358. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Prime Minister Macmillan’s Visit to Moscow
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- Mr. Herter
- Ambassador Whitney
- General Goodpaster
- Mr. Merchant
- The Prime Minister
- Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
- Sir Norman Brook
- Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar
- Sir Harold Caccia
- Mr. Bishop
The meeting opened with the President’s invitation to the Prime Minister to report his impressions of his journey to Moscow and his visits to Paris and Bonn. Mr. Macmillan said the Moscow visit fell into three distinct divisions: the honeymoon, the cold spell produced by the Khrushchev speech1 and his firm response, and the final resurrection of [Page 838] courtesy on the part of the Russians after the Prime Minister’s return to Moscow from Kiev and Leningrad. He said that he felt the great advance was in Khrushchev’s acknowledgment of the need to negotiate and settle disputes peacefully. Khrushchev he described as a mixture of Napoleon and Lord Beaverbrook. He is anxious to please, sensitive of his lower-class origin, and seeking equality in all things. He clearly wants to maintain the status quo and is a surprising admirer of Russia’s past and the achievements and policies of the great czars. Mr. Macmillan is satisfied that Khrushchev is the undisputed boss. All others watch even his expression to take the proper line. There is no doubt in the Prime Minister’s mind that no business can be done with the Russians except with Khrushchev.
Fundamentally he believes they want to maintain and consolidate the status quo. He thinks they are prepared to negotiate but from what they conceive to be a position of strength.
The Prime Minister found pride on the part of the Soviets in their economic achievements which are indeed great. However the West should not overrate these achievements for once one gets away from Moscow and Leningrad one is impressed with the backwardness of the economy, particularly in the agricultural field. For example, Mr. Macmillan visited one collective farm of 5000 acres on which 800 people were employed. In the UK the number of workers would be between 20 or 30 on a comparable farm. He saw few signs of police or guards. Khrushchev seems to move freely and mingle with crowds with no fear of his safety. In fact, Mr. Macmillan said that they seemed to be slipping into a “dictatorship by propaganda” rather than terror (at a later point the Prime Minister described Russia today as a “popular dictatorship”).
The problem therefore, said the Prime Minister, is to decide how to deal with the Russians. It is a psychological problem among other things and we should bear in mind their anxiety for respectability and general acceptance. Above all he is convinced that they desire to maintain the status quo.
The Prime Minister then called on Mr. Lloyd to describe their visit in greater detail.
Mr. Lloyd spoke of their arrival and the first dinner and evening meeting. Khrushchev apparently held forth at length on the necessity of facing facts and the necessity of both sides making the best of the present situation. He stated that there could be no thought of any “roll back.” He went on to say that Berlin, which he referred to as a “cancer” must be solved. It was behind Soviet lines and harbored more than two hundred Western espionage organizations. He said that the West Berliners could keep their form of life and that a free city status could be reinforced by [Page 839] token military forces of the four powers or by the UN or by a small neutral garrison.
Gromyko during the course of the evening discussed the nuclear test negotiations at some length. He took an extremely hard line on the issue of inspection which he characterized as in fact an intelligence operation. Macmillan told him that we would never accept a veto on the right of inspection. It was at this point apparently that the Prime Minister tossed out his suggestion of spot checks based on a ceiling for the number of such inspections which either party could make. Khrushchev expressed some interest in this which seemed to the Prime Minister more than polite although according to the Prime Minister’s and Lloyd’s account there was no later reversion by Khrushchev to the suggestion. There was then apparently some discussion of the “fourth country” problem to which the Soviets seemed sensitive and the Prime Minister emphasized the desirability of achieving a cut-off of production of weapons material. Khrushchev agreed to reconsider the Soviet position on this point.
On the question of the surprise attack conversations Khrushchev said that there was an extremely wide gap between the two sides and did not seem to give any indication of interest in narrowing it.
Lloyd said that he told the Russians that the West could not accept the denuclearization of Germany or the prohibition of the presence of foreign forces by invitation in Germany or any other discrimination against Germany. Apparently the Soviets did not press to any degree on the denuclearization of Germany.
Lloyd said that on Monday the talks continued and were largely devoted to questions of trade, past claims and related matters. Mikoyan, who was present, at one point asked for a 250 million pound credit for Soviet purchases. Khrushchev promptly interjected that they were not asking for a loan and that in fact to accept one would be doing a favor to British manufacturers.
The talk apparently then swung around again to the status quo and Khrushchev said that the Soviets would accept the two Germanys, one remaining in NATO and the other in the Warsaw Pact for a number of years. The emphasis again was on the maintenance of the status quo.
Mr. Lloyd said that on Tuesday the Prime Minister and party visited the atomic reactor station outside of Moscow and on their return found that Khrushchev had made his violent speech. Gromyko apparently accompanied the British party, and Lloyd reported that in private conversation with him the Soviet Foreign Minister had expressed an interest in the suggestion thrown out by the Prime Minister concerning a numerical limit on the number of spot checks which could be made under the nuclear testing suspension agreement. He asked Lloyd how [Page 840] many spot checks did he have in mind. Lloyd said that he replied “X” and refused to cite any figure. In the same conversation Gromyko also expressed curiosity as to the extent of the area which the British had in mind for a zone of reduced or limited forces and armaments. It was not clear to me what, if any, answer Lloyd had given Gromyko on this point. Gromyko also told Lloyd that the Soviets wanted a summit meeting followed by a foreign ministers meeting. Lloyd said that he recalled to Gromyko that this sequence had not proved successful in 1955. Summing up, Lloyd said it was the best talk he had ever had with Gromyko.
On the return of the British delegation to Moscow after Khrushchev’s speech, the Prime Minister spoke very plainly to Khrushchev (he was not clear as to whether this was at dinner or at the British Embassy reception that evening). In any event, the PM told Khrushchev that this was not the sort of behavior which was to be expected, that the British were not to be bullied on Berlin where the West had rights and obligations which it would maintain, and under no circumstances would the UK be divided from its allies. Khrushchev’s mood apparently was truculent, but the British had a feeling that he was conscious of possibly having gone too far. Nevertheless, the British were told, among other signs of Oriental displeasure, that Khrushchev had contracted a toothache which made it impossible for him to accompany Macmillan to Kiev as had been planned.
On the following day, Wednesday, the PM and his party got out of the elk hunt which had been planned. After luncheon the PM saw Khrushchev alone and had what the PM described as “a hard talk.” He warned Khrushchev that the Soviets and the West were apparently headed for a “collision.” Khrushchev was curt and cold.
On the following day there was another disagreeable interview with Khrushchev at the Kremlin. He referred to the British action in Suez in 1956 in thoroughly objectionable terms and went back to 1939 and accused the British of having collaborated with the Germans to egg the latter on to destroy Russia. Macmillan told him, among other things, that he had a curious conception of history. Khrushchev at this meeting confirmed that he and Mikoyan as well would not leave Moscow with the British party on their trip. Later that day the PM and his party left for Kiev and had no communication whatsoever with Khrushchev or Gromyko for 36 hours. During the trip Lloyd asked Kuznetsov, who was the highest ranking Soviet official accompanying them, “What are you trying to do?” and otherwise made plain to him the British displeasure of the treatment which Khrushchev had handed out to them in Moscow.
A day or so later there was a very civil message from Khrushchev reporting that his tooth was better and that Mikoyan would travel to Leningrad to meet the British party there. Gromyko, who also met them [Page 841] in Leningrad (as I understood it) gave to Lloyd (apparently on the Sunday) an advance copy of the Soviet note of March 2 and also a draft bilateral anti-aggression pact. My impression is that it contained only two substantive articles, the first being a mutual pledge not to resort to force, and the second requiring the closing down of all foreign bases on British soil. At Leningrad the PM also received a message from Khrushchev saying that he wanted to have a talk with the PM on Monday and that on reflection he considered that his speech earlier in the week had been “ill-timed.” The same message, however, went on to say that in his view the Western rights in Berlin had lapsed.
On Monday in Moscow there were lengthy talks with Khrushchev who conducted himself in a civil and reasonable manner. During the course of these talks he assured the Prime Minister that May 27 meant nothing, that it had not been intended as an ultimatum and would not be adhered to as a deadline if talks were getting under way. He said that the Soviets did not expect the UK to accord the GDR de jure recognition but rather de facto recognition which he said rather vaguely might be achieved through a third party. Khrushchev showed a definite desire for negotiation. That evening the Prime Minister gave his TV speech which the British estimated reached about five million people all in the general area of Moscow since it was not relayed nationally.
On Tuesday the Prime Minister again saw Khrushchev but briefly and alone. Lloyd did not report what was discussed. Gromyko and Lloyd then agreed without difficulty on the communiqué with the Soviets showing considerable accommodation, and the whole process requiring only 50 minutes. The British party left Moscow that afternoon.
In summarizing his impressions, Lloyd said that he found the Soviets a curious mixture of sensitivity and conceit. He feels that they have very big internal problems; that they want to reduce their defense budget which is so large as to be a burden on their economic effort; and that they do not want war.
The President inquired whether they had been allowed to go wherever they wanted to on their trip. Macmillan replied that the British had laid out their own itinerary and that no difficulty was made over their choice.
- Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Merchant. The meeting was held in the Aspen Lodge. Separate memoranda of this conversation were prepared; see Documents 359–360. Other memoranda covering Macmillan’s visits to Moscow, Paris, and Bonn and the reply to the Soviet note are in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Another record of this conversation prepared by Andrew J. Goodpaster, March 23, is ibid., Staff Secretary Rec-ords.↩
- On February 24, while Macmillan toured other areas of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev made a speech in Moscow in which he reiterated his call for a Summit conference and proposed that the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union sign a 20-year nonaggression pact.↩