Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

116. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State⁰

Berlin, December 23, 1958, 5 p.m.

511. Bonn pass routine POLAD USAREUR 160. Paris pass Thurston and West. On Dec 20 AP correspondent Topping called by appointment on East Berlin SovEmb Second Sec Sutulov to discuss rumor that Khrushchev would visit East Berlin in Jan. (Topping considers Sutulov to be Sov official in Berlin responsible for contact with West press and for conveyance, when Sovs desire, of their point of view to Allied officials through West correspondents.) On Sutulov’s initiative, Topping and Sutulov repaired to local cafe so that discussion could be held in relaxed and private atmosphere.

Sutulov stated Khrushchev would be so busy preparing for Party Congress to be held Moscow end of Jan that in absence of urgency now unforeseen Khrushchev not expected visit East Berlin in Jan.

Sutulov then raised Mikoyan’s forthcoming visit to U.S.¹ (Topping received definite impression this subject was principal matter Sutulov wished to discuss with him.)

Sutulov said Mikoyan would be prepared to discuss whole range of subjects, not just economic matters. He said specific information not available to him as to just what subjects Mikoyan would be prepared to discuss, but SovEmb understood Mikoyan would be prepared to discuss Berlin question if Pres Eisenhower or SecState were to raise subject with Mikoyan and “show positive interest.” Sutulov added that Sov Gov attaches highest importance to Mikoyan visit. (Topping filed AP story evening Dec 20 on Mikoyan visit.) Topping saw Sutulov again on Dec 22. Sutulov indicated that Berlin is Mikoyan’s principal reason for going to Washington.

Without prompting Sutulov also brought up Zakharov’s statement (ourtel 445 to Bonn, 501 to Dept)² in apparent effort to determine Topping’s reaction. Topping replied he could not understand why Zakharov chose to make such a statement when situation already so tense.

Sutulov replied that Zakharov’s statement was in reply to Gen Hodes’ statement made in Berlin on Nov 30 (ourtel 381 to Bonn, 432 to Dept).³ Sutulov said it was one thing for political figures, even including Eisenhower, to make statement such as Hodes had made—Sovs expect this sort of thing—but “when a senior and responsible US military person who holds the weapons in his hands makes such a statement it becomes matter of great concern and danger to us”.

Topping replied that Hodes had made no belligerent statements. Hodes had told press he had come to Berlin to make no statement but to make routine visit and attend football game. He met with press only at latter’s insistence.

Sutulov said that of course Sovs had to rely on West Berlin press accounts of Hodes’ interview, wherein it stated that Hodes had secret plans re Berlin. (USBer comment: Hodes answered press questions in calm and circumspect manner. Certain correspondents including some from West Berlin press chose to report certain remarks out of context— as they have on other occasions. Immediately preceding telegram gives text of typical West Berlin press account.)⁴ Topping replied that Hodes had been asked the question “Do you have plans for contingencies?” and Gen Hodes had replied “Yes, as a general it is my job to have plans for every conceivable contingency”. This, Topping observed to Sutulov, was only reply Hodes could give.

Sutulov next raised the NATO statement and said that Sovs were incensed because of its negative nature, failure to make counterproposal, issuance before Allied replies to Sov note, and because Berlin was none of NATO’s business anyway.

Topping has following impressions as result of talk with Sutulov:

• “(1) Sovs genuinely concerned over our possible use of force;
• (2) Sovs becoming very nervous over Berlin situation because both sides have gone so far there is little room for maneuver politically. Sutulov several times stated it ‘inconceivable’ world could be brought to war because of Berlin;
• (3) Sovs would welcome any counterproposal in Allied replies to Sov note which could conceivably serve as point of departure for EastWest discussion of Berlin—that Sovs may be looking for a way out.”⁵

Gufler

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6162B/12–2358. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow, London, and Paris.
1. Documentation on Mikoyan’s visit to the United States, January 4–20, 1959, is presented in volume X. Regarding his discussions with U.S. officials on Berlin, see Documents 121 and 135–137.
2. Telegram 445, December 20, reported that in an interview with the East German wire service General Zakharov had attacked the Western response to the Soviet proposals on Berlin, stating that Western military leaders, and General Hodes in particular, had attempted to create a war psychosis out of the Berlin question. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12–2058)
3. Telegram 381, December 1, transmitted a summary of the Berlin press coverage for November 30 and December 1 including Dulles’ meeting with Eisenhower at Augusta, Georgia, and Hodes’ press conference in Berlin on November 30. (Ibid., 762.00/12–158)
4. Telegram 507 from Berlin, December 22, summarized the local press for December 21 and 22. (Ibid., 962A.61/12–2258)
5. The following day Topping saw Sutulov again at the latter’s “insistent” request. At this meeting Sutulov referred to Western press reports that the reply to the Soviet note would be delivered at the end of the month and stated that it would be a “bad thing” to deliver the reply before Mikoyan went to Washington. Sutulov reiterated that the Soviet note was not an ultimatum, and further discussion revealed his “obvious concern” that the Allies might use force. (Telegram 520 from Berlin, December 24; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12–2458)