Office of the Historian

218. Memorandum of Conversation0

July 30, 1958, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Summit Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

  • Italy
    • Prime Minister Fanfani
    • Ambassador Manlio Brosio
    • Raimondo Manzini, Chief of Cabinet of Foreign Ministry
    • Egidio Ortona, Minister of Italian Embassy
  • United States
    • The Secretary
    • Under Secretary Herter
    • Under Secretary Dillon
    • Deputy Assistant Secretary Berry, NEA
    • Deputy Assistant Secretary Jandrey, EUR
    • Deputy Assistant Secretary Walmsley, IO
    • Deputy Assistant Secretary John N. Irwin, Defense Department
    • Mr. R.H. McBride, EUR:RA
    • Mr. R.M. Service, EUR:WE

Mr. Fanfani said that the French will insist on a different formula from that which the U.S. desires.1 It was his impression that the French were reluctant to set any fixed date for a Summit meeting or to have it within the Security Council framework. He said it was important to reconcile the French to having the meeting in the Security Council and he hoped that we were taking this line with the French. He said that although this was a French problem primarily he wished to call our attention to it.

2 Fanfani met with de Gaulle and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville in Paris on August 7–8.

The Secretary said that the French line of reasoning was different from ours. We reasoned that the Soviets had stated that there existed a threat to the peace and they alleged that armed aggression had taken place. We believed that the Security Council is the proper place to discuss such charges and that indeed the Security Council was intended for [Page 475] this very purpose. However, the Secretary continued the French position was also logical. They did not see the problem in the context of a threat to the peace but believed that the whole Middle East problem should be discussed calmly and quietly. Therefore such a meeting should not necessarily take place in the framework of the Security Council. Nevertheless, he concluded that the Soviets had stated that a threat to the peace existed and he therefore did not believe the French principle was valid.

The Prime Minister said that he had already stated his position to the French and that he believed their insistence on this position would ultimately harm NATO. He said he intended to see de Gaulle before August 10, and would repeat his statements.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 865.0077/7–3058. Secret. Drafted by Service and McBride. Separate memoranda of this conversation were prepared; see Documents 219–224. Memoranda concerning the conclusion of a U.S.-Italian consular convention, Czechoslovak propaganda in Italy, Italy’s candidacy for membership on the U.N. Security Council, and Italian plans to secure private loans and vocational training are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1067.↩
  2. Reference is to a U.S. proposal for a heads of government meeting at the United Nations to discuss the Middle East crisis of July 1958.↩