120. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Berlin Contingency Planning
PARTICIPANTS
- The Viscount Hood, British Minister
- Admiral Sir Michael Denny, British Standing Group Representative
- Mr. R. W. Jackling, Counselor, British Embassy
- Mr. W. Barker, Counselor, British Embassy
- Four British military representatives including Brigadier Carver
- Mr. John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secretary of Defense
- Major General Douglas V. Johnson, J–5
- Col. Edward Harris, OSD/ISA
- Mr. Foy D. Kohler, EUR
- Mr. Martin Hillenbrand, GER
- Mr. Thomas D. McKiernan, GPA
Viscount Hood opened the meeting by stating that the British wished to “probe our thinking” regarding paragraph D of the aide-mémoire of December 11, 1958,1 which deals with the use of limited military force in connection with Berlin access. He said that the British saw the situation as follows: The starting point is our intention, as reflected in Allied declarations, to maintain our position in Berlin and our access to Berlin. Khrushchev has resorted to “brinksmanship” on Berlin, and our only response can be to stand firm. Firmness means that all our NATO Allies must see eye-to-eye on the problem, and an important aspect of the Soviet action was probably the attempt to sow mistrust within the Western alliance. The need for solidarity among the NATO powers plus considerations of public opinion in our own countries require that our policy avoid giving the impression that we, rather than the Soviets, are provoking trouble. “The Russians must fire the first shot.” The British follow American thinking on paragraphs A, B, and C of the aide-mémoire, but they would like to know how the U.S. contemplates events will develop under circumstances in which we would invoke paragraph D and resort to the use of limited military force.
In reply, Mr. Kohler summarized the American position as follows: In reviewing our Berlin contingency planning, we soon realized that we had to demonstrate our readiness to fight in the last resort to maintain [Page 230] our access to Berlin by road and that we could not intelligently develop a tactical response to the Soviet threat unless we faced up to this question. We wish to bring the USSR to negotiations and we wish to exhaust all peaceful remedies. But we are in a better position if we can say, for example to Mikoyan, that the Soviets are challenging a vital American interest which we are prepared, if necessary, to maintain by force. We wish to leave no room for the Soviets to misunderstand our intentions. Unless we are prepared to do so, we have in effect publicly announced a policy with respect to Berlin, e.g. in the Berlin declarations, without actually having adopted such a policy.
Mr. Irwin added that the basic decision we must take is to face up to the problem “at the first turn of the screw”. We should try to avoid “firing the first shot”, but there will be a point at which we shall have to take action.
In response to the question what specific steps were envisaged, Mr. Irwin mentioned the possibility of using force to extricate a convoy which was not allowed to proceed because the commander refused to show documentation to GDR officials. General Johnson added that the questions how one uses force and how much force is needed were a matter for the determination of the field commander. It might, however, be necessary to have a series of tests of Soviet intentions, depending on Soviet reactions to varying actions on our part. We might ultimately have to be prepared to increase our effort, always trying, if possible, to avoid shooting or at least to avoid firing the first shot. In response to Viscount Hood’s question whether we would be prepared ultimately to take over complete control of the Autobahn, Mr. Irwin said that he hoped this would not be necessary. He also thought that there was a point at which the Soviets would prevent us from ensuring our ability to pass, but that the first convoy might get through.
Mr. Kohler explained that the American position was that we should probably not reach the point where we have to take additional military action. Our proposed course of action involves the readiness ultimately to go to war, but we would have a few months in which to try to find a way to permit the Soviets to back down.
Viscount Hood said that two questions arose from the foregoing discussion. First, how do we put the matter to the Soviets; and second, what measures of preparedness should we take. Mr. Irwin replied that we contemplated “non-provocative” military preparedness measures, and General Johnson amplified this statement by saying that General Norstad is preparing a list of steps which might be taken to improve our readiness. General Johnson speculated that we might wish to take such measures as cancelling announced force reductions, increasing draft [Page 231] calls, increasing the flow of replacements to Europe, evacuating dependents, and stopping tourist travel.
Admiral Denny expressed the view that “non-provocative” steps take time to have effect, and said that we would need to take other measures if we want “firm action at the first turn of the screw”. He mentioned the possibility of a NATO “general alert”, but Mr. Irwin replied that a “general alert” would be too precipitate an action and might create greater risks. Mr. Irwin expressed a preference for lesser steps which would put us in a better posture for a “general alert” at a later juncture. Viscount Hood inquired whether it was contemplated that there would be a series of preparedness measures (e.g. evacuation of dependents) in advance of any military operation, however limited, but this question remained unanswered. It was agreed that NATO-wide coordination would be required in any case.
Viscount Hood said that the British were of the opinion that there were other means of probing Soviet intentions, for example by setting up a “garrison airlift” rather than making use of limited military force on the road. He thought a “garrison airlift” would be an equally effective demonstration of our intention to maintain access to Berlin.
Mr. Kohler responded that a “garrison airlift” might seem to be only an evasion of the real problem and that the result would be that we should eventually have to face the test of force in worse circumstances. Mr. Irwin also expressed opposition to an airlift.
Admiral Denny declared that an airlift offered additional advantages as a test of Soviet intentions. First, an airlift would give us time to get physically ready for a test of force; and second, an airlift would make it necessary for the Soviets to precipitate the crisis by making the initial use of force.
Mr. Kohler replied that a Soviet “attack” to which we would have to reply would not necessarily involve shooting. The Soviets would, in effect, “pull the trigger” by withdrawing from their obligations regarding our surface access. General Johnson added that an airlift amounted to “accepting the blockade” and that the Soviets would not take our determination to maintain our access seriously.
Viscount Hood expressed a preference for a “garrison airlift” as a “first gambit”, because it would maintain access but would at the same time be a peaceful action. Admiral Denny added that the air route would also be a much more certain route for supplying the Berlin forces, for the road could not be held open by force. Furthermore, in Admiral Denny’s opinion, a “garrison airlift” had the advantage that it would not be interrupted, as could surface access, by “passive force” on the part of the Soviets. Viscount Hood reiterated his belief that one could not [Page 232] establish surface access by using armed convoys and that a “garrison airlift” was preferable.
Mr. Kohler reiterated the view that an airlift would be a “measure of surrender” and said that, since we would have to face a show-down some day, the only solution would come from being willing to face it now.
In reply to Mr. Irwin’s question whether the British looked upon the “garrison airlift” as postponing a crisis or as providing a casus belli in the event of Soviet interference, Viscount Hood said the British had both factors in mind. The shooting down of an airplane could, he thought, be regarded as a clear casus belli. Mr. Barker stressed the point that the Soviets might not have to resort to force to stop an armed convoy and that they could create a situation in which we might use force in a manner which would have a bad effect on public opinion. In reply to Mr. Irwin’s question what measures the British contemplated if an airlift proved not to be feasible, Viscount Hood said that he didn’t know and that the problem did not present itself since it has been concluded that a garrison airlift was practicable.
Viscount Hood then stressed the importance of military readiness measures. He said that he hoped the coming discussions would lead to concrete agreements on the preparatory measures to be taken before resorting to limited force, for we must be in a position to see a test of strength.
Mr. Kohler replied that what would be involved would be a “test of will”, not a “test of strength”, for we know that it is not militarily feasible to maintain Berlin or access to Berlin by force. General Johnson added that a test could in any case be deferred, for the Berlin garrisons could hold out for three months without any airlift. One might wait a week or a month.
Our planning, Mr. Kohler explained, was based on the assumption we would not have to resort to a test of force if we are ready for one. We assume that the Soviets do not want war. The way out is to put an “escape hatch” in our notes to the Soviets, but they will not look for this “escape hatch” unless we force them to.
Admiral Denny summarized by saying that we must persuade the Soviets of our intentions not only by our statements but also by our physical military posture.
Viscount Hood concluded that the basic issue was whether a probe of Soviet intentions was to be made on land or in the air.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1–359. Secret. Drafted by McKiernan and initialed by Kohler.↩
- See Document 98 and footnote 5 thereto.↩