Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

108. Telegram From the Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State⁰

Paris, December 15, 1958, 1 a.m.

Secto 10. French Chairman opened meeting French, U.K. and U.S. Foreign Ministers after tripartite lunch at Quai d’Orsay at 1440 hours today.

Secretary began by noting might be useful to consider at early stage, and before arrival of Germans, question of revision existing contingency plans which we had raised with British and French.¹ American initiative had been approved at highest level of government, and in essence we would like to revise instructions for Allied personnel on military trains and autobahn. Couve queried whether Secretary envisaged doing something in this field before replies sent to Soviet notes of November 27. Secretary said we wanted to change contingency plans now. We could not rely on six months waiting period stipulated by Soviets before changes to be made. If GDR officials appeared at check point tomorrow our people would operate on basis of agency theory which no longer valid.

Couve queried why there was no mention of air access in American proposals. He had impression air communications were most important to Allied position in Berlin, and he had thought that solution, as in 1948, would be to maintain communications of Berlin garrisons by air. Secretary responded that U.S. proposal did not deal with all contingencies, but was meant to eliminate present authority to treat GDR representatives as agents of Soviets. It dealt with aspect of problem which had aroused considerable emotional response in Federal Republic.

Lloyd said British could accept points A to C set forth in Deptel 1236 to Bonn, 327 to Berlin, 2147 to Paris, 559 to London and 945 to Moscow.² Point D however, involving question of using military action to try force way through, he considered to be in different category. He agreed we should make our position clear to Soviets and instruct our people accordingly, but contemplated military action was not part of same exercise. This would have to be considered separately. As to point E he was not quite clear as to whether this was consistent with A B and C, but in any case paragraph D involved a completely different range of discussion.

Couve said he had same opinion as Lloyd, and could approve proposed changes only up to and including point C. It was obvious that we could not accept idea that GDR officials are just agents of Soviets if it said in advance that Soviets are giving up all their rights to GDR. However, would have to think further about point D.

Secretary stated that point D contemplated show of force in order to test whether there would be resistance by force. If it agreeable to colleagues to accept A to C point D could be reserved for further consideration.

Couve added that he thought point A re informing Soviet Government would be largely taken care of by replies to November 27 Soviet note. Secretary agreed. Couve added that Foreign Ministers should accordingly instruct their representatives in Bonn to reconsider their instructions. In summary, Secretary stated agreement reached that instead of accepting GDR processing at check points, Allied officials would be instructed to turn back.

After further discussion in which Foreign Ministers summarized their understanding of agreement along lines indicated by Secretary above, in response to query by Lloyd, Secretary agreed that point E did not need to be considered at this juncture. Lloyd commented that our juridical case is that we have agreements with Soviets which we cannot allow them to renounce. Foreign Ministers agreed that Germans would be told that we would not treat GDR officials as agents of Soviets or substitutes for Soviets.

There was further discussion re agency theory. Steel noted that we could refuse GDR officials right to stamp our passports, but whole Allied moral position was that GDR officials were merely stooges of Soviets. This was concept to which we must continue to adhere. Lloyd added that stooge idea was essential, and therefore public treatment of new approach would present special problems. Secretary pointed out this was a particular case. Stooge theory was fine but when GDR officials purport to act as independent people then we could not accept their processing. We must, of course, be careful in any general pronouncements not to imply that they are independent. Lloyd said that, if GDR officials put themselves forward as Soviet agents we would, of course, accept this. What we must reject was their putting themselves forward as principals. Secretary noted that our position should be put primarily in terms of not accepting responsibility of GDR as substitute for Soviets.

Discussion moved to subject of communiqué. Secretary noted that Germans wanted substantive communiqué and that Spaak seemed concerned about this. Merchant had seen von Brentano at noon.³ As a result he thought it would be agreeable to Germans if communiqué were brief indicating that Soviet note unacceptable in form and substance and that views of four powers would be laid before NATO meeting, after which more detailed statement would be made. Merchant noted that position of von Brentano was that it desirable to have firm four-power communiqué but not one giving impression four Ministers had agreed on all details and were presenting NATO Council with fait accompli. Von Brentano also felt consideration should be given to more detailed and precise statement to be issued by NATO Ministerial Council on Tuesday, either as part of communiqué dealing with Tuesday discussion, or as separate release after Council discussion on Berlin.

During discussion of possible contents of four-power communiqué, Secretary said he thought it should mention exchange of views by Ministers, that they found Soviet note unacceptable in form and substance, that views of four powers were harmonious and would be laid before NATO Ministerial Council, after which more complete and detailed declaration would be made. Lloyd said he felt communiqué should contain three points: (a) attitude of Ministers that Soviet demands unacceptable, (b) that instructions being sent to Ambassadors in Bonn to make clear that we would not accept substitution of GDR officials, and (c) discussion of Soviet notes by Foreign Ministers reflected wide agreement preparatory to NATO meeting.

Small drafting party formed to prepare tripartite version of communiqué which, it was agreed, French Chairman should present to four-power meeting as his own draft.

Dulles

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12–1558. Secret; Priority. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to London, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.
1. See Document 98 and footnote 5 thereto.
2. Document 98.
3. See Document 107.