Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

17. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, August 28, 1958, 5 p.m.

505. Reference: Deptel 408, August 21.¹ Main point is we will not be able endure another invasion Steinstuecken without taking more positive and forceful action unless we are willing accept sharp and perhaps vital blow to our position Berlin and West Germany. This, we believe, remains true despite (a) uproar in Berlin aggravated by newspapers and politicians intent on forthcoming elections, and (b) would seem improbable there will be another comparable incident in near future.

Following are answers specific questions reftel:

(1) West German authorities admit their police fell down badly on job and facts have been difficult to ascertain. It seems a man whose identity not clearly ascertained entered Steinstuecken early morning and asked lamplighter if he were in West Berlin. Latter simply replied affirmatively whereupon man telephoned West Berlin police.

Inadequacy of latter and undoubtedly tapped lines brought Vopos instead. Apparently at some point as many as 800 may have surrounded Steinstuecken but very few entered. Man’s whereabouts as well as identity unknown and residents Steinstuecken afraid to talk.

(2) West German authorities have ordered a police radio car posted Berlin border at crossing point into zone and setting up permanent police post there. Also planning two officers, possibly retired policemen, live in Steinstuecken and be equipped appropriate communication devices. We do not wish request Soviets assure unhindered passage US patrols because (a) Soviets will, we believe, refer such request GDR; (b) we wish request nothing which may be refused unless we are prepared use force fulfill our requirements.

(3) Have no indication attitude British and French re possible use of force and consider it inadvisable discuss such measures with them until we have firm US position.

(4) We consider this advisable but are not yet ready recommend how or when and of course would do so only after US position determined.²

(5) Re other US sector enclaves,

(a) Wuestemark uninhabited but partly cultivated by farmer residing Zehlendorf. In June telephone message sent Markushin following this farmer’s complaint to Zehlendorf mayor that Vopos preventing access to his Auzstemark [Wuestemark] land. Subsequent West Berlin police investigation revealed probability farmer arrested by Vopos because involvement illegal currency transactions. Rathaus official then requested Wuestemark access difficulty not be publicized.

(b) Third US sector enclave, Nuthewiese, is both uninhabited and unused.

(c) Under circumstances, unlikely policy would have to be applied these two enclaves.

Bruce

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8–2858. Secret; Limited Distribution.
1. On August 7 an armed group of Volkspolizei had entered Steinstuecken, a U.S. enclave of Berlin, and forcibly removed an East German deserter following a protest by West Berlin authorities. General Hamlett protested this incursion to Zakharov. (Telegram 121 from Berlin, August 7; ibid., 762.0221/8–758) The resulting reaction in the German press resulted in the Department’s request in telegram 408 for details on the incident. (ibid., 762.0221/8–2858)

2. Question 4 in telegram 408 reads:

   “Is it contemplated steps would be taken make sure Soviets and GDR would be aware our intention cross Soviet Zone territory by force if necessary to preserve order in and protect Steinstuecken?”