Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

340. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, May 29, 1959, 2 p.m.

Cahto 43. For the President from the Secretary.

“Dear Mr. President

I think the Four Foreign Ministers Conference aboard the plane¹ served a very useful purpose. A very full text of the substance of our conversations is being forwarded to the Department and will of course be available to you, but some of the highlights will I know be of special interest. The conversations were arranged so that the eight of us aboard the plane were seated in two sets of four seats across the aisle with the four Foreign Ministers sitting on the aisle. This allowed the conversations to be heard by each of us without any voice straining. I opened up the session by recounting briefly the events which had led to our meeting and the fact that it was the Russians who had expressed dissatisfaction with the situation in Berlin and that I felt Mr. Gromyko should talk to us frankly as to why the Russians were dissatisfied and what they felt might be done to remedy the situation. This led to a long exposé by Gromyko couched in moderate terms but with many of the old familiar arguments. There were of course interruptions with questions from time to time. When it came down to specific proposals and exchanges of views, Mr. Gromyko was quite explicit and at least from our point of view three favorable developments ensued:

1. That any arrangement with respect to Berlin would be considered temporary pending German reunification;

2. That the Russians would give very explicit guarantees with respect to the maintenance of the free order in Berlin both politically and economically and complete freedom of access to maintain that position, and that the Russians could assure that similar guarantees would be given by the East Germans either in adhering to the same document or in a separate declaration, and that the Russians would accept some form of recognition by the U.N. to observe and report on how they were being carried out;

3. That Allied troops together with some Russian contingent could remain in West Berlin as a token presence of the four responsible powers.

The completely unacceptable concept from our point of view of Gromyko’s suggestions lays in two particulars. First that in any new agreement our occupational rights would be given up in favor of the new arrangements and, second, that a contingent of Russian troops should be stationed in West Berlin together with the troops of the three Allied powers. On the latter point, it is my guess that we can probably talk the Russians out of the Russian presence. With respect to the former, I think they may stand pat and it is possible that we could get a Berlin negotiation narrowed down to this one point for settlement at a Summit Conference. However, until the above favorable points have been firmed up through discussions of written documents, I have no certainty that they will stick.

The atmosphere of the talks was good and I feel that your own courtesies to Gromyko² as well as his inclusion with us aboard the plane have done much to at least relax tensions as between ourselves and may well be of very real importance in discussions to come.

Faithfully,

Signed: Chris”

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–HE/5–2959. Secret; Niact.
1. See Document 339.
2. See Document 338.