21. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State0

680. Department pass Defense. Reference Berlin’s tel 156 to Department.1 After further careful reflection exclave (i.e. Steinstuecken) situation Berlin, I remain firmly convinced for political and morale reasons it absolutely necessary we be in position take immediate action deal with any future Communist incursions and deliberate violations exclave borders.

To accomplish this, I do not think essential USCOB be given prior and unconditional authority undertake military action deal with any eventuality. On other hand, I feel strongly we must have specific contingency plan making possible USCOB take prompt and decisive action if faced with another Communist action against Steinstuecken.

I have read USCINCEUR’s EC 9–4696 September 102 carefully but do not share view that background of present exclave situation [Page 43] constitutes “long established modus vivendi” and implication that (1) August 7 incident of limited importance; (2) more serious incidents future unlikely; and (3) it therefore unnecessary prepare deal possible future incidents.

As I see it, one constant factor is there really is no stable modus vivendi in Berlin. (This applies not only West Berlin itself but in equal measure West Berlin exclaves.) We are confronted by persistent Communist attempts undermine and erode our position there. Therefore think important we take firm position assure we cannot permit or facilitate by lack of preparation deliberate physical violation by Communists our positions whose [in those] parts West Berlin and West Berlin exclaves for which we responsible.

USCINCEUR says it cannot recommend change in policy which would authorize counteractions “only after fact” but would be “particularly pleased hear any proposals which would improve situation before fact.”

Only proposal that might improve situation before fact would be to have it generally known that if incursion took place US armed force would be used to restore situation. Also we might assert our implicit right to overland access to exclave though this involves complex questions which no doubt Defense and State will wish to explore.

For all practical purposes our position Berlin is not such we can improve it fundamentally from military standpoint. Situation hardly conducive to that. However, we must do everything possible preserve our position by reacting promptly and effectively when it is jeopardized. Unless we are clearly prepared take prompt and effective actions, seems to me we inviting if not encouraging further Communist actions of increasingly serious character, especially since I think we must assume they are conscious of widespread doubts as to whether we have any settled policy regarding exercise of jurisdiction over exclaves.

With these considerations in mind I fully supported General Hodes’ first recommendation (reftel). I therefore hope State and Defense will examine problem in this context.3

Bruce
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/9–2258. Top Secret. Repeated to Berlin, Heidelberg, Paris, USAREUR and USCINCEUR.
  2. Telegram 156, August 19, reported that the United States was legally and morally responsible for Steinstuecken in the same manner as any other part of the U.S. sector of Berlin. Bruce reported further that General Hodes had suggested issuing an instruction to the Berlin Commandant authorizing him “to use such force as is necessary to preserve order in and protect” Steinstuecken. Bruce endorsed the proposal and stated that another incident like the one on August 7 would “be most destructive of U.S. prestige in Berlin and elsewhere.” (ibid., 762.0221/8–1958)
  3. Not found.
  4. In telegram 642, September 26, the Department replied to this telegram, stating that it intended to examine the problem in all its aspects but was awaiting the final views of the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Army in Europe. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/9–2258)