Office of the Historian

171. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany0

Washington, February 12, 1959, 11:52 a.m.

1797. Paris pass USCINCEUR Thurston and West.

A.
In course visits London, Paris and Bonn during past week Secretary discussed Berlin contingency planning with British, French and Germans and presented US views re action which should be taken in event GDR personnel substituted for Soviets at checkpoints. British, French, and Germans were receptive these views and, as Secretary stated publicly yesterday (February 9)1 on return to Washington, we are in general agreement as to procedures we shall follow if physical means are invoked to interfere with our access rights.
B.
FYI. US conception of action to be taken is as follows:
1.
If Soviets withdraw from functions they have heretofore exercised in connection with movements of Western occupying powers to and from Berlin, Three Powers should not acquiesce in substitution of GDR officials in performance of these functions. No stamping of papers or inspection by GDR officials should be permitted. More identification of vehicles as those of one of Three Powers should be provided to GDR officials on demand, but such identification should not be construed as acquiescence in substitution of GDR for Soviet officials.
2.
Between now and May 27, Three Powers should take quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures of a kind which would not create public alarm but which would be detectable by Soviet intelligence.
3.
The first movement (via the Autobahn) after the announced or attempted withdrawal of the Soviets should be one or more trucks from Berlin accompanied by scout car or other vehicle with shooting capability. This movement should attempt pass under conditions outlined paragraph 1 above. Effort should be discontinued if physically obstructed by GDR or Soviets. Movement would fire only if fired upon, in which case it should take whatever defensive action seems necessary.
4.
If movement physically obstructed, consideration should be given to possibility of substituting personnel of Three Powers for Soviet personnel withdrawn from checkpoints. In any case traffic should be temporarily suspended and efforts should be made along following lines to increase pressure on both USSR and GDR:
a.
Effort should be made to mobilize world opinion against USSR as violator of agreements, user of force and threat to peace. Situation could be taken to Security Council. If USSR vetoed, situation could be taken to special session of General Assembly. Consideration should also be given additional diplomatic pressure in other forms, including withdrawal of Three Powers ambassadors from Moscow.
b.
Military preparations should be intensified and could at this juncture include observable measures, for example, evacuation of dependents from Berlin and possibly from Federal Republic as well.
5.
If above-mentioned diplomatic measures and military preparations not successful in restoring free access, Governments of Three Powers should decide whether to apply further military pressures through use of additional force.
6.
Concurrently with development foregoing, Three Powers should continue their efforts to bring about Foreign Ministers’ meeting with USSR on the various aspects of German question by early May. These talks might provide cover which would facilitate modification or indefinite postponement by USSR of its “ultimatum” re Western Allied access to Berlin.
c.
Re paragraph 1 above, Secretary also discussed without firm conclusion possibility of accepting GDR personnel as agents of Soviet Union if they specified as such by Soviet government.
d.
Embassy will note necessity of reviewing provisional instructions already agreed upon to assure conformity with above. We shall send further instructions this point.
Dillon
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2–1259. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by McKiernan on February 10; cleared by Greene, Calhoun, Hillenbrand, Kohler, and Merchant; and approved by Murphy. Repeated to Berlin, London, and Paris, and pouched to Moscow.↩
  2. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, March 2, 1959, p. 297.↩