Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

249. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

USDEL/MC/16

Washington, March 31, 1959, 4:45 p.m.

TRIPARTITE-QUADRIPARTITE MEETINGS

SUBJECT

• Minutes of Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting of March 31, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The Acting Secretary
  • Mr. Murphy
  • Mr. Reinhardt
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Ambassador Burgess
  • Ambassador Bruce
  • Mr. Berding
  • Mr. Irwin
  • Mr. Knight
  • Mr. Hillenbrand
  • Mr. Timmons
  • Mr. Lampson
• UK
  • Selwyn Lloyd
  • Ambassador Caccia
  • Sir Frank Roberts
  • Lord Hood
  • Peter Hope
  • Anthony Rumbold
  • Patrick Hancock
  • Denis Laskey
  • John Drinkall
  • Donald Logan
• Federal Republic
  • Heinrich von Brentano
  • Albert van Scherpenberg
  • Georg Duckwitz
  • Georg Count Baudissin
  • Hans-Juergen Dietrich
  • Gunter von Hase
  • Hermann Kustrer (interpreter)
  • Ambassador Grewe
  • Franz Krapf
  • Rolf Pauls
• France
  • Maurice Couve de Murville
  • Ambassador Alphand
  • Charles Lucet
  • Jean Laloy
  • Pierre Baraduc
  • Jacques de Beaumarchais
  • Jean-Claude Winckler

Governor Herter opened the meeting by extending a warm welcome to the other Foreign Ministers and stressing the importance of the meeting. He then outlined the objectives of the meeting. The Foreign Ministers should give their formal approval to the agreed portions of the Working Group Report,¹ resolve as many as possible of the outstanding issues in the Report and instruct the Working Group to study the issues which remain unsolved and lay down policy guidance for the next Working Group session on the substance and presentation of the Western position. They should also agree on a report to be made to the NATO Council to be as complete as possible in giving their preliminary views. They should also report to the NATO Council on contingency planning measures.

Governor Herter then emphasized the importance of keeping publicity to a minimum. It was vital that nothing should detract from the emphasis which must be placed at this time on the unity of the West. There was great danger that any discussions outside of this room might be seized upon by the avid press and create an impression among the public of differences and divisions between the Four. He hoped that the Ministers could agree this afternoon on a non-substantive communiqué.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd warmly supported Governor Herter’s remarks about publicity. He hoped that they could agree on a line which would not be exceeded and that it would be understood that no additional information would be given.

Herr von Brentano began his remarks by saying that he had not had an opportunity fully to analyze the Working Group report. The report had only been submitted to the German Government last Thursday and the Government had not completely finished its analysis. Thus he hoped that the report would only be discussed along general lines and no decisions about particulars would be taken at this time until the German Government had fully considered the implications of the Report.

Governor Herter pointed out that the work of the Working Group would be thoroughly reviewed again at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on April 27 in Paris. Mr. Couve de Murville added that everything that was done at this time was revisable. He hoped that the Ministers would not feel that they would be prevented from beginning discussion of the substance of the report at this time and would find themselves unable to give guidance to the Working Group.

Governor Herter then commented on the general approach of the United States Government to the plan which had been prepared by the Working Group. It considered the plan to be one comprehensive package. This package should be designed so that it would appear reasonable and would receive Western public support. If this was agreed it would provide the Working Group with a general frame of reference. It was especially important that the principle is clearly spelled out that the various parts of the package are inseparable. The other side would undoubtedly attempt to pick out bits and pieces of the plan which suited them and would try to get them accepted independently of the other features of the plan. This would be extremely dangerous. It must be made absolutely clear that the Western plan is a unit and must be taken as a whole or not at all.

Governor Herter then asked Herr von Brentano to comment in general on German thinking on the subject of reunification.

Herr von Brentano then summarized some of the general considerations in the light of which the German Government viewed the plan of the Working Group. Anything which led in the direction of a confederation was completely unacceptable. It was impossible to have a confederation between states or parts of states which are built upon different principles—which do not agree at least on the basic objectives which they have in mind. One has only to refer to the stated objectives of the Soviet Zone to see how completely incompatible they are with those of the Federal Republic. Any plan which provided for the formation of an all-German body composed of representatives chosen by the Soviet Zone regime would mean that the body would include some Communists who were in no way representative of the German people. He therefore had serious objections to the alternate plan suggested by the American delegation to the Working Group.² If we adopt such thoughts we would find ourselves approaching the concept of a confederation. It would be particularly dangerous to allow such a body to draft a constitution. Providing for a referendum would be no safeguard. The population would be quite uncritical if called upon to vote for a constitution if they felt that an affirmative vote would bring about reunification. They would vote in a highly emotional frame of mind and would accept practically any constitution rather than placing themselves in a position of voting against reunification by voting against the constitution. There was a great danger that such a constitution would leave the Soviet Zone free and unfettered to infiltrate the Federal Republic.

He also expressed the opinion that any group composed on the basis of Laender in the Soviet Zone and the Federal Republic would prove to be an unreliable body in terms of drafting a constitution. The delegates from the Eastern Laender would not be representative of the people. There was a great danger that some Western delegates having affinities with leftist groups would work together with delegates from the Soviet Zone in producing a constitution which would tend to become a communist constitution and would not provide the necessary safeguards for democratic institutions. A referendum would provide no safeguard.

Herr von Brentano said that he also had serious objections to the idea of giving the Laender parliaments competence to deal with economic and social affairs. The Federal Government recognizes that it would be impossible to transfer the institutions of West Germany to the Soviet Zone in one single act. It would be extremely difficult to make such transfers. But to place power to deal with social and economic institutions in the hands of legislatures under the strict control of the SED would contribute to the disintegration of Germany. It would be unthinkable to set up in such a small area as the Soviet Zone social and economic institutions different from those in the rest of Germany. Such a proposal would be quite impracticable.

Herr von Brentano concluded that we must find other ways and means than those proposed here which were completely wrong.

Governor Herter commented that the proposals which had been approved by the Working Group had been based on thoughts which had been contributed largely by the German members of the Group.

Herr von Brentano replied that it had been valuable that the Working Group had made a number of proposals and their discussions had not been dogmatic in tone but their recommendations now had to be considered very carefully.

Governor Herter added that the views expressed by Herr von Brentano had never been reflected in the discussions of the Working Group which had begun its discussions in February.

Herr von Brentano replied that this showed the need for further detailed analysis. It would be dishonest on his part if he concealed his views. The Working Group had only a limited time in which to work. The task of the Foreign Ministers was to examine all points and raise objections as necessary. He had to emphasize that he would be very disturbed if the proposal outlined in the Working Group paper was accepted. It would lead to a situation similar to that which had existed in Czechoslovakia.

Herr von Brentano then referred to the German paper³ which had been submitted toward the end of the Working Group session. It contained the idea of introducing preliminary conditions for cooperation between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone. This would provide some way for reducing the tension between the two parts of the country which he had referred to previously. The recognition of human rights and political liberties by the Soviet Zone was a necessary precondition for any political collaboration with the GDR.

Herr von Brentano concluded by saying that most of his remarks had been directed against the alternate plan proposed by the U.S. delegation. The first proposals which had been approved by the Working Group as a whole did not go nearly so far. For example, they did not speak of a constitution being drafted by a body which was not elected and did not have any provisions dealing with the competencies of the Laender.

Governor Herter asked the German Foreign Minister whether the German plan on preconditions had been drafted by Ambassador Grewe and was conceived of as a reserve position in case it was desirable to propose direct East-West German conversations. He then asked whether Herr von Brentano would be prepared to submit a proposal tomorrow which the Group could consider. Herr von Brentano replied that he would submit a paper tomorrow.

Mr. Couve de Murville summed up the position of the German Foreign Minister. As he understood it there were three proposals on German reunification. First was the approved plan contained in Annex I of the Working Group Report; second was the American alternate plan; third was the supplementary plan which had been prepared by Ambassador Grewe. He understood that the German Foreign Minister had strong reservations about the second and the third. He wondered whether the Germans believed there were elements of at least the first plan which could be kept. Herr von Brentano said Mr. Couve de Murville’s summation was correct.

Governor Herter suggested that discussion of particulars about what the Germans were willing to accept be postponed until tomorrow since Herr von Brentano had promised to introduce a paper at that time. It would be more profitable to continue the discussion on the basis of this paper.

Mr. Couve de Murville then said that he wished to discuss another part of the Working Group report—namely, the section on security measures and disarmament. He referred to the mention of the limitation of forces in paragraph six and at the end of paragraph 31 in stage II. These paragraphs related the total force levels of the Four Powers to limitations in an area comprising Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia and to progress towards reunification. He had grave doubts about the wisdom of these measures. He did not see the connection between limitations of the total forces of the Four Powers and the German question. In short he questioned the wisdom of linking general disarmament to German reunification and European security. He did not think it would facilitate the discussion of German reunification to make it dependent on progress in general disarmament. He did not think this sounded like a serious proposal. Therefore he doubted that it would have appeal for public opinion.

Governor Herter said that he agreed that we would not want the discussion of German reunification to turn into a discussion of disarmament. He pointed out that the plan contained no commitment on the limitation of arms except as part of an agreement also providing for the settlement of political questions. He disagreed, however, in his estimate about public reactions. He thought the idea of concomitant progress towards disarmament would have a great deal of public appeal. He added that both the U.S. and the French had insisted on the connection between the reduction of troops of the major powers and progress in the settlement of political questions.

Mr. Couve de Murville replied that he thought we had always put things the other way around. We had never made progress on reunification dependent on disarmament. Governor Herter repeated that he thought if the two were represented as going hand in hand this would have a considerable appeal to public opinion. If it were possible to secure reunification independently of disarmament this would probably be highly desirable but most people did not think this was so. There is a natural feeling that the reduction of tensions which would result from progress in disarmament would increase the chances for reunification.

Mr. Couve de Murville replied that one should make a distinction between general disarmament and European security. We had long been in favor of special measures in the European security field. But general disarmament was quite a different matter.

Herr von Brentano said that we were all aware that under present circumstances there was no such thing as European security in isolation. This would only produce insecurity. It is necessary and logical that a beginning be made in the disarmament field. What is essential, however, is that one does not stop at the first step in disarmament. Progress must continue step by step. Unless there were this kind of progression there would be a danger of a change in the military balance of power to our disadvantage. Governor Herter commented that this view was shared by the U.S. military experts.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd directed the attention of the other speakers to specific paragraphs of the Working Group paper. He said he understood that Herr von Brentano had objected to paragraphs 16 through 20 of Annex A of the Working Group Report. But they do not have the same objections to paragraphs 8 through 15. He understood that the Germans considered that the latter paragraphs could be discussed. Referring to the French distaste for paragraphs 6 and 31, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said that his view on these sections would depend upon what was in the rest of the paper.

Governor Herter pointed out that the parts in the paper dealing with disarmament would bring us close to the 1957 London disarmament proposals. Mr. Couve de Murville asked what was the use of doing so. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd commented that it was getting to be a question of what would be left in the plan. He asked the Germans what they thought of the staged approach to reunification.

Herr von Brentano said he believed it was essential that the creation of any all-German body must be preceded by the reestablishment of political freedoms in the Soviet Zone. Otherwise there would be Communist party delegates in the all-German body who would block reunification. We cannot build on the basis of two Germanies or two parts of Germany which are totally different in structure and ideology. We must find some kind of a democratic basis on which to build. Once this has been done there would be no objection to steps such as are butlined in the plan.

Governor Herter asked how he thought these democratic processes could be created. Herr von Brentano replied that if it could not be done then we could not make any progress toward reunification. There would be no way of proceeding. He could not accept any method which would turn the German people over to Communist rule.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said that he could understand Herr von Brentano’s point about the danger of having a constitution drafted by a non-representative group in which Communists had a say. But supposing this constitution-drafting proposal were dropped, would the Germans then rule out closer contacts between East Germans and West Germans?

Herr von Brentano replied that they had always tried to increase contacts between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone. They strove to promote freedom of movement. They would welcome anything which could be done to do away with the obstacles and handicaps which separated Germans in the Federal Republic and in the Zone. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd then asked whether the German objection to the all-German committee provided for in the Phased Plan applied only to the question of the constitution. Herr von Brentano agreed that was their main objection, but that they also disliked the Laender competency feature.

Governor Herter then turned the discussion to the question of whether to table a peace treaty or the principles of a peace treaty. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said this really broke down into two questions. Should we table a peace treaty? If so, what should be in it?

Governor Herter summarized the U.S. position. It seemed clear that the Soviet Union would insist on discussing a peace treaty. We felt that we would be in a stronger position if we had a peace treaty of our own from which to talk rather than being forced to discuss a Soviet draft. This would seem to leave the initiative to the Soviets and put us in a poor and defensive public posture. We could either table a draft or principles of a peace treaty on the understanding that when there was an agreement in principle we would table a draft.

Mr. Couve de Murville said that frankly he was not sure that we should put ourselves in the position of discussing a peace treaty. We would find ourselves talking about the possibility of a peace treaty with two Germanies. What would be the purpose of a peace treaty? Almost all the questions involved in such a treaty have been regulated by agreements between the Western Powers and the Federal Republic on one hand and the USSR and the Soviet Zone on the other. Only two questions remain to be settled. They are frontiers and the military status of Germany. So long as there are two Germanies we cannot discuss these questions.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd pointed out that we have now agreed to go to a conference at which a peace treaty will be discussed. There would be a tactical advantage in presenting a draft. We would not be able to evade the discussion of a treaty. There would be a spurious advantage appealing to the uninformed if we had our own draft.

Governor Herter explained that we would naturally be agreed that there would be only one treaty with one Germany. There would be some appeal in comparing what we have to offer to what the USSR has offered.

Herr von Brentano expressed his concern about a peace treaty which went into details. This would bring about a discussion which would certainly be to the disadvantage of the future all-German government. He thought it much better to state principles. The first of these principles would be that only a democratically constituted all-German government could speak for the German people and conduct negotiations on their behalf. It was much better to focus public attention on this point than to permit this question to be set to one side while discussions go on about details on a peace settlement. He agreed, however, that we would obviously have to discuss the question of a peace settlement. He thought the advantage lay on the side of presenting a statement of principles. The best subject on which to center an argument with the USSR on this subject was the question who will be the German partner. If it were a question of stating general principles these could be extracted from the Bonn Conventions⁴ with the exception of the question of frontiers and military status.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd asked whether a statement of principles could deal with the question of frontiers. Herr von Brentano replied that this was a very difficult internal question. Moreover, the Federal Republic obviously could not bind an all-German government. But the Federal Government could state with the approval of the Bundestag that it was ready to make guarantees to its Eastern neighbors that it would not use force in the settlement of any questions outstanding between them and to enter into discussions with them on these questions. This could lead to the opening of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic and the countries to the east of it. This plan had been outlined at the first meeting of the Working Group.

Governor Herter then circulated a draft statement to the press⁵ which was accepted by the Group with minor amendments. The meeting was adjourned until 10:30 a.m. the following day.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1235. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lampson and approved by Herter on April 15, The meeting was held at the Department of State. A summary of this conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 2297, April 1. (Ibid., CF 1226) For another account of the four Foreign Ministers discussion of the Working Group report and particularly the German position, see Grewe, Rückblenden, pp. 396–399.
1. See Document 242.
2. Reference is to the U.S. four-stage plan for German reunification, submitted to the Working Group on March 12; see Document 242.
3. See footnote 1, Document 239.
4. For texts of the conventions signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 111 ff.
5. Not printed. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1226)