Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

301. Despatch From the Embassy in Norway to the Department of State ⁰

No. 52

Oslo, July 29, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Norway and U.S. Leadership

Summary—The events of the past few months and the role played in them by the United States Government have given rise to some uneasiness in Norway concerning United States leadership of the free world. Divergencies of views between the United States and Norway have appeared in other than the three areas where they have persisted for some time, namely, China, Spain in NATO, and shipping and maritime policy. The withholding of United States support from EFTA in the period of its formation, the timing of the U–2 flight, our handling of the shooting down, the collapse of the Summit¹ (though the U.S. is not blamed for it), the cancellation of President Eisenhower’s visits to the Soviet Union and Japan, and the curtailment of the importation of sugar from Cuba have all contributed to a questioning either of the wisdom of some of our policies or of our skill in carrying them out. At the same time the warmth of British-Norwegian relations glowed brightly during the recent official visit of the British Prime Minister to Norway. The Embassy recommend that we take measures which will renew confidence in United States leadership and contribute to the furtherance of our common goals. Among the actions recommended are the speedy conclusion of a bilateral agreement providing for a jointly financed ship building program for the Norwegian Navy,² closer contacts with Norwegian leaders, including the Chief of Government and the Head of State, and a continuation and development of consultation, particularly within the framework of NATO and the OEEC or OECD.

During the dramatic events of the past three months our Norwegian friends, who are rarely if ever reticent, have been outspoken, and they have been more critical than usual of our conduct of foreign affairs. A brief review of some of their criticism would appear to be in order. To date Norway has been one of our most friendly and understanding allies, and it would be unwise to ignore the Norwegian misgivings.

When I arrived in Norway three years ago there were really only three areas in which there was any serious and persistent divergence of views between the United States and Norway in the field of foreign policy. These were: China, Spain as a potential member of NATO, and United States shipping and maritime policy. In the past three years nothing has happened to reconcile the Norwegians to U.S. policy in these three matters.

A new area in which there has grown up in the past two years a serious conflict of policy between our two countries has centered around the United States position in regard to the European Common Market and the European Free Trade Association. Despite our persistent efforts the Norwegians have not understood why we gave such strong support to the EEC. They regarded it as dividing free Europe and therefore considered it as a hindrance to the unification of Europe, of which we had been such a firm supporter in the postwar years. Further, in view of our strong backing of the EEC they could not understand our coldness to the European Free Trade Association. Part of their complaint has been that the United States did not take the views of their friends into account. They cited as an example the omission from the report of the Group of Four³ of many the key ideas advanced by the Norwegians and those who thought like them, particularly in connection with the functions of the new OECD.

The Norwegians are also having doubts about our intention to undertake with them a jointly financed shipbuilding program for the Norwegian Navy similar to the one negotiated with Denmark in 1958.⁴ As soon as the Norwegians heard about the Danish program they came to us in November 1958 and asked about the possibility of a similar agreement. To date the Embassy has not been authorized to begin negotiations.

It is far more difficult to assess the impact of the events of the past two or three months on Norwegian attitudes than to point out areas of disagreement or frustration prior to that time. It is safe to say, however, that the U–2 affair reinforced Norwegian adherence to their base policy, [2 lines of source text not declassified].

The most direct and immediate adverse effect of the U–2 affair arose from the involuntary involvement of Norway. Mr. Lange informed the Storting on May 13 that after it had been ascertained that the pilot was bound for Bodo he called in the American Ambassador and protested.⁵ On May 30, 1960 he went further and again in the Storting stated that the Americans had confirmed that the destination of the plane was Bodo, although the Embassy has never received from the Department any evidence to substantiate this statement. The Norwegian Government has maintained firmly throughout that no permission to land at a Norwegian airfield had been requested or granted. The position of the Norwegian Government was, therefore, that the American Government was planning to use a Norwegian airfield without Norwegian consent, and a formal protest was lodged with the United States Government.

The intention of the United States to use Bodo as the termination of the flight is given credence by all, and so is Mr. Lange’s assurance that no permission had been requested or granted. There was an outcry from a small group that Norwegian territory was not completely controlled by Norway. Even within the government it was considered necessary to review and possibly tighten up the regulations governing the use of Norwegian airfields. The established Norwegian policy of non-provocation of the USSR was invoked by many and the wisdom of the base policy was widely proclaimed anew, by the Prime Minister, among others.

The threats to bomb Norwegian bases and Mr. Mikoyan’s attacks on Norwegian membership in NATO and on the United States were more than enough to make all Norwegians except the Communists, and a small group of ultra left wing members of the Labor Party, fully aware anew of the value of NATO to Norway. The Norwegians were not frightened by the threats, but at the same time, even among the supporters of NATO, the resistance stiffened to the use of Norwegian territory in connection with actions regarded as provocative by the Soviet Union. [2 lines of source text not declassified] At the same time, possibly somewhat paradoxically, there was widespread acceptance of the need for a strong defense, and the pressure for the reduction of the period of military service is expected to be less.

As far as the Norwegians are concerned, however, the U–2 had repercussions which to many were more serious than the exclusively Norwegian consequences discussed above. Norwegians, other than the Communists and possibly some of the left wing Orientering Group of the Labor Party, have not expressed the belief that the U–2 caused the collapse of the Summit. But it is widely held that the United States played into Khrushchev’s hand by giving him a better excuse than he himself could have devised for wrecking the Summit. This is important in two respects: First, many Norwegians blame the U.S. for the timing of the flight and giving Khrushchev an “out” and they do not consider this the farsighted, wise leadership they want us to exercise. Second, the Norwegian Government and Labor Party set great store by negotiations between East and West as the best road to the reduction of tension. Even though the Norwegians did not expect great results from a single Summit meeting, they watched hopefully the laborious progress of the Great Powers toward the Summit, and were sorely disappointed when it collapsed. Almost generally, Norwegians regarded what happened in Paris as a serious setback in East-West relations and a temporary end, at least, to the hope that a series of Summit meetings might eventually produce a sustained reduction of tension. Although Khrushchev bore the brunt of the blame, there were misgivings about the U.S. handling of affairs, although there was sympathy for and admiration of the President’s conduct in Paris under extremely difficult circumstances.

In the wake of the wreck of the Summit Mr. Macmillan and Lady Dorothy arrived in June for an official visit of four days. After Suez the British star, if it did not wane in Norway, had paled somewhat. But the shadow of Suez did not reach to 1960, and as reported by the Embassy, the glow of the warmth and sincerity of mutual admiration far surpassed that of the usual official visit. One could not document it, but one could sense the confidence in British leadership going up, just as confidence in American leadership was slipping, much to the sorrow of many Norwegians.

It was not an official statement, but it was a significant one, when, on the occasion of Mr. Macmillan’s address under the auspices of the Students’ Association, the President of the organization said that “in Norway Britain is regarded as the bulwark of the free world.” Prime Minister Gerhardsen said in one of his speeches during the Macmillan visit (recalling the early days of the occupation of Norway): “When tyranny’s dark night sank over Europe, it was from Britain that the only ray of light came.” After the war there were also very close relations between the British Labor Government and the Norwegian Labor Government. Even now with a Conservative government there is a great community of interest, and the position of the Norwegian Government on negotiations with the Soviets has been closer to Mr. Macmillan’s than to that of the United States. The Norwegians and the British have also worked closely together in EFTA, and they have both been disappointed by our policy in the matter of European unification. It was therefore not surprising for the Norwegian Prime Minister to say in his speech at the official dinner given by the Government for Mr. Macmillan that “I feel sure I speak for the great majority of my countrymen when I say that we have confidence in Britain’s skill as a leader and in the qualities and abilities of British statesmen. We have, therefore, a feeling of security in the company of Britain.”

We should not be over-sensitive and read into the Prime Minister’s speech a meaning that was not there, because two weeks later, during Mikoyan’s visit to Norway, both the Norwegian Prime Minister and Mr. Lange stoutly defended NATO and the United States. Particularly at the dinner at the Soviet Embassy on the evening before Mr. Mikoyan’s departure, Mr. Gerhardsen was extremely forthright in his defense of Norway’s membership in NATO and friendship with the United States.

As reported in the Embassy’s despatch No. 19 of July 15, 1960,⁶ Mr. Mikoyan’s reiteration of the threats against Norwegian airfields, his attacks on the United States, and his advocacy of Norway’s reversion to neutrality certainly did not achieve their obvious goal. They made the Norwegians in general firmer believers in NATO, and in the need for defense, and instead of driving a wedge between Norway and the United States, helped to draw us closer together. That, however, does not mean that Mr. Mikoyan dispelled the doubts which had arisen about American leadership. We must do that ourselves.

In our recent dealings with Cuba we have come in for some strong unofficial criticism. Our restraint in dealing with Castro in the first year and a half of his rule, in spite of severe provocation, won approval. On the other hand the cutting of the Cuban sugar quota, the pronouncement of the Standard Oil Company on the subject of tankers⁷ and other moves have been criticized, sometimes in very sharp terms. Mr. Lange himself in a private conversation remarked that Norwegians almost automatically have a certain sympathy for the “little fellow”.

The misgivings about the wisdom of some of our policies or the way in which we seek to carry them out have not deterred the Norwegian Government from continuing to give us valuable cooperation. The most recent example which can be cited was in the case of the RB47.⁸ Even before the debate in the Security Council with Mr. Lodge’s account of the shooting down of the plane over international waters in the Barents Sea and the Soviets’ two vetoes preventing any investigation, the Norwegians did not hesitate to run risks in our behalf. At the same time the Norwegian Government was firm in its insistence on the non-involvement of Norway in the flight of the RB47 itself.

Conclusion—From the foregoing review it can readily be seen that there is no crisis in Norwegian-American relations. What is involved is something more subtle. It is rather an uneasiness about the U.S. capability to lead the free world in these crucial times. Confidence in the United States or lack of it is reflected in Norwegian political life in a number of ways, but possibly the most significant one was called to my attention by Mr. Lange shortly after my arrival. In one of our long conversations on a number of subjects, he observed that the strength of neutralism in Norway varies in inverse ratio to confidence in American leadership and the wisdom of U.S. foreign policy. One Labor Member of the Storting very succinctly summed up the views of many Norwegians as follows: “We desperately want American leadership, we do not want to be told what to do, but we want the United States to follow policies we can support.”

There are many things which the United States Government might do which would help to restore or renew the Norwegians’ confidence in us and our leadership. A few specific suggestions are enumerated in the following paragraphs.

In the field of bilateral Norwegian-American relations the most important and most immediate contribution we could make would be to proceed speedily to the negotiation of a mutually advantageous jointly financed ship building program for the Norwegian Navy. We should seek opportunities for contact between leaders of the Labor Party, especially the Prime Minister, and civilian leaders in the United States Government. We should consider an early opportunity after the visit of the King and Queen of Denmark to the United States⁹ to extend, with sufficient advance notice, an invitation to the King of Norway for an official visit to the United States.

In the broader field of multilateral relations we should seek, especially in NATO and in the OECD, to develop the process of consultation. This is something to which the Norwegians attach great importance, and they have been pleased with the progress made in NATO in this field since the report of the “Three Wise Men” of which Mr. Lange was one.¹⁰ They fully recognize the imperative need for a large power to take fast action at times. On the other hand, as a small nation and a member of NATO they want, particularly in matters which affect the alliance, to be consulted, not merely informed after a decision is made or action taken. Although the OECD is a much looser organization, they may also measure its worth partly by the degree of real consultation achieved in it.

In this presentation of the Norwegian reaction to recent events and the criticism of our role in them, no attempt has been made to describe the broad measure of agreement between us in numerous fields. This fact should be borne in mind in order to avoid a distorted evaluation of the state of relations between our two countries, which have been, and I hope will continue to be, excellent.

Frances E. Willis

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.00/7–2960. Confidential.
1. Reference is to the downing of a U.S. high altitude reconnaissance plane (U–2) over the Soviet Union on May 1 and the collapse of the summit conference at Paris on May 18.
2. This recommendation was implemented in an exchange of notes at Oslo on November 29. For text of the agreement, see 12 UST 101.
3. Reference is to the Report of the Group of Four (United States, United Kingdom, France, and Greece), April 19, 1960, recommending, inter alia, a new organization to replace the OEEC.
4. Presumably a reference to the shipbuilding agreement between Denmark and the United States effected by an exchange of notes at Copenhagen on May 8, 1959. For text, see 10 UST 939.
5. Willis reported Lange’s protest in telegram 963 from Oslo, May 13, and transmitted the translated text. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.40B/5–1360)
6. Despatch 19 from Oslo transmitted a 3–1/2-page evaluation of Mikoyan’s visit to Norway in June. (Ibid., 033.6157/7–1560)
7. Reference is to the sharp reduction in the Cuban sugar quota ordered by President Eisenhower on July 5 and Standard Oil Company’s threat to blacklist any tanker owners or brokers who carried Russian oil to Cuba.
8. Reference is to the shooting down of a U.S. RB–47 airplane over the Barents Sea on July 11.
9. See Document 302.
10. Reference is to the Report of the “Three Wise Men,” approved by the North Atlantic Council on December 13, 1956, concerning cooperation within NATO in non-military fields.