147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations0

Topol 2462. Polto 2016.1

1.
Department recognizes necessity eventual NATO consultation on Berlin contingency planning and desirability informing NAC at least in general terms as soon as Three Powers, in consultation with Federal Republic, have reached clear understanding on subject. Discussion in NATO at this time, however, would not only be premature but might also have effect of tending reduce Western position on use of force maintain access to Berlin to lowest common denominator of determination.
2.
If in interim you believe it necessary make some comment to satisfy legitimate NATO interest in question, you might wish take following line:
A.
Basic political decisions have been taken that we will maintain our access to Berlin and will not permit substitution of GDR personnel to perform functions Soviets have exercised re this access.
B.
Contingency planning now proceeding should be regarded as implemention of these decisions.
C.
Discussions among Three Powers at present turn on question of what measures can most effectively maintain access, both on surface and in air, against GDR efforts assert controls over access.
D.
Security considerations naturally prevent anything but most restricted discussion of detailed military plans. However, Three Powers fully aware of NATO interest and will give NATO substance of planning after plans more fully developed.
E.
Should be borne in mind that military planning for various contingencies must be worked out well in advance and that completion of such planning does not signify plans will automatically be carried out without recourse to appropriate diplomatic measures.
3.
Re para 3 reftel, language suggested by French would seem make further consultation, probably including NATO consultation, inevitable before decision taken to use force to maintain surface access.
4.
Re para 4 reftel we believe it essential Soviets have clear understanding our surface access to Berlin can be blocked only at risk of war. If paragraph D adopted leak of fact West had adopted firmest possible [Page 296] position could thus do us no harm. On either [other?] hand leaks to effect Western Powers not fully agreed on this or to effect British and French do not entirely share US views can give Soviets impression we may be prepared evade issue and thus induce them implement their threats against our access rather than accepting some face-saving way out of crisis. For this reason we have been concerned about recent press speculation which obviously inspired by leaks from various sources.
5.
Any statement in NAC should of course be coordinated with British, French and Germans.
Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1–2059. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McKiernan, cleared by Merchant and Hillenbrand, and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, and Berlin.
  2. Dated January 20. (Ibid.)