323. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Latin American Developments and President Eisenhower’s Trip
[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 322.]
During his discussions with the Foreign Minister, the Secretary noted Spain’s special relations with Latin America, and said he would appreciate receiving the Foreign Minister’s impressions of developments in that area, particularly in Cuba.
The Foreign Minister stated that Spain’s friendly ties with all Latin American countries were well known. The situations in Cuba and Venezuela, he said, were of concern to Spain, especially Cuba. He stated that Spanish Communists were temperamentally more dynamic than other [Page 757] Communists and were, therefore, more dangerous. The U.S.S.R. had realized this, he continued, and was trying to send Spanish Communists to Latin America where the climate was more favorable for their work and where they might obtain results.
With regard to Cuba, the Foreign Minister stated that Spain had difficulties with Castro but was trying to keep relations normal. He pointed out that there was a large Spanish colony in Cuba and that Cuba has strong economic ties with Spain, since the latter was the largest consumer of Cuban tobacco. Therefore, he said, Spain had tried to show a great deal of patience and not to break off relations. Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister continued, Spain was worried about Cuban agitation. He added that many Spanish exiles in Cuba, both Communist and non-Communist who were also anti-American, were trying to cause trouble.
The Secretary stated that he was greatly interested in the Foreign Minister’s appraisal as the Cuban situation disturbed the US deeply because of its effects in other Latin American countries. He said it was made clear during President Eisenhower’s trip to Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay that there was little sympathy for Castro’s activities, such as the placing of Communists in many high government positions which was a tendency which appeared to be growing. However, the Secretary stated there was still a reluctance in those countries to criticize Castro as his “mystique” continued to be very strong. The few demonstrations, mostly by students and some labor elements, during the President’s trip were primarily pro-Castro rather than anti-American. The Secretary pointed out that Latin American countries were watching Cuban developments with great anxiety as Castro occupied a unique position and they feared internal Castro-type revolutions. The Secretary stated that the United States did not believe this was a propitious moment to bring the Cuban question before the Organization of American States. He added that continued patience was necessary as strong feelings existed on the principle of non-intervention, and a request for group action might be embarrassing to some countries. The Secretary also noted that, during the President’s trip, the feeling of the great majority of the people was of warmth, happiness and appreciation. They greeted the President not just from idle curiosity but to express a basic friendliness and latent good will, which impressed the local officials who had never seen such crowds before.
The Foreign Minister stated that the existing good relations between the United States and Spain had made a good impression on and was a good example to Latin America, and to Arab countries as well.
The Secretary thanked the Foreign Minister for his views and stated that he wished to add further comment on the President’s Latin American trip. There was no doubt, he said, that the Governments in the countries visited were under continuing political and social pressure to [Page 758] hasten internal developments, which worried them. This gave rise to questions for the United States, the Secretary continued, for if developments were not fast enough the United States would be blamed for not satisfying their needs., He pointed out that when the President of Brazil refused to cooperate with the International Monetary Fund on a stabilization program (which the Spanish were carrying out so successfully) he wanted United States approval for his decision, while Argentina, which was taking the opposite course and was involved in a stabilization program, also wanted United States endorsement. This posed a dilemma for the United States which was in danger of being charged with going too slowly in aiding Latin American countries. Actually, he stated, the United States had cooperated in establishing the new Inter-American Development Bank to assist Latin American economies.
The Foreign Minister replied that he and all Spaniards were happy that the President and Secretary had visited Latin America. He added that while this trip did not solve all problems the fact that concern with them was shown had a good effect, and in Spain’s opinion the trip had been a success. Sr. Castiella also noted that in his October 12 speech at Santiago de Compostela to all Latin American Chiefs of Mission in Spain, he pointed out to them, approvingly, that the United States was following very closely social and political changes in Latin America.
The Secretary referred to the Latin American economic setup and stated that many of those countries were dependent on a single crop. The fact that the United States, he continued, had been willing to enter the Coffee Agreement1 to maintain prices had impressed the Latin American countries, as it meant that American consumers had to pay a higher price for their coffee. With metals, such as copper and tin, it was more difficult to reach a similar agreement.
The Foreign Minister commented that stable prices were necessary for social and political stability, it being better to pay a little more now than to have to pay a great deal more in the future.
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Valliere and Van Reigersberg and approved in S on April 1. See also Documents 322 and 324–326.↩
- For text of the Final Act of the negotiations for the conclusion of a Latin American Coffee Agreement, signed at Washington, September 27, 1958, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 413–415.↩