Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

243. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

PSV/MC/2

September 30, 1959.

SEGNI VISIT

SUBJECT

• Disarmament

[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 242.]

Mr. Segni commented that the Italians know that the President is their friend. He then went on to inquire whether Khrushchev had discussed his disarmament plan¹ with the President?

The President replied that he had only told Khrushchev that we would study the plan and proposals he had made in the UN. He said there was no question but that Khrushchev thinks he has scored a propaganda victory with these proposals. However, beyond that he would repeat his conviction that Khrushchev wants a relaxation and easement.

Mr. Segni said he agreed. He felt that Khrushchev felt a need to give more satisfaction to the Soviet people. However, he said the Italians feel that Khrushchev would seek only atomic disarmament, leaving Europe open to and at the mercy of the huge Soviet conventional armed forces. Referring to the recently established Ten-Power disarmament group,² with which Italy is associated, he then inquired whether the US had any proposals which they contemplated submitting to this forum.

The President replied that about two months ago he had set up a special study group in the US Government under the Chairmanship of Mr. Coolidge.³ This group would review the whole course of the disarmament question since 1945, examine both Western and Soviet proposals and the reasons why they had been rejected. This group would seek to develop reasonable and fair proposals. The main difficulty in disarmament resided in our insistence on effective inspection, on the one side, and, on the other, Soviet efforts to evade effective inspection. If this question could be solved, then we would be on our way to effective disarmament.

Mr. Segni replied that he agreed with the President that inspection was essential. He added he thought that inspection arrangements should be linked step by step with actual disarmament measures. The President indicated his agreement with this statement. Mr. Segni then inquired whether Khrushchev had referred to any regional plans. The President indicated that he had not, but Secretary Herter said that Gromyko had asked whether the US had given any consideration to the proposal of a European zone of arms limitation and that he, the Secretary, had replied, “Only in connection with the proposed reunification of Germany.” Mr. Segni then resumed, saying that he considered it very dangerous if there should be any regional proposals which would have the effect of depriving the German Federal Republic of arms and thus open the way to an invasion of Europe.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1490. Secret. Drafted by Kohler and cleared by S and the White House on October 14. The meeting was held at the White House. See also Documents 242 and 244–247.
1. In a September 17 speech to the U.N. General Assembly, Khrushchev called for “general and complete disarmament” without outlining specific proposals for attaining this goal.
2. On September 7, a Ten-Power Committee on Disarmament was established by an agreement of the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and France. At an October 21 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, the five Western states on the committee issued a statement calling for an initial meeting of the committee on or about March 15, 1960.
3. On July 29, Eisenhower appointed Charles Allerton Coolidge, a Boston lawyer, to head an interagency study of comprehensive and partial arms control measures.