Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

8. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

May 21, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Present French Crisis

PARTICIPANTS

• The French Ambassador, M. Herve Alphand
• M. Charles Lucet, Minister, French Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. Matthew Looram, WE

The French Ambassador stated he had been in Paris the day before yesterday when he had seen Premier Pflimlin and Foreign Minister Pleven, who had asked him to convey their views on the present situation to the Secretary. It was obvious that the situation was extremely uncertain and difficult. However, some relief had been felt in Government circles following de Gaulle’s press conference.¹ It has been somewhat reassuring that de Gaulle had indicated that he would not take over power by force. Pflimlin had told him (M. Alphand) that for the first time he felt that he might be able to resolve the situation.

M. Alphand stated that the French Government greatly appreciated the fact that the American Government had shown great circumspection in not commenting publicly on the French crisis.

The Ambassador said that Pflimlin’s first aim was to normalize relations between Paris and Algiers. Actually, there had never been a complete breakdown between the two. Even before Pflimlin was invested, Gaillard had received a call from General Massu in Algiers on May 13 saying that the mobs were breaking into the Ministry of Algiers and asking for instructions. Massu had asked Gaillard whether he should shoot on the mobs. Gaillard had said no, and these instructions had been subsequently confirmed by Pflimlin. However, the generals in Algiers then said that they had to canalize the situation and set up a Committee of Public Safety in order to try to keep matters under control. Following Pflimlin’s investiture, the Cabinet had proceeded to give General Salan² full powers. Moreover, Salan had recently sent his assistant to Paris, and General Lorillot³ would soon be going to Algiers for conversations with Salan. In response to the Secretary’s question, the Ambassador stated that General Ely had resigned as a result of the arrests of his two assistants. A stormy scene had ensued between Ely and Defense Minister Chevigne. M. Alphand stated that Pflimlin felt that he must get the military in Algiers under control extremely quickly or otherwise the movement in Algeria would grow and the possibility of de Gaulle’s return would increase.

M. Alphand stated that Pflimlin’s second aim was to take advantage of the current crisis in order to induce Parliament to revise the Constitution with a view to strengthening the executive powers and to setting up a federal republic. Algeria could then be made a federated state. It was curious in this connection, the Ambassador opined, that Pflimlin’s policies were much closer to de Gaulle’s than were the policies of Soustelle. De Gaulle was in favor of an association between France and Algeria. Soustelle and the generals in Algeria, on the other hand, were in favor of full integration of Algeria with France, but at the same time were insisting on de Gaulle’s return.

Pflimlin’s third aim, M. Alphand stated, was to prevent serious deterioration in France’s relations with Tunisia and Morocco. However, French forces in Tunisia had now been kept more or less prisoners for several months and there was considerable fear that with the slightest provocation there might be serious incidents. Should such occur, it might be impossible to keep the situation under control. The Ambassador stated that he understood that the United States Ambassadors in Tunis and Rabat were urging moderation on the respective governments. Pleven had told him to tell the Secretary that it would be most important if the United States could continue to urge moderation, particularly on Bourguiba. A serious incident had just occurred at Remada. Unfortunately it appeared that Bourguiba had ordered Tunisian troops to fire on the French.⁴ General Gambiez⁵ was loyal to the Government and doing all he could, but the attitude of the colonels was less certain.

The Secretary stated that it would be almost a miracle if an incident involving Tunisia and Morocco could be avoided unless the situation in Algeria could soon be resolved. The Moroccan and Tunisian Ambassadors had called on him a few days earlier. The Secretary said that they were as worried as we were about the present situation.

The Secretary noted that M. Soustelle had just asked publicly for United States support. This action was rather amusing coming from a person such as Soustelle. The Ambassador said he was not aware of this and pointed out that Soustelle was not even a member of the Algiers Committee of Public Safety.

M. Alphand stated that the situation in France itself was calm; there were no strikes; there was great public support for Pflimlin. The latter would endeavor to capitalize on this situation in order to revise the Constitution.

The Secretary agreed that if this were done it would represent a great step forward. Otherwise there would probably be a repetition of the present unstable situation with no telling what the outcome might be. The present alternatives of a “Popular Front” or De Gaulle would then be posed again.

The Ambassador stated that it was to be hoped that both would be avoided. Obviously nobody could tell what might happen now—certainly de Gaulle had a great following. Nevertheless, there were some favorable signs, such as the recent fraternization between the French and the Moslems in Algeria. The Secretary interjected that reports we had received indicated that these demonstrations were somewhat artificial.

The Ambassador stated that should de Gaulle come back to power, NATO would be safe, but de Gaulle would certainly be opposed to European integration. And this was curious, he said, because in the talks he had had with the General in Algiers during the War, de Gaulle had indicated that he favored European integration. The Secretary agreed saying that during a long conversation he had had with de Gaulle in 1947, the latter had indicated that he was rather in favor of steps to integrate Western Europe.

In conclusion M. Alphand asked if he could report to Foreign Minister Pleven that the Secretary would continue to urge moderation on the Moroccan and particularly the Tunisian Governments in the present crisis. The Secretary agreed and said that he would accordingly call in the Moroccan and Tunisian Ambassadors.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.00/5–2158. Confidential. Drafted by Looram.
1. De Gaulle held a press conference in Paris on May 19 on the conditions of his return to power. For text, see de Gaulle, Statements, pp. 1–6.
2. General Raoul Salan, French Army.
3. General Henri Lorillot, French Army.
4. In the May 18 incident at Remada, Tunisia, French troops took six Tunisian soldiers prisoner for a few hours.
5. General Fernand Charles Gambiez, French Army.