Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

325. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

March 23, 1960, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Summit Meeting

[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 322.]

During his call on the Secretary, Foreign Minister Castiella inquired about the Summit Meeting.¹

The Secretary stated that there was no fixed agenda for the meeting. He said he expected the Russians to raise the German question in terms of separate peace treaties with the two Germanies. This, he stated, would put everything right back to where it was before the Geneva Conference.² The Secretary stated that he did not know how far the Russians would push on the Berlin question, but Chairman Khrushchev would find a solid Adenauer–de Gaulle front on the preservation of the status quo. Chancellor Adenauer, he added, was concerned about the forthcoming elections,³ as he felt Mayor Brandt would be his opponent, and therefore he was being more of a Berliner than the Berliners. The Secretary pointed out that this led to an inflexible attitude which made it very difficult for President Eisenhower. Noting that the President had made clear to Chancellor Adenauer that they were in full agreement on the principle of the freedom of Berlin, the Secretary stated that whether or not this subject would be discussed at the Summit was not fully agreed upon. He added that at the Camp David talks⁴ the President had told Chairman Khrushchev that the United States was willing to continue negotiations but not under any time limit ultimatum.⁵ While Khrushchev had withdrawn his ultimatum, the Secretary continued, it was not known whether he would revert to it.

With regard to disarmament, the Secretary stated that he did not know if this would come up at the Summit, as it would depend on the progress of the Geneva talks.

The Secretary then referred to the nuclear testing question and stated that we were now studying what sounded like a good suggestion from the Russians. The Russians recognized that it was not possible to detect small explosions but wanted a moratorium of indefinite duration. The United States, the Secretary emphasized, wanted adequate inspection as a matter of principle. If we were to agree to inadequate inspection, he added, our position in Geneva in the disarmament talks would be prejudiced. He pointed out that the British were anxious to reach quick agreement with the Russians and the latter were counting on this. The Secretary also noted that the Russians were concerned with the spread of information on nuclear arms. He stated that it was not known if the Russians were under pressure from Red China and the satellite countries to provide such information. The Secretary said that the French did not want to discuss this matter.

The Foreign Minister expressed his appreciation for the information which the Secretary had given him.

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Valliere and Van Reigersberg and approved in S on April 1. See also Documents 322–324 and 326.
1. Reference is to the preparations for a U.S.–Soviet summit meeting to be held in Geneva in May.
2. Reference is to the Geneva summit conference July 18–23, 1955.
3. West German Bundestag elections were held on September 17, 1961.
4. Reference is to the Camp David conversations between President Eisenhower and Chairman Khrushchev September 25–27, 1959.
5. In a note to the United States, January 10, 1959, the Soviet Union demanded the signing of a peace treaty with Germany or it would sign a separate one with East Germany.