87. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Tripartite Talks
PARTICIPANTS
- M. Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
- M. Charles Lucet, French Minister
- Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
- Mr. Robert McBride, WE
- Mr. Dean Brown, WE
Ambassador Alphand said that Paris agrees with the Secretary’s suggestion that the tripartite talks start with the Far East. He suggested that an agenda be prepared so that the proper papers could be written and so that Paris could select the experts it would wish to send to the meeting. He plans to discuss this with the British Embassy as well.
Mr. Murphy asked how long it would be before we would talk. In a sense, he said, this depends on Paris.
[Page 161]M. Alphand replied that, once the agenda is prepared, we could start the talks a few days later.
Mr. Murphy asked, in general, what would be on the agenda.
M. Alphand repeated the list he and the Secretary had discussed: Taiwan, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and the Indo-China area.
Mr. Murphy replied that this seems satisfactory.
M. Alphand then stressed the importance which the French Government attaches to parallel military discussions. He said that the highest French military representative in Washington should discuss with US and UK military the matter General de Gaulle had raised with the Secretary; namely, creation in peacetime of theaters of operation for use in war. Examples are North Africa and the Middle East. This would be strategic rather than political planning. The Secretary, said M. Alphand, had had no objection to this but had said he would have to consult the Pentagon.
M. Alphand read from his instructions which said that political consultation without military planning is not enough . . .1 “military cooperation is just as important as political cooperation as it is this cooperation which governs the future of the North Atlantic alliance.”
M. Alphand said he wanted to stress this point. He believes that this discussion can best be done in Washington.
Mr. Murphy asked what form it would take.
M. Alphand replied that it should be in the form of studies. For example, if there is a war, North Africa and West Africa will be involved. Who will be the commander? How will the forces be divided? Should the wartime commander be the inspector in time of peace? How would planning for these areas be connected to NATO planning?
Mr. Murphy asked if there were problems with the Mediterranean command.
M. Alphand replied affirmatively. He said that it would be preferable to discuss this matter in Washington rather than in the NATO forum where there might be trouble. Paris, he continued, has informed him that he will receive more precise instructions on this question of having military talks parallel political discussions. He said these will basically be aimed at discussing blueprints of global defense. He urged Mr. Murphy to expedite Pentagon agreement.
Mr. Murphy asked if the French envisaged involving the military during the Far East discussions.
[Page 162]M. Alphand said this might be the case. It depends on how the talks go
Mr. Murphy said we would study the matter.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/1–959. Secret. Drafted by Brown and initialed by Murphy.↩
- Ellipsis in the source text.↩
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After receiving a summary of this conversation (telegram 2416 to Paris, January 10; ibid., 700.5/1–1059), Burgess reported on January 15:
“General Norstad and I have most serious reservations about contingent military planning exercise proposed by French in context present tripartite discussions. This proposition is hardly distinguishable from global standing group concept which in our view is not acceptable to other members of Alliance and certain to impose dangerous strain on NATO unity. We strongly recommend that on specific points made by Alphand re NATO military planning and NATO Mediterranean Command arrangements, he be informed that these are matters to be pursued obviously in the first instance with the competent NATO military authorities.” (Polto 1958 from Paris, January 15; ibid., 700.5/1–1559)
In Topol 2358 to Paris, January 16, Dulles stated the Department of State had not given the French any encouragement in connection with their desire to undertake tripartite military planning and no response would be given until the matter was fully cleared with the Department of Defense. The Secretary noted the Department of State had not decided how to respond to this aspect of the de Gaulle memorandum which was at the core of de Gaulle’s thinking and “accordingly must be handled with extreme caution.” Dulles concluded that the Department did not currently envisage the possibility of a favorable response to the French. (Ibid., 700.7/1–1559)
On January 10, the British were informed and agreed to start tripartite talks on the Far East. (Telegram 2416 to Paris, January 10; ibid., 700.5/1–1059)
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