Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

299. Letter From the Ambassador to Sweden (Bonbright) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)⁰

Stockholm, October 13, 1959.

Dear Livie: As he was about to leave for the airport from our house last week, Secretary Benson told me that when he got home he was going to urge the President very strongly to visit a number of countries.¹ He seemed to be thinking mainly of such visits taking place on the President’s way home from Moscow next year,² although his thought was not limited to this timing. The countries which he mentioned to me were India, Yugoslavia, Finland and the Scandinavian countries, including Sweden. I did not have time to question the Secretary as to his reasons, but, with the possible exception of Finland where he seemed to have possible political benefits in mind, his recommendation about the rest of Scandinavia appeared to be based largely on the concept that they are nice countries, populated by nice people.

I naturally do not know how receptive the President will be to Mr. Benson’s suggestions, but, on the chance that the Department’s views may be sought in the relatively near future, I thought that I should perhaps lay before you informally some of the factors which will need to be taken into consideration with respect to a possible Presidential visit or stop-over in this country. For the sake of convenience, these have been put in the form of a memorandum which is enclosed. As you will see, it is not categorically affirmative or negative, although at the moment our thoughts here incline quite a bit more toward the latter.

I am taking the liberty of sending a copy of this to Foy Kohler, too.

All the best,

As ever,

James C.H. Bonbright ³

[Enclosure]

⁴

Memorandum by the Ambassador to Sweden (Bonbright)

Stockholm, October 13, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Considerations Bearing on a Possible Visit by the President to Sweden

1. Swedish practice as a general rule is not to issue official invitations to chiefs of state or heads of government except in the case of the neighboring Scandinavian countries. It is not felt, however, that this point would be overriding in the case of a possible visit by the President, especially in conjunction with a visit to several other countries. In such a case, his visit would presumably be more in the nature of a visit by a head of government than by a chief of state. In any case, exceptions to the general rule have been made in the past and doubtless will be made in the future.

2. Reaction is apt to be divided as between the people and the Government. With regard to the first, such a visit should be exceedingly popular and the welcome might provide an interesting contrast to that expected for Khrushchev.⁵ There is also the angle of Mrs. Eisenhower’s family background.⁶

3. From the Governmental point of view the reaction would be much more doubtful and restrained, and whatever they might say they would probably view a visit with mixed feelings. In any case, no significant change in Sweden’s basic international policies could be expected as a result of a visit to Sweden.

4. In Sweden these matters are judged largely on the basis of reciprocity which was the ostensible reason for the invitation to Khrushchev. Would a visit by the President raise the question of a return visit by Erlander or by the King? The first might be easy, the second might be difficult.

5. Such a visit would immediately reactivate the question of the Khrushchev invitation which the Swedes would like to allow to remain dormant at least until after the election in September 1960. They would probably prefer never again to take the initiative with regard to Khrushchev in view of the manner in which his visit was postponed and the attendant domestic political row. However, with their policy of balancing every action as between the East and the West, a visit by the President might impel them against their will to make an important gesture towards the Russians, either by renewing the invitation to Khrushchev or in some other way.

6. The question arises as to what effect it would have in Sweden if the President were to visit the other Scandinavian countries and not come here. Since they have chosen to remain aloof from NATO it would do no harm and it might be even salutary for the President to visit Copenhagen and Oslo and skip Stockholm. It would be much more difficult to do this if he were to include Helsinki with Oslo and Copenhagen. On the other hand, a visit to Finland alone, presumably en route to or from the USSR, would not in our view necessitate a visit to Sweden as well. Further, if the President were to visit solely NATO members, it would be embarrassing to the Swedes if he were to visit Sweden also.

7. One way of going about it would be to avoid taking any initiative with the Swedes (as we presumably would do with the others) and at the same time find some way to let them know that a visit to the others is contemplated. In this event they could either remain silent and be bypassed, or they could themselves take the initiative to be included.

8. Although it may not be for us here to point out, it does seem that there are a number of other countries, e.g. Italy, where a visit by the President could be expected to pay much larger dividends than in Sweden.

9. Finally, while we cannot and do not want to intervene in domestic affairs, there is an election coming up in Sweden next year and it is at least questionable whether it would be a good thing to hand to the Social Democratic Party as a present the prestige which they might obtain from a visit by the President and possibly a return visit by the Swedish Prime Minister. This is particularly true during a period when there is a serious debate on Swedish foreign policy going on, in which the policy of at least one of the opposition parties is much more specifically based on collaboration with the West than is that of the party in power. Also, it would be difficult for the President to avoid making statements [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Sweden’s spirit of neutrality [1 line of source text not declassified] might be encouraged as a result of the visit. This would be particularly true if Sweden were singled out for a visit in any way that might be comparable to a previous or subsequent visit to India.

10. The timing of a visit to Sweden would present some difficulty. The winter months from mid-November to mid-February are usually unfavorable from the standpoint of weather. A visit in the spring or summer, when the weather should be more pleasant and when the countryside is more attractive, might run into the campaign for the Swedish national elections which will be held in September 1960.⁷

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files. 711.11–EI/10–1359. Confidential; Official–Informal. Attached to a letter of transmittal, also dated October 13, from Bonbright to Kohler.
1. Secretary of Agriculture Benson visited Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, Berlin, Finland, and Scandinavia September 23–October 9.
2. Following Khrushchev’s visit to the United States in September, President Eisenhower planned to visit the Soviet Union in 1960. The failure of the summit conference in May resulted in Khrushchev’s withdrawing the invitation.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
4. Secret.
5. On February 25, 1959, the Prime Ministers of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden invited Khrushchev to visit their countries. After an initial positive response, the Soviet Government on July 19 informed them that the visit would be postponed. Khrushchev subsequently visited Scandinavia in 1964. A report on the postponement of the visit, OIR 8052, July 24, 1959, is in Department of State, INR Files.
6. One pair of Mamie Eisenhower’s grandparents were from Sweden.
7. President Eisenhower did not visit Scandinavia during his term in office.