Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

25. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State⁰

Paris, June 20, 1958, 5 p.m.

6074. Deptel 4744.¹ We have no firm indications of de Gaulle’s thinking on possible summit conference and issues which might be discussed there. Laloy, who was present at meeting with de Gaulle last week when summit matters were discussed briefly, said he had following impressions of his views:

1. De Gaulle exhibited no particular reaction one way or other concerning idea of summit meeting. He did not seem to feel that it was pressing matter, but he did not appear opposed to it in principle.

2. Firmest point which emerged was importance which de Gaulle attaches to nuclear question. He not only insists on link between cessation of tests and of fabrication of weapons, but goes further in making quite explicit his view that France should have its own atomic bomb. According to Laloy, de Gaulle will resolutely oppose any agreement with Soviets which would have effect of shutting France out of “nuclear club”.

3. De Gaulle did not discuss in any detail problems of German reunification and European security. However, Laloy thought he detected interest on de Gaulle’s part in some kind of European security arrangement “which might help the Poles.” There was no talk of Rapacki plan² as such, but Laloy believes de Gaulle may be interested in using it as base of discussion. Laloy hopes, however, that de Gaulle can be persuaded that from strictly military point of view, entirely apart from political aspects, Rapacki plan is dangerous. Laloy also has impression that de Gaulle might be willing consider security arrangement which would be based on status quo (i.e. divided Germany). In this regard Laloy suggested that de Gaulle might be fairly close to British thinking, and added that lack of firmness on Adenauer’s part concerning German reunification would not be helpful in persuading de Gaulle to take different line. (Embtel 5759).³

4. Question of non-aggression pact with Soviets was raised at meeting, but de Gaulle evinced no special interest in it. He said that such pacts did not mean very much and that it was something which could be considered later.

5. De Gaulle gave no sign of thinking in terms of making spectacular gesture toward USSR or of breaking sharply with established Western positions. Laloy added, however, that de Gaulle will want his letters to Khrushchev to have “distinctive flavor” (Embtel 5972),⁴ although this did not mean they would do violence to agreed concepts.

Laloy said that draft reply to Khrushchev’s last letter⁵ is now before de Gaulle, and that he expects discussion of this letter in next few days will elicit more definite views from de Gaulle concerning summit; Laloy regretted he did not have anything more precise to give us at moment, but emphasized truth of matter is that de Gaulle has simply not had opportunity to give close study as yet to East-West problems. This is reason behind French request for postponement of Working Group on German Reunification (Embtel 6027).⁶ In preparing for Macmillan and Dulles visits,⁷ Laloy expects de Gaulle will “work into” summit problems and that in process his views will become clearer.

Department repeat as desired.

Houghton

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.00/6–2058. Confidential.
1. Telegram 4744 to Paris, June 17, requested any evidence the Embassy had on de Gaulle’s views on a possible summit meeting. (Ibid., 396.1/6–1758)
2. The Rapacki Plan, first proposed by the Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly on October 2, 1957, called for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and the German Federal Republic. The U.S. reply of May 3 rejected the plan as “too limited in scope to reduce the danger of nuclear war or provide a dependable basis for the security of Europe.” For texts of the Polish note of February 14 and the U.S. reply of May 3, see Department of State Bulletin, May 19, 1958, pp. 821–823.
3. Not found.
4. Dated June 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/6–1658)
5. For text of Khrushchev’s letter of June 11 to the President in which he asked if the British and U.S. Governments really wanted a summit meeting and Eisenhower’s July 2 reply, see Department of State Bulletin, July 21, 1958, pp. 95–101.
6. Dated June 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6–1858)
7. For Macmillan’s account of his visit to Paris for talks with de Gaulle on June 29, see Riding the Storm, pp. 446–449. Regarding Dulles’ July 5 visit with de Gaulle, see Document 33.