Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

288. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Lisbon, May 19, 1960, 6:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summit; Sixes and Sevens; Africa

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The President¹
  • Colonel Vernon Walters
• Portugal
  • Prime Minister Salazar
  • General Luis Pina

After the usual amenities, the Prime Minister asked what the President thought of his reception.

The President said that it had been splendid and was really very pleasant after the disappointments at Paris.² By that he did not mean the French people, who had been very hospitable and friendly, but Mr. Khrushchev.

Dr. Salazar asked for the President’s opinion concerning the reasons why Khrushchev had broken up the Summit Conference.

The President said that something had evidently happened at some point where Khrushchev had decided not to hold the Summit Conference, as only a week before, his Ambassadors in both Paris and London had seen the respective Chiefs of Government to discuss arrangements for the Summit Meeting. General de Gaulle had expressed doubts to the Soviet Ambassador that the USSR really wanted a conference, and the Soviet Ambassador had replied that the Soviet Union did indeed want a Summit meeting and that he was sure it would be fruitful. Therefore, at some time subsequent to this, Khrushchev had evidently decided against holding a Summit meeting. We could only speculate as to the reasons. It might well be that he had yielded to pressure from the old Stalinist groups or the armed forces.

Dr. Salazar wondered why he had come all the way to Paris to impose such impossible conditions. He could easily have done this from Moscow.

The President said that General de Gaulle had asked Khrushchev why he had done this, and the Soviet Premier had given no satisfactory answer. The President believed that he could probably have made more of a propaganda issue by doing it from Moscow with an exchange of notes, etc.

Dr. Salazar asked the President what could be expected now.

The President replied that there would probably be further harassment by the Soviets of Berlin, and they might stir up trouble elsewhere by pressuring the Chinese Communists to create trouble in Southeast Asia or in the Formosa area. Khrushchev had indicated that he did not want to negotiate with the President. The President said that he felt that the meeting in Paris had not been a complete failure, that the unity of the West was greater than ever, and that General de Gaulle and Mr. Macmillan had made this quite plain to Mr. Khrushchev.

Dr. Salazar then referred to the Common Market countries and the Outer Seven, pointing out that the Outer Seven countries were at that time holding a meeting in Lisbon. He said that the countries of the Outer Seven were not seeking to divide Europe into two camps, but rather to see if some means could not be found to bring them all closer together in economic cooperation, though not necessarily political integration. He said that this was the essential difference between the two groups. The countries of the Common Market were cooperating economically with the purpose of achieving eventual political integration, whereas the countries of the Outer Seven were working together economically without aiming at political integration. He knew that this political integration was very dear to the Americans, but he felt that this was a long way off, perhaps not in their lifetime. Mr. Dillon had recently made a speech in which he had praised the six countries of the Common Market.³ When the United States praised one of the two groups, it necessarily made things more difficult for the other.

The President said that the United States was in favor of the efforts of the countries of the Common Market to work together economically and politically. Likewise, he was in favor of the efforts of the Outer Seven to collaborate economically. He was actually in favor of the Thirteen, hoping that some way would be found to compose their difficulties. He referred back to the beginnings of these efforts, when he had been Supreme Commander at SHAPE, and of the support he had given to the idea of closer unity between the nations of Europe. He cited the historic example of the United States, where in the early stages of our history there had been great differences between the individual states, and the only way to solve them had been by union. He was, however, a realist, and he knew that there were obstacles and difficulties to similar action in Europe. Nevertheless, he felt that if the nations of Europe could constitute a great political-economic complex to stand with the United States facing the great political and economic complex of the Soviet Bloc, this would make the West even stronger.

Dr. Salazar then said that the Portuguese were extremely concerned with the situation in Africa. They felt that a great Communist effort was being made to move into this area. The Communists were already present through their representation in Morocco and Guinea. They would attempt also to move into some of the newly independent nations that were being set up. Portugal was watching with alarm the creation of a multitude of new independent nations in which a small elite ran the country and the illiterate masses were really not ready for self-government.

The President said that this wave of nationalism probably began during the First World War and had been rolling on since. In these underdeveloped areas the ideal of nationalism seemed to be the only ideal that could stand up to the appeal of communism, and the important thing was to swing this nationalistic feeling to the side of the West. He felt that the greatest problem facing the civilized developed nations of the West was the problem of helping peoples of these areas towards a better way of life. He had given much thought as to how this could best be done—perhaps by an association of free nations running across the world, including Japan, with a council to undertake studies, to make an inventory of the resources and requirements of these areas, and then to see how best the highly developed nations could help. Not all could make a financial contribution, but all could contribute with something, perhaps teachers, doctors, engineers. The essential thing was to convince these peoples that standing with the West offered them the best opportunity to improve their way of life.

Dr. Salazar expressed fear that these nationalist forces would join with communism. As they became independent, these nations opened their gates not only to the West, but also to the countries of the Communist Bloc, enabling these countries to carry out propaganda operations in these countries.

The President said that the difficulty of holding these countries down by force was apparent. The French had to have 600,000 troops in Algeria merely to maintain order.

Dr. Salazar said that this was due to the fact that Morocco and Tunisia, which lay on either side of Algeria, were arming, supporting, helping, financing, and giving asylum to 25,000 or 30,000 rebels who were creating disorder in Algeria. His feeling was that the Western nations should bring pressure to these two countries to cease assisting the rebellion, which he felt would come to an end quickly if this Moroccan and Tunisian support were withdrawn. He felt that these small fragmentary countries that were being set up were not economically viable and that this weakness constituted a danger.

The President smiled and said that this was why Western Europe should give these countries a good example by working together towards much greater unity.

Dr. Salazar said that he realized the President had a dinner engagement, but he did want to say how pleased he was that the President had gone through with his trip to Portugal despite his trip to Paris, and this had given the Portuguese people a chance to show how they felt about the President and the United States.

The President thanked the Prime Minister for his kind words and spoke also of the close friendship between Portugal and the United States. He spoke also of the great changes for the better he had seen in Portugal since his last visit nine years previously.

Dr. Salazar and General Pina then took leave of the President.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1682. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Walters and approved by Goodpaster on May 24. The meeting was held at the Queluz Palace in Lisbon.
1. In November 1959 when the White House was preparing for President Eisenhower’s good will tour, it was decided that he should visit Spain rather than Portugal. Portuguese officials, however, expressed their desire that he pay a subsequent call to Lisbon. In February 1960, the White House agreed that he would stop in Portugal on his return from the summit meeting at Paris in May. The President arrived at Lisbon at 10 a.m. on May 19 and departed the next day at the same time. Documentation on the preparations for the visit and on the President’s stay in Portugal is ibid., Central File 711.11—EI, and ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1680–1682.
2. Reference is to the collapse of the summit conference on May 17.
3. Presumably reference is to Dillon’s address to the annual New Jersey Business Conference, May 12. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 30, 1960, pp. 855–858.