Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

27. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) to Secretary of State Dulles⁰

June 26, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Scope of Your Meeting with de Gaulle

I believe that the primary purpose of your forthcoming talks with de Gaulle should be to establish a personal contact which would serve as an important basis for U.S. relations with France under the de Gaulle regime. de Gaulle’s anti-American disposition and his mystical nationalism will not facilitate U.S.-French relations. A personal relationship with yourself should serve to dispel some of his misconceptions and instill greater confidence in U.S. leadership.

It is a one-man government—all important decisions will be made by de Gaulle. For that reason it would be important to probe his thinking and intentions and at the same time to get across our own views. Over the past twelve years de Gaulle has given much thought to France’s basic problems and to the principal issues outstanding in the world and, therefore, he has definite views on these issues. But it is doubtful that he is fully informed on all aspects of recent developments. As a result his thinking may be in ferment as he is being brought up to date. (He will also be greatly preoccupied with Algeria.) Despite his autocratic temperament, de Gaulle is subject to influence. This meeting should, therefore, provide a unique opportunity to convince the man who will govern France for the next two years as to the validity of our policies.

Under the circumstances, it would be desirable for your meeting to be as informal and intimate as is possible with a person like de Gaulle. It should consist of a wide exchange of views on world problems with no fixed agenda and no decisions. During the conversations, de Gaulle will expect you to set forth your opinions very frankly on issues which are of paramount importance to the United States. On the other hand, he may be suspicious of any indication that the U.S. is trying to pressure him to align his policies with ours or that the U.S. is interfering in matters which he considers of more direct interest to France, such as North Africa and European integration. We should accordingly concentrate on issues which are of fundamental concern to U.S. security and on issues where he may be susceptible to influence. Much of the initiative in the discussion should, on the other hand, be left to de Gaulle.

It is suggested that after the initial exchange of courtesies and your reference to your earlier meeting with de Gaulle, you might wish to extend him the President’s greetings and state that he looks forward to meeting with de Gaulle. However, in view of the President’s heavy schedule and de Gaulle’s own preoccupations in France, such an early meeting was not feasible and the President hoped that in his behalf, you might have full and frank exchange of views on issues of interest to France and the United States. If de Gaulle is in agreement, you might wish to lead off with your estimate of Soviet capabilities and world strategy—both short and long-term—and how they should best be met. de Gaulle’s views on the specific questions of summitry, disarmament, European security, etc. are not known. While his views on East-West matters have reportedly changed very much since 1944 and he is generally considered to be pretty sound now on these issues, he is nevertheless unpredictable. Anybody who considers that he alone can save his country may someday decide that he is the only one who can save the world. His old concept of France serving as the “bridge” between East and West may not be entirely extinct.

The primary difficulty you should expect to encounter in your talks centers on de Gaulle’s determination to have France become the fourth nuclear power. Inherent in this issue are de Gaulle’s two basic concerns: one, that France regain her stature as a world power and two, that she be treated by the U.S. on a basis not less favorable than that accorded the U.K. For this reason a generally negative response would risk having an adverse effect on the course of the talks and to some degree on de Gaulle’s future attitude toward the U.S. On the other hand, de Gaulle would resent an apparent lack of frankness on our part. What will be particularly difficult to explain is why we will not provide France with the same nuclear information we intend to supply the British once the French explode a bomb, which may not be far off. In this connection, the question of France resuming her place in the “three power club” will probably be uppermost in de Gaulle’s mind, but he may not broach the subject directly.

Another possible source of contention may arise in discussions on the Middle East in general and Lebanon in particular. Given his background, de Gaulle will be especially suspicious of any attempts by the U.S. and U.K. to exclude France from the Middle East.

North Africa will reportedly not be raised by de Gaulle, but rather by Couve, so it is not anticipated that this will be a contentious issue at this juncture—it may become one later on, for de Gaulle will consider that NATO should be an alliance not merely covering the NATO geographical area, but to apply to all issues in various parts of the world where NATO members’ interests are involved. But if the subject of North Africa does arise, this would provide a good opportunity to hit hard again on French rumors that we are trying to displace France from North Africa, take over the Saharan oil, etc.

On the Far East, de Gaulle’s views on Communist China are not known. The recent hardening of the Soviet line and the possibility of Communist China’s contribution to these developments may be a salutary influence on de Gaulle. However, given the existing sentiment in France, U.K.’s recognition and de Gaulle’s desire to maintain Socialist support, de Gaulle may be tempted to recognize Communist China.

Submitted herewith is a list of the topics that may arise during your talks and that indicate the general course of the discussion, as far as can be anticipated at this juncture.¹

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.11/6–2658. Confidential. Drafted by Looram and initialed by Elbrick, Calhoun, and Murphy. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “Sec saw.”
1. Not printed. The list of topics included East-West relations, Near East, North Africa, Far East, and contingency topics.