350. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Foreign Secretary Lloyd’s Visit
PARTICIPANTS
- United States
- The President
- Secretary of State Dulles
- G. Frederick Reinhardt
- United Kingdom
- Foreign Secretary Lloyd
- Lord Hood, British Minister
The Secretary reported on the progress of his conversations with Mr. Lloyd.
United Nations—The Secretary said he and Mr. Lloyd had agreed that the United Kingdom and Jordan should make a statement in the Security Council with respect to the British response to King Hussein’s request for military assistance but they hoped that it would not be necessary to table a resolution and thus avoid a debate with Egypt.
Propaganda to Arab Countries—There was a discussion of the problem of Arab mass opinion which had so obviously been captured by Nasser. The President observed that we had failed to develop good information and propaganda operations in the Arab countries and had not responded to all their requests for assistance to this end. It was, he said, essential that we be more skillful in identifying the interest of Arab [Page 820] nationalism with the free countries of the world and the western point of view. The Communists had taken over this concept of nationalism and we must do a better job in winning the minds of the Arab peoples.
The Secretary referred to our efforts to set up a large radio station in Cyprus but after two years this project was still far from complete. The President recalled that Ambassador Heath had told him there was a radio station all ready to go in Saudi Arabia if only King Saud’s agreement could be obtained. Mr. Lloyd said that there was a small British station at Skant which they were closing down for lack of funds and would be glad to have the U.S. take over. The Secretary said he would have Mr. Allen Dulles look into it.
Jordan—Mr. Lloyd said he had been asked by Mr. Macmillan to say how very grateful they were for U.S. support with respect to Jordan. The Secretary had given something to the press, we were to make a statement in the Security Council, and our experts were looking into the problem of logistical support. This was all to the good but the British Government would be particularly happy if the Jordanian exercise could be a truly joint operation. This would in effect make it a kind of deterrent. The President pointed out that we did not have the advantages of a parliamentary form of government and that our operation in the Mediterranean had been presented as being limited to Lebanon. We would surely stand shoulder to shoulder with the British but as in the Torch Operation there were occasions when it was well to have a division of effort. There was a brief discussion of the progress of the British troop movement into Amman, concerning which information was very meager, as well as regarding the plot against King Hussein. The Secretary reported that he had been called at 2 a.m. because the Israelis insisted that we support the British request for overflight commission. He had agreed to this but the timing has been very late.
Mr. Lloyd said the British were putting 2200 paratroopers into Amman and the Guards Brigade would be behind. They did not want to put in too many forces because of the supply problem which had to be carried out by air.
Persian Gulf—The Secretary reported that he had discussed with Mr. Lloyd the problems of the Persian Gulf and the western oil installations there. This matter would be studied by U.S.–U.K. experts, military and civil. It was Mr. Lloyd’s and his belief that subject to the report of the experts, these were positions that we should hold. The British had troops in Bahrein and an agreement with the Sheik of Kuwait for the defense of that area. We of course had no rights in Dhahran where the American installations were located. The Secretary reported that Ambassador Heath thought King Saud might welcome some military presence at the Dhahran airfield which he could use if necessary.
[Page 821]Iran and Turkey—The President believed that both the U.K. and the U.S. should be thinking how to increase the strength of Iran and Turkey. There was more morale in those countries than elsewhere in the Middle East. With respect to Iran, the President believed they should first get 12 divisions in good shape and then if possible perhaps add two more. These people, he said, tried to build up their military forces too fast and if they were permitted to do so, there was the danger that they would tear the heart out of their military establishment.
Jordan—At the end of the meeting Mr. Lloyd again raised with the President British hopes that there might be a U.S. participation in Jordan. The President gave him no encouragement but said that we would of course not permit the British to get into a jam there.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.4111/7–2358. Top Secret. Drafted by Reinhardt. The meeting was held at the White House.↩