Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

2. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Embassy in Germany⁰

Berlin, January 16, 1958, 9 p.m.

775. Allied Political Advisers met with Kotsiuba at Karlshorst this afternoon. Kotsiuba apologized for being unable to receive American Political Adviser yesterday, stating he had not had time to brief himself on subject which he assumed was purpose of visit.

British Chairman for month opened by stating political advisers had come to protest against unprecedented control measures which Sovs had tried to impose on Allied military trains night of Jan 14–15.¹ He said that, after lengthy series of discussions with Kotsiuba new forms of documentation had been introduced by Allies in effort to eliminate difficulties which had been experienced at Sov checkpoints. This system had now been disturbed by Sov control officers who had tried to stamp movement orders of individual travelers on Allied trains. During all these previous discussions, Kotsiuba had never mentioned any desire on part of Sovs to stamp movement orders and, during some 12 years of operation of Allied military trains, no such stamps had been placed on documentation of travelers. Political Advisers therefore desired to register protest against this action and to request that instructions be issued that Allied trains be permitted to pass checkpoints in accordance with established procedures.

French and American Political Advisers endorsed statement of British Political Adviser. We added that we felt conduct of Soviet officers at checkpoint in obtaining movement orders by subterfuge from train commander of Berlin–Frankfurt train, and refusing to return them to him until they had all been stamped in checkpoint office, was undignified and should be protested.

Kotsiuba responded that reasons brought to his attention for Allied protest were insufficient and therefore he could not accept such protest. Before answering specifically, he would in turn like to lodge protest with Americans and British for violation of understanding reached during meeting of November 20 last year.² He claimed that at this meeting he had referred to fact that same procedure would apply to rail travel as for autobahn. He stated that one of aims of new procedure was to limit use of travel documentation for one single round-trip. It had appeared that this had been agreed. Sovs had now observed that movement orders were being used for several trips on military trains by same person. Moreover, same movement order was being used by personnel initially traveling on autobahn and making return trip by military train. He cited case of American sgt who had arrived in Berlin on Jan 4 by autobahn and left Jan 14 by military train. He said there were many cases of American soldiers using orders issued with a period of validity of one month for numerous trips, and he did not think these facts could be denied. This was reason, Kotsiuba continued, why new measures of control had to be taken similar to those already in force on autobahn. He could only construe statements made by Political Advisers against these new measures of control as based on desire to continue such violations on American and British side.

Kotsiuba then launched obviously fabricated tirade against alleged rudeness and “hysterics” (displayed by American train commanders) on night Jan 14–15. He went into considerable detail regarding actions supposed to have taken place which he said “could only cause astonishment”. If in future, American train commander displayed such rudeness, he could not be permitted on train, and he (Kotsiuba) would request that he be relieved of duties. He noted that British and French trains had passed same evening without incident and with no notable loss of time. He then referred to conversation on Dec 11 between Soviet Colonel Safronov and American Colonels Forame and Baxter. During this meeting, he said, Col Safronov had drawn attention to violations of movement order procedures which Sovs had noted, and had stated that Sovs intended to put into effect same procedures for rail travel as for autobahn.³

Kotsiuba continued that, on night of Jan 14–15, incidents occurred at checkpoint of kind which had never happened before. Only a technical matter was really involved which Sovs considered came within scope of their authority to “control” travel between Berlin and West Germany. Therefore incidents were entirely fault of United States. In future Sovs did not intend to permit any violation of rules, and he therefore requested that train commanders be appropriately instructed to permit observance of same procedures as at autobahn checkpoints, as well as to avoid rudeness. He recognized that some would be needed to permit proper dissemination of instructions and hence stamping of movement orders would go into effect on night Jan 31–Feb 1.

British Chairman responded that they in turn must decline to accept his protest, which could not be justified. He must repeat that Political Advisers were to ask for abandonment of Soviet attempt to propose new controls. He then asked specific question whether Kotsiuba was actually arguing that traveler could not proceed to Berlin by autobahn and then proceed to West Germany by military train on basis of same movement order. Kotsiuba evaded direct answer, stating that movement order was issued for single round-trip. He then rhetorically asked whether there was any way to insure that movement order was not used for several trips except by placing stamp thereon to show movement order had previously been used.

He could not see what the objection was to stamping movement orders in the same manner as they were stamped at autobahn checkpoints.

To this British Political Adviser responded that point Allies were making was that an established procedure was being disturbed. For 12 years Sovs had not thought it necessary to stamp travel orders. Allies must, accordingly, request that these established procedures remain unchanged, and that new travel documentation continue to be treated in same way as between Dec 2, 1957 and Jan 13, 1958.

Kotsiuba once more said that he could not see what the objection was to stamping movement orders used on military trains, since we did not object to their being stamped for autobahn travel. Defending old system was tantamount to defending violations involved in use of same movement order for repeated trips.

Further inconclusive exchanges of this kind ended with Political Advisers reiterating that Allies saw no need for change of established procedures, maintenance of which must be requested.

To straighten out historical record, American Political Adviser noted that, whatever may have been Col Kotsiuba’s understanding of meeting of November 20, Allied record of this meeting and understanding was that nothing had been said which implied that procedures on military trains re handling of movement orders were to be same as those on autobahn. Also pointed out that visit of Cols Forame and Baxter intended to effect delivery of samples of freight documentation which he (Kotsiuba) had requested. They were prepared to answer any technical questions arising out of freight documentation procedures, but had made it quite clear that they were not competent to discuss any substantive questions.

At this point Kotsiuba expressed hope that today’s meeting would prove to Allies that there was no real excuse for disturbances which had taken place, due to very minor importance of issue involved. He then asked whether night of January 31–Feb 1 provided enough time appropriately to instruct train commanders. To this, Political Advisers responded that Allies objected to introduction of stamping of movement orders at any time in future, and that their views had been clearly expressed on this point. When Kotsiuba again said he could see no reason for Allied objections, British Political Adviser said there would have to be further communication on these matters, and that Allied position had been made clear. Kotsiuba concluded by saying he thought night of Jan 31–Feb 1 was sufficient time for issuance of new instructions.

Col Forame, Berlin Command Transportation Officer, who accompanied American Political Adviser, concurs in foregoing account.

Hillenbrand

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1–1658. Confidential; Priority. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Heidelberg, London, Paris, Moscow, and the Department of State as telegram 840, which is the source text, and pouched to DCSI USAFE.
1. On the night of January 14–15 U.S. military trains were held at the Marienborn checkpoint by Soviet officers who insisted that the movement orders of all passengers had to be stamped by them. Documentation on the incident is ibid., 762.0221.
2. Hillenbrand reported on this meeting in telegram 620, November 19, 1957, but indicated that it had taken place on November 19. (ibid., 762.0221/11–1957)
3. Hillenbrand reported on this meeting in telegram 706, December 12, 1957. (ibid., 762.0221/12–1257)