Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

69. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France⁰

November 18, 1958, 10:02 a.m.

1797. For Ambassador from Secretary. Re your memorandum November 7¹ you may convey following message verbally de Gaulle:

“President and Secretary both asked me convey their warm personal wishes.

President asked me say once again he hoped very much General would find it possible visit this country. As soon as General finds such visit possible, we could proceed arrange date suitable both President and himself.

Secretary further asked me state he was looking forward to tripartite conversations in Washington on General’s proposals.² Secretary emphasized he personally admired very much General’s courageous and imaginative leadership in working to resolve many difficult problems that had plagued France for so many years. It was his earnest hope that de Gaulle would succeed in building new and strong France that would resume its rightful place in world. Secretary said we had need of de Gaulle’s experience and vision in dealing with grave issues that confront West and it was thus his desire that we work closely together to this end. Any formalization of special relationships would be resented in world but this fact should not preclude evolution on ad hoc basis of closer cooperation.”

Dulles

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.13/11–1858. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Looram; cleared by McBride, Elbrick, Calhoun, and Minnich at the White House; and approved by Dulles.
1. In his November 7 memorandum to Dulles, Houghton outlined a proposed message that he might convey verbally to de Gaulle upon his return to Paris. The text was transmitted in Tedul 2 to Seattle, November 10. (Ibid., 751.11/11–1058)
2. In a telephone conversation with Murphy on November 8 at noon, Dulles said: “He thought all de Gaulle wanted was to crystallize the tripartite relationship. He tells us one thing; he tells others something else. He wants to dramatise before the world France’s gradual emergence as a third great power. Anything which will bring about this result, he will accept. If we ask him just what his program is, he will be hard put to come up with something.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)