Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

30. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State ⁰

Paris, June 30, 1958, 7 p.m.

6275. Ref Deptel 4934.¹ No precise information is available on position de Gaulle plans to take on IRBM and atomic stockpile questions and probably will not be available before meeting.

De Rose of Foreign Office stated week ago to Embassy officer that his office has prepared factual briefs for de Gaulle on present status IRBM and stockpile negotiations. De Rose also said de Gaulle would undoubtedly wish have thorough-going discussion of IRBM and stockpile questions, along with “central question of nuclear cooperation. De Rose added that Foreign Office in dark as to what position de Gaulle would take and gave impression he very likely will keep his views to himself until meeting.

De Rose stated today that de Gaulle had met last Saturday with officials responsible for nuclear, IRBM, and stockpile matters. De Gaulle posed number of searching factual questions and terminated hour-and-a-half interview by saying, “Thank you very much, gentlemen. I will read your briefs.” No clue given as to position he plans to take. De Rose reaffirmed that de Gaulle likely to keep his position to himself until Dulles meeting.

Meanwhile, below are our best estimates of possible lines de Gaulle may take.

(1) IRBM’s (a) De Gaulle can be expected to try to maximize French role in control and command over IRBM squadrons for France. He will probably seek an agreement which is as close as possible to the US–UK bilateral, thereby trying to minimize or eliminate SACEUR’s role. (Thurston is sending separate message on specific proposals on control made by General Ely to Norstad just before French political crisis began last April.² This may be put forward again.)

(b) De Gaulle may also seek to link military nuclear cooperation as quid pro quo for French agreement on introduction of IRBM’s.

(2) NATO atomic stockpile, (a) De Gaulle may propose that France have greater voice in the decision to use nuclear weapons. This may apply not only to nuclear weapons which may be located in France (in which France already has a voice through April 1954 exchange of letters³ and would continue to have a voice in any new arrangements in this field) but more generally to nuclear weapons located in the NATO area. Proposal may be for establishment of some sort of US–UK–French “political standing group” for making basic decision on use of nuclear weapons for NATO. In his recent talk with Norstad, for example, General de Gaulle referred to desire of France to participate in “world nuclear plans”. He also spoke in this general vein to Jebb.

(b) De Gaulle may also propose eliminating U.S. custody and control features from NATO atomic stockpile as presently conceived and converting it into a stockpile in which NATO as an organization has custody and control, which was what the French originally had in mind when they first proposed the NATO atomic stockpile in May of 1957.⁴

Houghton

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/6–3058. Secret; Limited Distribution.
1. In telegram 4934 to Paris, June 26, Dulles requested the Embassy to send any information “discreetly” obtained from French Government sources on the position de Gaulle would likely take in his talks with Dulles on U.S. assistance to the French nuclear weapons program, IRBMs, and the NATO stockpile. (Ibid., 611.51/6–2658)
2. In telegram 6277 from Paris, June 30, Thurston stated that Ely proposed to Norstad in writing on April 18 that the French military units equipped with IRBMs under the command of a French General be assigned to SACEUR under conditions stipulated in the NATO documents currently in effect. Thurston stated that Norstad did not make known his views to the French at the time, but should the proposal be renewed, Thurston said Norstad would be disposed to accept it provided there was clarification of NATO’s requirements for “operational control” over IRBM units. (Ibid., 611.51/6–3058)
3. Not further identified.
4. On May 2, 1957, at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting at Bonn, Pineau proposed that France be permitted to stockpile atomic weapons under NATO auspices. Regarding this meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. IV, pp. 167–169.