Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France⁰

March 6, 1959, 7:43 p.m.

3256. Paris pass USRO and Thurston. FYI. We have been awaiting receipt French paper on fleet¹ before making any decisions on possible courses of action. Now that paper received we believe we must give it most careful examination. We do not intend take hasty or ill-considered actions or what might be regarded as reprisals and possibly generative further French actions. Our primary concern at this moment is Berlin crisis. We would want to take no actions which would menace essential allied solidarity on this subject.

We believe our posture should be one of calm but cold dignity and that we should await reaction of others before charting future course. Specifically we would want to see temper of NAC and perhaps await results Macmillan–de Gaulle talk.²

In discussing with French possible effects which their action might have we have mentioned two subjects: tripartite talks and nuclear cooperation. Tentatively we have following thoughts. On tripartite talks we shall simply indicate for time being to French that we are not ready discuss agenda and, if they press, that because of time lapse needed between agenda decisions and tripartite talks we may not be able have talk March 16 as planned. On nuclear cooperation we plan proceed with necessary paperwork, including preparation drafts but not initialing for enriched fuel bilateral and completion security determination for reactor. We would not however indicate to French any possible signature date for first item or further action, such as negotiation draft agreement, which would involve sending French team to US, for second. These are of course stalling actions until we make final determination whether we must be negative.

As for Belleau Wood and MDAP supplied naval vessels, we shall unilaterally study appropriate texts. This would be consonant with our belief that any counter-action if taken should confine itself to tripartite and naval fields in order prevent deterioration relations in other fields which could impair our objective maintaining solidarity of alliance. End FYI.

We would of course wish maintain close contact with UK on this subject. In this connection we believe it essential British views closely parallel ours and hope Macmillan will stress to de Gaulle during their meeting next week unfortunate short and long term effects French action.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.5/3–659. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Brown; cleared by Farley, Timmons, and McBride; and approved by Merchant. Repeated to London.
1. See Part 1, Document 196.
2. Macmillan had discussions with de Gaulle in Paris March 9–10; see Document 359.