Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

216. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

July 29, 1958, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The Middle East Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Italy
  • Prime Minister Fanfani
  • Ambassador Manlio Brosio
  • Raimondo Manzini, Chief of Cabinet of Foreign Ministry
  • Mr. Egidio Ortona, Minister of Italian Embassy
• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary, IO
  • Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
  • Mr. Lampton Berry, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
  • Mr. John N. Irwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
  • Mr. Richard M. Service, EUR/WE

The Secretary welcomed Prime Minister Fanfani and said that he had looked forward to an opportunity to exchange views with the Prime Minister and to congratulate him on his success in the recent elections and on the formation of a new Italian Government. Thanking the Secretary, Mr. Fanfani said that he had looked forward to hearing from the Secretary’s own lips how he managed to carry on successfully such a heavy burden of work. Mr. Fanfani noted that the excellent relations which exist between the Italian Embassy and the Department are a guarantee of a high level of understanding between the two Governments, as are the relations which exist between his Government and the American Embassy in Rome. He said that all political parties in Italy felt that his present visit to the United States would prove fruitful. It was clear in Parliament that support which the Government enjoyed on major matters of foreign policy was much greater than any particular vote of confidence, such as that which established his Government. The Prime Minister pointed out that consultations of the type which brought him to Washington would convince all political elements in Italy, including the opposition, that relations between Italy and the United States are good.

The Secretary began with a discussion of the Middle East crisis, including a review of the events and the reasoning which brought about our decision to assist the Lebanese Government with the landing of American troops. In the first place, we had come into possession of in-controvertible proof of external support of the civil unrest in the Lebanon, largely from the UAR; we had reason to believe that the Soviet Union was also involved, although we did not possess evidence to prove this. It was a case of indirect aggression fomented from without and involving the expenditure of large amounts of money. [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Secondly, our action in the Lebanon had been in response to an appeal from a good friend. We responded because if we had turned a deaf ear and looked in another direction under such circumstances, there would have been doubt all over the world in the hearts of many nations, which would have wondered if we could be counted upon in a time of need. The impact of this doubt would have been very harmful. Thirdly, our assistance to the Government of Lebanon demonstrated that we are not afraid to act in the face of such a situation. The Soviet Union is relatively weaker at this time than it will be in a few years, since it has not built up an adequate fleet of long-range bombers, and its missile production is not yet adequate to produce a situation of strength equal to our own. Our action in the Lebanon was taken promptly, and perhaps without adequate consultation with our friends, because of the urgency induced by the overthrow of the Government in Iraq and by an imminent coup in Jordan.¹ We determined that it was necessary to act at once, realizing that the utility of our action would have been compromised had it been subject to any delay.

Regarding Jordan the Secretary told Mr. Fanfani that the British landed troops on their own initiative after consultation with us, and that we promised moral and logistic support. The Secretary stressed that the reasons for assistance to Jordan and the Lebanon were different; the Lebanon is not a wholly Arab country, about half of its population is Christian. It has highly-developed trade relations with the West and is a Middle Eastern air transport center. On the other hand, Jordan is [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] state created by the British and it is burdened by about half a million Palestinian Arab refugees. Collapse of the Government of Jordan could have grave consequences and could be the occasion for another Arab-Israeli outbreak; such hostilities under present conditions would be very difficult to keep under control. France has close relations with Israel, and it could be anticipated that the Soviet Union would furnish assistance to the Arabs in a struggle with Israel. Israel probably would seize the West Bank of the Jordan at the outbreak of hostilities, and the Arabs would fight. In brief, it was extremely important to prevent fighting in that area and it appeared certain that fighting would break out, involving Israel, if the Jordan Government collapsed.

Prime Minister Fanfani opened his remarks by stating that no one in Italy has any doubts regarding the necessity for our action in Lebanon. He said that the Italians asked themselves “what if intervention had not taken place?” The United States’ estimate of Soviet reaction had proven accurate and useful. Regarding conditions in Lebanon, Italians have the impression that President Chamoun and his associates have not always acted prudently, but the consequences of their actions nevertheless affect the little country’s Western friends, who could not permit Lebanon to fall. The Secretary’s analysis of the Jordanian situation was correct; the internal situation represents a balance between King Hussein and the Arab refugee problem. The situation is complicated by Jordan’s geographic position and the repercussions on nearby states, such as the Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Saudi Arabia. While a solution in the Lebanon is possible, it is hard to believe that Jordan can solve its problem as long as general Middle Eastern problems, including that of Israel, go unsolved. While British intervention in the Middle East was a necessity, it is harder to justify than the U.S. action in the Lebanon, which was not designed to favor any particular segment in that small country. [3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

The Prime Minister said that these recent developments had focused Italian attention on the Middle East. Italian public opinion might be divided into three segments: the extreme Right considers that recent Middle East developments reflect Soviet machinations; the extreme Left believes these developments are simply the result of Arab nationalist aspirations; the Government’s position is that there is today in the Middle East a tide of nationalism and independence in which various groups compete for control and in which the targets are primarily existing ruling groups in the Arab countries rather than foreign nations. Moscow propaganda contributes heavily to Arab unrest. Objectively the Middle East situation is a movement of the Arab world; expansionism is encouraged by the Communists, against a background of traditional Russian objectives of expansion toward the Mediterranean. Because of Italy’s geographic position relatively close to the Communist world and because of the large size of the Italian Communist Party, Italy cannot look with complacency on Soviet moves toward the Communization of the Mediterranean area. Italian interest in the Arab problem is therefore intensified by an awareness of the Soviet determination to expand Communist strength in these nearby areas. The Italian concern in the Arab problem reflects Italy’s hope that the Arabs will find the means for peaceful development and will be able to keep the Russians out.

Prime Minister Fanfani then offered his analysis of the five major aspects in the complicated Middle Eastern situation today. He broke down the Middle East problem into the Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Iraq, and the UAR.

1. Lebanon. This problem appears to be the simplest, and may be further broken down into three parts. First, the election of a new president is necessary. Second, the length of the stay of U.S. troops is a significant factor. Third, how is the territory and integrity of Lebanon to be insured in the long run? It is to be hoped that the election of a president will solve the internal problems of the country. One may be optimistic, as there are many factions in the opposition, largely the result of the importance of personal relationships among the Lebanese politicians. It is quite impracticable to approach these complex Middle Eastern political relationships, which become largely personal when they are judged by Western standards, and it will be a long time before greater political maturity develops. The Russians recognize and exploit these political situations and find individuals whom they can use skillfully to further Soviet aims. As a result, the West’s most generous policies of economic aid risk coming to naught; bribery of a key local official, either civilian or military, can turn almost any situation to Soviet advantage. For the West, a multiform approach is necessary and this will involve loans, technical assistance and other aid.

2. Jordan. Here the question is centered on the withdrawal of British troops; if it is difficult to find a formula for the withdrawal of American troops from Lebanon, it is much more so for the British to withdraw their troops from Jordan. [2 lines of source text not declassified] It is desirable that King Hussein renounce the Arab Union and all claims to Iraq. Jordan’s relations with Israel center on the problem of Palestinian refugees rather than the border problem. If the refugee problem could be solved, conditions in Jordan would generally improve. The British delude themselves when they say that a Summit meeting could deal only with the problems of Lebanon and Jordan; Israel inevitably is involved in the Jordan problem.

3. Israel. The basic problem here is to find a formula under which Israel can live at ease with the Arab world. Her principal frictions are with Jordan and Egypt. The Prime Minister’s personal impression was that there is some possibility that the situation may be brightening.

4. Iraq. The principal question is recognition of the new government. Assurances received by Mr. Fanfani from the Secretary during the luncheon at the White House on July 29 put his mind at rest regarding the attitude of the United States Government. As he had told the Secretary during the luncheon, he believed that recognition must take place before a Summit meeting. Iraq’s problems involve her relations with the West and her relations with the Arab world, and the new Iraqi leaders are divided over the country’s future relations with Nasser; they appear to be less divided over relations with the West. This problem of Iraq brings us to the heart of the Middle East situation, which is the problem of the UAR.

5. United Arab Republic. The UAR is the most expansionist government in all the Arab world. The heart of this problem is the UAR’s relationship, now and in the future, with the USSR. UAR leaders say that they want nothing to do with the Communist Party and sometimes they take steps against the Communists. Nevertheless, the UAR is increasing its contacts with the USSR. Fanfani feels that the visit of Nasser to Tito was out of pattern, particularly as Nasser chose an occasion when Tito’s relations with Moscow were at a low ebb. There are some who say that the purpose of Nasser’s sudden trip to Moscow after his visit with Tito was to urge Khrushchev not to intervene in the Middle East. In conclusion, Fanfani said that his observations on the Middle East situation indicate that the issues are confusing, but that all of the aspects of the Middle East problem are interrelated.

Prime Minister Fanfani said that the crux of the Middle East situation can best be illustrated by a series of questions. We must answer these questions if we are to deal effectively with the problems of the area.

1. How can the peaceful and fruitful development of the Arab nations be guaranteed in such a way that these nations will not be under Soviet domination and will be able to maintain friendship with the West?

2. Is it possible to work in the direction of Question One without an organic effort?

3. Can this objective be obtained through guarantees of neutrality for Arab countries by foreign states; if so by what states, by the United Nations or by groups of states? What is the position of the Soviet Union regarding neutrality guarantees? Is it enough to maintain peace through foreign guarantees or is it necessary to have non-aggression agreements among the Arab countries themselves?

4. To attain guarantees of neutrality and non-interference, is it not necessary to have an organic economic plan for the absorption of produce from these countries so that a degree of control can be exercised? Mutual collaboration among Western countries is necessary.

While the Prime Minister had no solution, the foregoing questions outlined the problems. With full recognition of the interests of other countries in the Middle Eastern area, the Italian Government will always be glad to cooperate. Italy is interested in Middle Eastern oil; whenever useful and proper examination of the policies of all Western oil companies could take place, Italy was ready to join in this examination.

The Secretary said that he would comment briefly on the five aspects of the Middle Eastern problem outlined by the Prime Minister.

1. Lebanon. If the Soviet Union had not vetoed recent resolutions in the United Nations Security Council there would have been an opportunity for strengthening UN ability to be of assistance to Lebanon, and the country might have been made a semi-permanent neutralized state under UN protection. Elections could have followed. This possibility was frustrated by the Soviet vetoes. We feel, and the Secretary General of the United Nations probably shares this view, that Lebanon should have special status, perhaps like that of Austria. This would have served to separate the Lebanon from Arab problems, and the UN presence would have contributed to this solution.

2. Jordan. As the Prime Minister had observed, the problem in Jordan is difficult. The country is Arab. The only reason for special status is to stabilize the Israel-Arab situation. We believe the United Kingdom is thinking along these lines. We do not know whether either the Lebanon or Jordan would accept neutralized status. We have no concrete plan at the moment for a solution of the Jordan problem; the United Kingdom is devoting much thought to this question.

3. Israel. We recognize that the Israeli-Arab problem is very important. Our greatest handicap in dealing with the Arabs is their belief that the West is responsible for the creation of Israel. Following our most recent discussions with the Israelis, we have come to the conclusion that neither the Israelis nor the Jordanians are anxious for a real settlement at this time. The United States cannot compete with Soviet offers to help the Arabs in their fight against the Israelis.

4. Iraq. The Secretary referred to his luncheon conversation with the Prime Minister and said that the three Asian members of the Baghdad Pact favor recognition of Iraq, perhaps by the end of the current week. He said that the meeting of the Baghdad Pact powers is continuing, and that a decision should be made on July 29. It is the preference of the United States that the three Asian members of the Baghdad Pact recognize the new Iraq Government first. It could be anticipated that the United States would accord recognition within twenty-four hours after announcement of such action.

The Secretary said that we fear Nasser will dominate the new Iraq Government, while there is some ostensible pro-West sentiment in the new Government, it is likely that real power clearly depends on Egypt and the USSR. In this connection, it is significant that Radio Moscow announced the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, whereas Baghdad has not said that this is so. There are elements in Iraq that are against Nasser, but we must bear in mind that Nasser wants control of oil properties. There will be those in Iraq who will not wish to divide oil profits with the UAR. It can be anticipated that the new Government of Iraq will wish to revise the oil agreement. But as long as the West can still buy from Iran and other oil-producing areas in the Middle East, drastic revision of the Iraqi oil agreement will not prove wise for the new Government. Iran discovered, when it nationalized its oil industry, that striking a bargain with the West was not easy. This was because the West was able to increase production in other areas in the Near East. At this time, Iraq will find it cannot enhance its revenues greatly.

Inevitably, there will be friction between the new Iraqi Government and with Iran and Egypt. It was demonstrated at the time of the Iranian oil nationalization that marketing facilities are the most important factors in oil production. The marketing organization is most intricate, and the cost of marketing is greater than that of producing oil. If Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran all go to the UAR, then the situation will of course be difficult.

5. The United Arab Republic. Nasser is a complex person; he is rational yet he is fanatical. He cannot retain power or satisfy his personal ambition without feeding on political victories. Some say that if economic development assistance had been sufficient Nasser would have been satisfied; they say that he would not have been forced into revolutionary channels. Nasser has achieved great popularity with the Arabs, but not because of authentic Arab nationalism; he made himself a hero in Arab eyes, with seizure of the Suez Canal Company and by his “victory” over the French, British and Israelis. This “victory” was due to the attitude of the United States. But now Nasser is a great political force in the Arab world, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Sudan, where a majority of the inhabitants are anti-Egyptian, is threatened through bribery and corruption. In the last chapter of his book Philosophy of the Revolution Nasser says that the Arab world is awaiting a hero; he believes that he is this hero. In the face of this situation he cannot abandon this role, and he is not interested in patient and orderly development of the economies of the countries in the Arab world. Nasser is like Hitler in many ways. While no two people are alike, it is the Secretary’s impression that Nasser can be reasonable—as could Adolph Hitler. This is a common trait of the two men. Nasser’s role in the Middle East raises difficult problems for which we see no easy solution. The United States cannot compete with Soviet tactics, which encourage Nasser to overthrow Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, and Israel. While we cannot feed Nasser’s ambition by encouraging him in these tactics, the Soviets can. Economic aid will not be a substitute in this situation. We had planned to assist Egypt with the Aswan Dam project; at the same time, the Soviets bribed Nasser with arms and appealed to his desire for adventure. Egypt’s role in the Aswan Dam project would have absorbed all of the country’s energies for a considerable period; if Nasser was sincere about this project, how could he justify building up a great army at the same time?

The Secretary suggested that Egypt is like a stream in flood. Such a stream cannot be blocked up entirely, but sand bags may be placed at the edges to slow down the spread of the flood. The flood will not last, and the apparent invincibility of the flood will be weakened. Sand bags now will help Lebanon and the Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia to maintain their independence. Economic aid will not dissuade Nasser from his present political schemes.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1067. Secret. Drafted by Service.
1. On July 14, a military coup led by Brigadier Abdul Karim Kassem overthrew the government of King Faisal of Iraq. King Hussein of Jordan appealed for military aid to the United Kingdom on July 16 alleging foreign efforts to topple his government. British troops arrived on July 17.