Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

240. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/123

Geneva, July 12, 1959, 4 p.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

Palais des Nations, Geneva, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • Secretary Herter
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Stoessel
• Italian
  • Foreign Minister Pella
  • Ambassador Straneo
  • Mr. Pansa

SUBJECT

• European Questions

After expressing appreciation for the Secretary’s courtesy in receiving him, Mr. Pella said he would like to begin his presentation by discussing certain matters which were not directly concerned with the Geneva Conference. In the first place, he thought it might be of interest to review the conversations recently held with President de Gaulle in Rome.¹ Mr. Pella said that, during these discussions, there had been no discussion of Algeria or a Mediterranean Pact. However, there were discussions under three general headings, which he thought it might be useful to comment on further. These headings were (a) European cooperation, (b) aid to underdeveloped countries, and (c) de Gaulle’s views on consultation among Western powers.

With regard to European cooperation, Mr. Pella said that the Italians had suggested that questions involving consultation between European powers should be put in the framework of the Six, rather than on a narrower basis of consultations limited to three or even two powers. Mr. Pella said that de Gaulle had readily accepted this Italian viewpoint on the condition that consultations among the Six would involve political cooperation and not political integration. Mr. Pella commented that this was in accord with de Gaulle’s views concerning a “Europe de patries”. However, Mr. Pella remarked, if one is realistic it must be recognized that political integration in Europe is impossible at present and that the only feasible prospect in the short term is political cooperation between the countries.

Mr. Pella said that the Italians had made clear in the de Gaulle conversations that, for them, cooperation between the European Six represented a point of departure which would contribute to cooperation on a broader basis in the future. He said that Italy does not believe that the Europe of Six should attempt to turn in on itself and constitute a closed bloc.

The Secretary inquired if NATO problems had been discussed with de Gaulle. Mr. Pella replied that NATO had been discussed in only the most general terms. It had been said that increased cooperation among the European Six could help in giving more vitality to NATO. Mr. Pella said that de Gaulle had not spoken of any desire on the part of France for primacy in the Alliance or in Europe, although Mr. Pella cautioned that absence of comments by de Gaulle on this subject did not mean that he did not have something of this kind in mind for its future. So far as the proposals for meetings among the Six were concerned, de Gaulle had agreed to the idea that the meetings should be held by rotation in each country. A small secretariat might be organized in connection with these meetings, and Mr. Pella thought that the secretariat might be located in Paris.

The Secretary inquired whether de Gaulle had spoken of the Common Market, Euratom, or the Coal and Steel Community, in the sense of wishing to do away with them. Mr. Pella answered negatively, although he said that, on the other hand, the Italians had not heard any “warm declarations” by de Gaulle concerning these institutions. Mr. Pella mentioned that, prior to the visit of Prime Minister Segni to Paris² to see de Gaulle, he had been worried about de Gaulle’s reported opposition to the European organizations. Since then, however, he has been reassured on this score, since his contacts in French circles have told him that de Gaulle has chosen a “European line”.

Mr. Pella asked if the Secretary shared the Italian views concerning the desirability of increasing the ties between the European Six. Mr. Pella said that he believed such cooperation has many advantages, including the negative one of making it more difficult for de Gaulle to push his ideas of closer association among a smaller number of countries.

The Secretary said that, before replying to Mr. Pella’s last point, he wished to revert for a moment to NATO matters. He said that he was very concerned about de Gaulle’s views on NATO and some of the actions he had taken recently, such as the decision concerning the French Mediterranean Fleet, the problem of the nine squadrons, etc. De Gaulle seemed to have a very nationalistic approach to military matters. This has been tried in earlier times, but it is completely outmoded and inefficient in the present situation. The Secretary said that, if de Gaulle carried his views to the extreme, this would encourage the tendency in the U.S. to think that we should get our troops out of Europe.

Mr. Pella commented that the Italians also were worried about de Gaulle’s actions on the fleet, the problem of the squadrons, and France’s desire for a kind of directorate. He said that the Italians opposed certain aspects of de Gaulle’s policies and that they had tried to make this clear by maintaining “opportune silences” at various stages in the Rome conversations. However, the Italians believe that their idea of closer cooperation among the Six may be useful in countering de Gaulle’s views, especially since some of the smaller countries will then be able to express directly to the French their feelings opposing some aspects of French policy.

The Secretary then referred to Mr. Pella’s inquiry concerning our views regarding increased cooperation among the Six. He said that the U.S. had always believed that any movement toward greater integration in the economic or political field in Europe, whether on a small or large scale, is a desirable thing. It adds strength to the smaller nations who are encouraged to act together and thereby to strengthen the whole. Mr. Pella was gratified to hear these views from the Secretary, which he said confirmed information previously received concerning the U.S. position from Ambassador Brosio.

Mr. Pella went on to say that the Italians desire above all, in connection with the proposal for closer cooperation among the Six, to avoid offending London. He stressed Italian friendship with the U.K. and said that Italy wants the framework of cooperation with the U.K. to be as large as possible. Mr. Pella stated that, in contacts in Paris and Bonn, the Italians have consistently expressed the view that it is undesirable to stimulate a division between the U.K. and the Continent. Of course, he remarked, this carries the implication that the U.K. itself understands the desirability of cooperation with Europe. This, however, is not too clear as yet, he added.

Turning to the subject of aid to underdeveloped countries, Mr. Pella said that the formula adopted in Rome had been a very general one, although the idea was to help primarily the Middle East and certain countries of the Mediterranean. Mr. Pella remarked that the Italians do not believe it is possible to help the whole world. He thought it was advisable to support the concept of aiding countries without any discrimination on political or other grounds, particularly in order to prevent giving the Soviets a propaganda advantage. Mr. Pella also said that, while it is quite well for Europe to pledge support for an aid program, Italy realizes that, without the U.S. and without the support of such organizations as the World Bank or the Export-Import Bank, it is impossible to visualize large-scale enterprises.

The Secretary commented that, when French Finance Minister Pinay was in the U.S. in the spring, we had held a number of discussions with him concerning the de Gaulle aid program, which was not a very clear one. Pinay had agreed with us that, for the present, the best way of approaching the problem of aid to under-developed countries was through the establishment of a new fiduciary institution which would be attached to the World Bank. Pinay apparently hoped to persuade de Gaulle of this. The Secretary said that we see great difficulty with de Gaulle’s vague program which involves collaboration with the Soviets and which seems to be based on the idea that the West will win a propaganda victory through Soviet refusal to accept such a proposal.

Mr. Pella said the Italians see the same difficulties as we do with de Gaulle’s proposal and, therefore, they had refrained from exploring it further through experts. Although de Gaulle’s ideas are vague, the Italians have the general impression that the proposal would involve a Directing Committee, with dependent bodies which would concern themselves with financing, programming and execution of a multilateral aid program. Mr. Pella said there was some indication from the French that they would contemplate representation by the underdeveloped countries themselves in the administrative organization and direction of the program. Mr. Pella alluded in this connection to the possibility, which he said had been suggested by Mr. Black of the World Bank, that some of the petroleum producing countries in the underdeveloped area might contribute profits from their petroleum production to an aid program.

Mr. Pella said the Italians have no concrete proposals to make for an aid program, although the Italians would be in a position to submit such proposals for study within four to six weeks. He thought, however, that it was well to be cautious in making proposals in order not to raise too many illusions.

On the subject of de Gaulle’s views concerning Western consultations, Mr. Pella said that de Gaulle had made clear that, following a Summit meeting, or a decision not to hold a Summit meeting, a “new phase” would have opened in international affairs which would call for consultations between Western Powers. Mr. Pella stated that de Gaulle had not been more specific than this and that the Italians had felt the question was such a delicate one that they did not feel it was advisable to explore it further.

Mr. Pella concluded this portion of his presentation by saying that the Italians in general had received an excellent impression of de Gaulle and of his balanced approach to problems. De Gaulle had refrained from adopting any extreme positions and no difficult polemics, which the Italians had feared might develop, took place in the Rome discussions. The Italians found that de Gaulle was more relaxed and “easier” than they had expected.

The Secretary said he was interested to hear that the Mediterranean Pact idea had not been discussed in Rome. Many newspapers had indicated that this was the main subject of the conversations. Mr. Pella responded that the French press had launched this idea, but that de Gaulle had never raised it. Perhaps he had been impressed by the fact that, in earlier conversations with the King of Greece and the President of Turkey, the Italians had spoken favorably of a “Mediterranean spirit” but had carefully refrained from mentioning a Mediterranean Pact.

Mr. Pella said that, during the Rome discussions, there had been discussion of Spain. It was agreed by both parties that it was desirable for Spain to be drawn into greater cooperation with the European economy. In reply to a question from the Secretary, Mr. Pella stated that there had been no detailed discussion of Spain’s relationship to the OEEC, but the general idea seemed to be that, eventually, Spain should become a full member of this body. He thought this obviously would have to take place gradually, since it was difficult for Spain to accept some of the obligations involved. He asked if this corresponded to the U.S. position.

The Secretary responded affirmatively, saying that we favored Spain in the OEEC if the other countries felt this was desirable. He understood, however, that there were certain technical difficulties involved in Spanish accession to the OEEC.

Mr. Pella then raised the problem of France and its attitudes toward the Alliance. He was inclined to be quite concerned and wondered what could be done about the problem. The Secretary said that the answers to some of the questions involved in this problem could only come after a meeting between Presidents Eisenhower and de Gaulle. Certain of these matters go very deep and it seems that no one of any lesser stature than the President will be able to have a satisfactory conversation with de Gaulle on these subjects. The Secretary said he hoped that the occasion would present itself soon for a meeting between de Gaulle and the President. He noted that it seems clear that de Gaulle will not come to the U.S.

After discussing other matters, Mr. Pella said that, in connection with matters concerning the Geneva Conference, he would hope to have a further discussion with the Secretary at some later date. He noted that it was difficult for Italy, and for him personally, to continue to press so insistently for a closer association of Italy with the Conference. However, this was something which related to political conditions in Italy and it could not be avoided. He said that this is a question which should be considered in human terms, that he represents a country of 50 million people who are running certain risks for the West. Therefore, he hoped the Secretary would forgive him if he said that Italian insistence on closer associations would not diminish in the future.

The Secretary said he had hoped that this problem would be less acute since the discussions in Geneva are now almost entirely on Berlin.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1341. Confidential. Drafted by Stoessel on July 13 and approved by Merchant and Herter. The meeting took place at the Villa Greta. Memoranda of the discussion of Algeria and Somalia (US/MC/124) and Israel and NATO (US/MC/125) are Ibid.
1. De Gaulle made a 5-day State visit to Rome beginning June 23.
2. Segni met with de Gaulle in Paris on March 20.