Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

312. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Dillon to President Eisenhower⁰

June 4, 1959.

SUBJECT

• “Spain’s Coming Ordeal” an Article by Emmet Hughes in “Esquire Magazine”¹

With reference to your request for my comments,² I agree that Emmet Hughes’ article on Spain is most interesting and provocative. In it Hughes refers to some questions of fundamental significance of which we have been well aware and have had under study for some time. His arguments that our policy supports an unpopular regime in Spain are familiar, because they reflect the present “line” of the anti-Franco forces both in and outside Spain. We have very carefully weighed this charge against our national security objectives and in the context of the actual situation in Spain. We find no reason to recommend a change in the policy which you approved on May 14, 1957.³ The Operations Coordinating Board found this policy adequate on June 3, 1959, when it made its semiannual appraisal of the Operations Plan for and Policy on Spain.⁴

Emmet Hughes knows Spain well, and approaches his topic with evident sympathy. The problems he mentions are real and serious. As was indicated in the recent Report on Spain,⁵ there has been increasing unrest there. The discontent of the Spanish people is based, first, on their economic difficulties in a period of rapid industrialization and on their desire for an improvement in their standard of living; second, on weariness with the unchanging and restrictive political climate; and, third, on discontent with the rigid social structure of their country. As Mr. Hughes says, Spain is a land of paradox where hate and fear of Spaniards for their fellow Spaniards is widespread, where the individualistic character of the people promotes disunity, and where uncertainty about the future is universal. The problems pointed out by Mr. Hughes are not, as he acknowledges, the fault of one political regime. They are a historical reality, and are certain to plague any future ruler of Spain as they have plagued its past governments.

Unfortunately, this article is long on diagnosis but short on remedy. We do not know with certainty, any more than Mr. Hughes, what will come after Franco, or how the change will come about. We do know that, for the reasons outlined above, there is considerable opposition to General Franco. But, as Mr. Hughes states, a sizeable proportion of the Spanish people still prefer him to the unknown future. Potential political opposition is still fragmented and disorganized. As Mr. Hughes concludes, many things could happen in Spain, yet there are no simple answers to present dilemmas or future dangers, neither for the Spanish people, nor for the United States. He charges, and the Spanish opposition to Franco would agree, that by its presence and by its programs, the United States, in fact, interferes in Spain’s internal affairs, despite professions of respect for Spanish sovereignty.

Emmet Hughes is, of course, correct in this assumption. The United States acquired a more than passive interest in what was going on in Spain by signing the 1953 Defense Agreement. Since then, we have actively, although often indirectly, pursued policies that committed us in Spain’s internal affairs. Our use of Spanish bases as a part of our cold war deterrent to Soviet aggression has removed Spain from among the neutrals, shattered tradition, and placed it on our side. Our military assistance to Spain’s armed forces has been aiding them to develop a capability for defense of Spanish territory, and of the jointly used military facilities located thereon. It has also taught them United States’ concepts and use of NATO-type equipment. Our economic aid, which since 1951 has exceeded $1.1 billion in the form of grants, loans, and sales of surplus agricultural commodities in pesetas, has contributed to economic stability in Spain, promoted some economic growth in that country and more than compensated for the impact on Spain’s economy of our base construction program. As part of our contribution to the belated industrial revolution in Spain, the Development Loan Fund recently approved a $14.9 million project for the Spanish railways.⁶ To the same end, the Export-Import Bank has, in past years, made various equipment loans for the electrification of Spain and to develop transportation resources. We have, in this manner, and to a greater degree than most Spaniards are willing to realize or recognize, taken Spain out of the cocoon of isolationism in which it has been sheltered for generations. Our policies in Spain and for Spain have been the catalysts of its present evolution into the modern society of nations.

Yet we have been conscious of the danger of identifying United States’ programs, beyond the inevitable degree, with the continuance of General Franco and his regime. We have, therefore, sought to underline the benefits which the Spanish people as a whole, whatever their political beliefs, derive from American aid and the presence of our military forces among them. In this sense also, we have recognized the value of Spanish participation in international organizations. It is largely due to United States’ support that Spain was admitted to the United Nations in December 1955. We encouraged Spain’s joining the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and we look forward to the early admission of Spain as a full and equal member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, a step which we have steadfastly supported. We continue to back the admission of Spain to NATO, and are pleased to note increased support on the part of France, West Germany and the Benelux countries. However, we have been recently informed that Norway and Denmark continue to oppose Spanish membership. The purpose of all these efforts is to Europeanize Spain, and to establish and nurture as many bonds as possible between the Spanish people and the Western world. Breaking down Spain’s isolation will, we hope, give an impetus to the development of more democratic attitudes among its people, the majority of whom still appear to have understanding and good will for us. Many Spaniards would dispute the contention that the United States has become General Franco’s main support, and would point out that, on the contrary, the outside influences we have introduced contributed as much as anything to the growth of discontent and the increased desire for change. We believe that this Europeanization of Spain offers the best hope that the change, which seems inevitable sooner or later, will be evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

Emmet Hughes seems to recommend that we assume a more active role in forcing this change in Spain. His view disregards the part that Spain plays in our worldwide defensive strategy, and the fact that our policies towards that country are dictated, in a sense, by our security interests. We must also remember that Spanish history is replete with instances of violent reaction to foreign intervention. We have no reason to believe that an attempt on our part to force short-range change in Spain would not suffer a similar fate. Therefore, while we are alert to developments, we believe that our long-term interests in Spain are being best served by our present policies.

Douglas Dillon⁷

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 752.00/5–2059. Secret. Drafted by Sacksteder and cleared by McBride and White. Secretary of State Herter was attending the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting May 11–June 19.
1. The article was published in Esquire magazine, May 1959, pp. 91–94.
2. On May 20, Goodpaster wrote Dillon that President Eisenhower had read Hughes’ article, which he thought was “provocative and of considerable interest,” particularly since it stated that support of Franco was harmful to long-term U.S. interests. The President told Goodpaster that he wanted it analyzed. (Department of State, Central Files, 752.00/5–2059)
3. NSC 5710/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Spain,” May 14, 1957, was not declassified.
4. At its meeting on June 3, the OCB reviewed U.S. policy toward Spain and decided that no review of U.S. policy was necessary at that time. A copy of the notes for the meeting is in Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430; a copy of the Semi-Annual Appraisal of Operations Plan and Policy on Spain is Ibid.: Lot 60 D 661, Spain.
5. Reference is to the OCB “Report on Spain,” November 19, 1958, which reviewed U.S. policy toward Spain for the previous 6 months. A copy is Ibid.: Lot 62 D 430, Spain.
6. This was part of the $22.6 million U.S. Development Loan Fund Agreement signed at Madrid on June 4.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.