Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

219. Message From the Ambassador to Germany (Bruce) to Director for Central Intelligence Dulles⁰

Undated.

Sorry to feel it necessary send this message [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] but as you read it you will understand reasons. Expect almost simultaneously transmit adequate but expurgated report same conversation,¹ together with information gathered from Ambassador Steel, to Department. If in exercise your own judgment, you think advisable show this message selected officers Dept, that thoroughly satisfactory to me. In view Chancellor’s ineradicable conviction President [Secretary?] ill man, I have little choice about how to convey this present account, especially since Chancellor anxious certain parts go only to Foster.

Last night, after Adenauer had accompanied Macmillan airport he sent for me. First, he spoke of how satisfactory his visit de Gaulle had been,² the cordiality of their relationship, and the mutuality of their views on European problems. He indicated they had not descended to particulars, but had remained on mountain top.

Re Macmillan, with whom he had been in intermittent conversation for thirty hours, he had following observations to make.

Adenauer had taken Macmillan to task for the mention of disengagement in Moscow communiqué. British PM had answered he had been misinterpreted by Western press.

Having jumped this hurdle, and knocked over all the bars, the two continued in strict privacy, while their Foreign Ministers kicked about in another room. Result, Adenauer thinks, should be carefully analyzed in Washington.

PM related impressions derived from Moscow trip. His listener was not impressed, either by this, or by subsequent knowledge of same conclusions imparted by Lloyd to von Brentano. Chancellor thought they had incorrectly assessed Soviet intentions. British seemed unaware Soviets have different set political morals from Western ones, and what they term morals are utterly deplorable. British over-rate Khrushchev’s position in Sov Union.

Discussions on first day with PM were tough, because British diplomacy had not profoundly considered implications subjects under scrutiny, particularly disengagement. Posture and tactics British Labor Party opposition play great part in Macmillan’s attitude, and PM evaded answer when queried as to who inserted mention of disengagement in communiqué.

After their preliminary talks, they returned to feast following day, while Lloyd and Brentano sat well below the salt.³

PM made as essential points:

1. Present situation dangerous and might lead to war. British ready to take risks, but owe it to their people to try to avoid war.

2. Gromyko is minor character in Soviet cast. Much less important than was Molotov. A technician, a tool. Khrushchev treats and regards him as such.

3. Therefore, in FonMin conference, Khrushchev would not allow Gromyko to make major decisions, and instead desires summit conference.

4. Consequently, Macmillan, realizing situation, will use his influence to induce Western nations agree to summit meeting, with FonMins as prelude.

5. Further, Macmillan believes Khrushchev will only enter into genuine negotiations, if given definite summit date, perhaps August.

Adenauer rejoined by offering opinion Khrushchev would indeed try to sabotage possibility real achievement in FonMin meeting. But, on other hand, he did not subscribe to Macmillan proposal of “A Summit Conference”. He thought there should be a series of Summit meetings, denominated “First Stage, Second Stage etc.” The first might perhaps last eight days and be followed by technical conversations, before resumed at Second Stage. Little could be expected to be accomplished by single meeting of Chiefs of State.

Khrushchev should be informed West will not negotiate at summit under threat of peace treaty, Berlin, or recognition GDR. Therefore, Adenauer thinks West should demand Khrushchev confirm status quo of Berlin and present East Zone arrangements for five years, so that problems can be calmly examined, and constructive negotiations take place.

Macmillan asked if German people would put up with status quo for another five years. Adenauer replied in affirmative, saying it would be helpful if SovZoners could again freely visit FedRep, and if pressures against two Christian churches were relaxed.

Chancellor asked whether Macmillan had inquired into de Gaulle’s position on summit meeting. Answer was French President not “averse”.

Adenauer now repeated to me what he regarded as capital. Agreement by US, UK and France to summit meeting with USSR must be predicated on Khrushchev paying price of five years extension status quo. Believed this realistic, because Khrushchev’s strong desire conversations other Chiefs State.

Chancellor had told Macmillan Dulles illness greatly complicated matters. Unknowing when Secretary would become mobile, one cannot predict who might manage first stage summit negotiations for U.S. Since U.S. was leading power free world, summit conversations, without participation Dulles, would be dangerous.⁴

Evident, according Adenauer, Macmillan thinks FonMin conference has little significance and would probably serve only preparation agenda for Summit, and footling interchanges.

It will be to convey such impressions PM will visit Ottawa and Washington.

For moment this seemed end of Chancellor’s comments, but after ponderation, he resumed conversation, saying the four Foreign Ministers must at end of month in Washington deliberate over answer to Soviet notes, and Macmillan and Lloyd will advocate promise of Summit meeting.

Adenauer is absolutely opposed to this tactic, for Soviets would immediately accept and pocket such concession, yielding nothing in return. That would be, in Chancellor’s estimation, a sale at too low a price.

Chancellor is conscious FonMin meeting, in light Khrushchev’s views, offers little prospect unless Summit follows. But Summit unsafe without strong U.S. leadership.

When Chancellor had presented these arguments to Macmillan, PM agreed to Adenauer proposals: (1) Maintenance status quo for 5 years should be condition precedent to Summit; (2) Summit should take place in stages.

From time to time during exposition, I questioned Chancellor, but only answer of importance was that he had not discussed Summit possibilities with de Gaulle. Evident he will quickly remedy this omission, but through what instrumentality or oddity God wot.⁵ He formed during Paris visit favorable impression of Debré, has invited him Bonn, but will probably not await his coming to try to line up de Gaulle.

Always with this whimsical old gentleman there is something juicy in reserve. He asked me whether I had any recent private news of Foster’s health, and if I thought it possible he might be at Camp David to supervise conversations between President Eisenhower and PM. I answered I was without information on that subject. He said Globke had recently been told by unrevealed source President was thinking of making Foster Prime Minister so he could represent US at Summit conferences. Was that possible under US Constitution? I told him it was not, but, borrowing from Soviet example, I saw no reason why Foster should not, as had been done when Khrushchev was hierarchally subordinate to Bulganin, participate in Summit conversations. This cheered him considerably.⁶

As to place of possible Summit meeting, Chancellor is specifically against Moscow or London, and favors some location in US. He thinks Khrushchev would give much to see US, and would be impressed by its manifest vitality.

In conclusion, Adenauer requested that the substance of his talk with me be treated with greatest discretion, and certain undesignated parts of it be suppressed unless conveyed only to Foster [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

I saw Steel this morning. He said PM had agreed we ought attempt obtain concessions from Soviets in return for agreement on Summit conference, but PM had not, at least in Steel’s presence, committed himself on five year suggestion. Notes on meetings are in London, and Department will be informed from there what transpired. Steel’s own view is insistence of five year standstill unrealistic, but feels proposals for more limited concessions deserve thorough study.

0. Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret.
1. The expurgated report was transmitted in telegram 2024 from Bonn, March 14 at 1 p.m., and was received in the Department of State at 10 a.m. the same day. This paragraph was not in the telegram, and other differences are noted in subsequent footnotes.
2. See Document 203.
3. This sentence was not in telegram 2024.
4. This paragraph was not in telegram 2024.
5. Middle English form of “knows.”
6. This paragraph was not in telegram 2024.