function of GDR officials but stop short of action recognizing GDR controls as sovereign right.

We are also concerned that NATO countries might misunderstand application agreed formula. However, security considerations probably make undesirable volunteer any discussion of subject in NAC unless raised by others or until it becomes apparent contingency planning will be put in effect. Hence propose mention contingency planning only in response to specific inquiries such as made by Italian Ambassador Brosio to Elbrick November 13.⁴ During general discussion Berlin situation (memorandum of conversation being pouched all addressee posts) Brosio asked how far we prepared to go in contact with GDR officials. It was explained that there has been considerable Allied contingency planning to meet various theoretical situations which might arise on Allied access routes. We would continue insist on ultimate Soviet responsibility, regarding GDR officials as essentially agents of Soviets. Obviously difficult problems involved in determining how far we can go in any given situation.

Concept of GDR officials acting as agents of Soviets was spelled out in earlier versions of contingency plans. We have noted failure to make specific reference to agency concept in latest Policy Paper but assume changed wording did not derive from abandonment of usefulness of concept for public purposes.

Embassy Bonn should immediately work out tripartitely agreed statement for release to press and NATO at moment it becomes necessary put contingency plans into operation.

Dulles

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11–1458. Secret. Drafted by McFarland; cleared with Eleanor Dulles, Kohler, and Fessenden; and approved by Hillenbrand. Repeated to Berlin, Rome, Moscow, London, and Paris.
1. See footnote 4, Document 34.
2. Telegram 1027, November 13, reported that the Federal Republic would appreciate being informed about the moves that were contemplated if the Soviet Union relinquished control of access to the East Germans. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/111358)
3. Regarding telegram 315, see footnote 5, Document 34. Regarding telegram 316, see footnote 3, Document 30.
4. A memorandum of Elbrick’s conversation with Brosio is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11–1358.