227. Editorial Note

On November 4, NIE 24–58, a National Intelligence Estimate entitled “The Political Outlook in Italy,” was issued. The conclusions of NIE 24–58 read as follows:

  • “1. The May elections in Italy demonstrated a trend toward the moderate left; a majority of the Italian people apparently demand social and economic reform, but wish to avoid radical solutions. Gains were made by the center and left groups of the Christian Democratic Party (CD) and by the faction within the Socialist Party (PSI) which seeks to reduce Socialist-Communist cooperation. The elections also made it clear that the CD will continue to dominate the Italian political scene, at least until the next elections which are scheduled for 1963. (Paras 9,27)
  • “2. The Communist Party (PCI) retained but did not increase its proportion of the popular vote. It dominates the largest labor federation and many cooperatives and local government administrations. The joint participation of the PSI with the PCI in labor and local governments makes it difficult for the PSI to make a complete break with the Communists. (Paras. 16–19)
  • “3. The outlook is favorable for a fairly lengthy tenure of office for the Fanfani government which is based on a coalition of the CD and the Social Democrats (PSDI). The government’s parliamentary position, however, is precarious. It does not have a majority and is subject to many pressures. For instance, there will be constant pressures for a merger of the two Socialist parties. While such a merger is not likely in the next year or so, pressures may become so great as to cause the PSDI to splinter or possibly to cause its leader Saragat to withdraw his party from the coalition, (Paras. 23, 25)
  • “4. Fanfani’s parliamentary position will be improved in the likely event that the Republican Party (PRI) agrees to support him or at least to abstain in confidence votes. Although the PSI will probably not agree officially to support Fanfani, some of its parliamentary delegation may abstain, if not vote in the affirmative, on some items of Fanfani’s program. (Paras. 23, 24)
  • “5. Fanfani’s principal problem will be the meeting of popular expectations of social and economic reform with the limited political and economic assets available to him. We believe that in the next few months, Fanfani will concentrate on less controversial programs, including school and low-cost housing construction and the expansion of social security benefits, in order to minimize the resistance of his more conservative supporters. The successful carrying out of these programs, which we believe likely, will strengthen his political position. The government will have greater difficulty in dealing with the pressing economic and social problems of southern Italy. Fanfani appears determined to make considerable efforts in this area, and if he fails to attract private capital, he will probably increase the scope of government action. (Paras 24, 32)
  • “6. Italy will continue to give strong support to NATO and European integration moves. It will probably seek a greater voice in European [Page 485] circles and pursue a more active foreign policy, particularly in the Mediterranean area. More importantly, however, Italy will seek to maintain its close ties with the US. (Paras. 34, 35, 37)” (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Italy 1958–60)