Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

226. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, March 17, 1959, 9:45–11:13 a.m.

• OTHERS PRESENT
• Secretary Herter
• Deputy Under Secretary Murphy
• Assistant Secretary Merchant
• Mr. Reinhardt
• Mr. Hagerty
• General Goodpaster
• Major Eisenhower

Secretary Herter explained the reason for his requesting this meeting: to summarize for the President matters which Prime Minister Macmillan might bring up on his forthcoming visit.

Before addressing the briefing book,¹ the President remarked about his surprise this morning, in reading the newspapers, to see that his speech² of the night before had been interpreted as agreeing to a summit meeting. As a related issue, the President expressed perplexity over the inconsistent reports which he receives from Macmillan on the one hand and from de Gaulle or Adenauer on the other with regard to the conclusions being reached in high-level talks in Paris and Bonn. Mr. Hagerty and Mr. Murphy agreed that the reports coming from the British, French and Germans had been inconsistent.

The President then went on to describe Adenauer’s stated view that summit talks should be routine affairs rather than one-time operations. Adenauer believes there should be a series of such meetings. The President remarked at the readiness of people to tell the President of the United States to chase all over the world.

Secretary Herter then touched on the matter of contingency planning. He expected that in the meeting to be held later in the day this matter would be clarified.³ He expressed the hope that our current plans would undergo minimum change. We are currently receiving reports from overseas as to the exact details of what is going on. State is satisfied with the instructions as they stand, but Defense desires more precision.

The President mentioned the question posed by Ambassador Lodge as to the possible use of the UN. Secretary Herter answered that we recommend going to the UN immediately if the Soviets turn down the reply which we are preparing for transmission within the next few days.

The President then turned to the question of stamping of identification papers. He admitted that if he were to place himself in the situation of the Soviets, he could see flaws in the U.S. position. We recognize the FRG, whereas the USSR recognizes the GDR. If a final peace treaty between the FRG [USSR?] and the GDR specifies that:

(1) there will be no interference with authorized traffic to and from Berlin, and

(2) that stamping identification papers will merely verify this identification,

then it is difficult for us to argue with them. The GDR could take the position that this identification is necessary for a checkpoint in Berlin to ascertain that a convoy did in fact originate in the Western zone. Secretary Herter agreed that the real issue is whether the Communists actually restrict our traffic. The President observed, however, that the USSR has stated that we must leave Berlin. Mr. Murphy added that stamping of papers might be considered the “thin edge of a wedge.”

The President asked whether a treaty between the USSR and the GDR would be considered valid if there were no Berlin problem. Secretary Herter admitted that we would argue with such a treaty only when it cuts across our rights.

The President then considered an additional complication. Even if the GDR were to pledge themselves to carry out the responsibilities heretofore exercised by the Soviets, we could not, even though tempted to accept, give it consideration, because it would be death to Adenauer.

The President then expressed the opinion that Macmillan may be making a serious mistake even in the context of his narrow domestic political viewpoint. The main weakness of Macmillan’s reported position consists in accepting a summit meeting without receiving any quid pro quo. It would appear that the British public would finally ask how long Britain needs to be slapped in the face. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (7–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

In connection with the subject of German reunification, the President-remarked that we seem to be fighting with pillows. Adenauer is now talking as if the first step toward unification might be a federation. The President asked what we currently mean by the term “reunification.” At Geneva we had specified that reunification must come about as the result of free elections. Here we appear to be considering the prospect of a federation, that is, anything to enable us to include all of Germany in a peace treaty. Secretary Herter answered that the FRG is extremely leery of the idea of a federation, and the paper which is being worked on in the State Department includes many steps toward eventual reunification. (The President recalled that the process is expected to take three years.) Mr. Merchant then stated that Adenauer’s fears are of the concept of equality. He does not wish the GDR to be given a veto over the actions of the FRG. A possible solution to this would be the concept of a Council of German States. This would avoid the actual governments of East and West Germany becoming involved. Mr. Murphy added that the Germans are busy working on all sorts of ideas for unification below the federation level.

The President then referred to our metaphor of “walking a rickety fence.” Here it would appear that we are walking two fences in different directions. In particular, he had in mind the difficulties in backing both Adenauer and the British, whose views appear to be diametrically opposed. The President noted in the briefing book that Britain would just as soon see Germany remain divided. He pointed out, however, that the Germans are one people and the desire on their part to reunite is strong indeed.

Mr. Murphy then pointed out the difficulties within Germany itself. Mayor Brandt and Chancellor Adenauer are hardly on speaking terms. Berlin is a hotbed of Social Democrats, and party politics within Germany are highly competitive. He pointed out further that areas such as Saxony and Thuringia are strongholds of the Social Democrats. Adenauer feels that his party would be thrown out if reunification came about tomorrow.

The President turned to the subject of how to ensure that the West German viewpoint is represented in a “summit” meeting. At the Geneva conference of 1955, we had set up a pipeline to Adenauer. In any further conference, however, the views of Adenauer would be so important to the Western delegations that it would be necessary to keep him in the next room. With Adenauer close at hand, we would have to face the criticism in our own press that Adenauer is a stumbling block for us. Mr. Merchant pointed out that during the Geneva negotiations Adenauer had come to a summer home near the city, where he was readily accessible.⁴

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material. Top Secret. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Appointment Book. (Ibid.)
1. No briefing book as such has been found, however, briefing papers on the various topics that might be raised during Macmillan’s visit are ibid., International File and in the Staff Secretary Records.
2. See Document 225.
3. See Document 228.
4. At a second conference on March 19 Herter and Eisenhower again reviewed the British and U.S. positions on a Foreign Ministers meeting and a Summit conference. (Memorandum of conference with the President, March 19; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material)